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The Cooperative as a Proletarian 
Corporation:  The Global Dimensions 
of Property Rights and the 
Organization of Economic Activity in 
Cuba  
By Larry Catá Backer* 
Abstract: Since the 1970s, the relationship between productive property, and the 
state and individual has been contested in Marxist-Leninist nations.  Though 
China has moved to permit robust private activity and the private aggregations 
of capital in corporate form, Cuba has strictly adhered to traditional communist 
principles.  In the face of recent financial upheavals, Cuba is seeking to 
liberalize its approach to economic organization, but in a way that would retain 
a state monopoly of the use of the corporate form while opening a small and 
well-managed consumer oriented private sector.  Among the most innovative 
alternatives being developed is the cooperative, which has the potential to 
develop into a useful form of what this Article calls a proletarian corporation.  
But innovation faces substantial hurdles.  This Article examines in Part II the 
context for the development of this new approach to cooperative organization.  
Part III then turns to a close study of the cooperative and its constraints, 
starting with a consideration of the agricultural cooperative as template for 
changes.  It then turns to a critical consideration of the development of a 
theoretical basis for changing the function and operation of cooperatives 
developed by Cuban intellectuals, and ends with an examination of the 
transposition of that theory into the guidelines for restructuring the Cuban 
economy (Lineamientos) adopted by the Cuban government, and then 
articulated through a regulatory framework.  Part IV then briefly considers the 
role of the cooperative in efforts to internationalize the Cuban economic model 
through vehicles such as the Alianza Bolivariana.  This Article concludes that 
while the cooperative fits nicely within Cuba’s efforts to develop a complex and 
well-integrated program of economic organization, its theoretical elegance 
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remains in tension with the realities of Cuban politics.  This tension increases 
the risk that cooperatives will be reduced to little more than a means of 
privatizing central planning. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cuba has been facing increasingly challenging economic problems 
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since the fall of the Soviet Union
1
 and the end of the Soviet system of state-
to-state based economic activity.
2
  In the absence of Soviet aid, and in the 
face of U.S. political and economic hostility,
3
 Cuba has sought new partners 
and allies.
4
  Cuba also has increasingly experimented with innovative ways 
of organizing economic activity that avoid reducing the paramount power of 
the State to own and control property, especially capital, but that also 
permit the aggregation of effort for mutual economic benefit.
5
  At the center 
 
 1  See Jorge Pérez-López, The Cuban Economic Crisis of the 1990s and the External 
Sector, 8 CUBA TRANSITION 386, 386 (1998), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume8/pdfs/41perez.pdf. 
 2  On the Soviet trade system, see Nicolas Spulber, The Soviet Block Foreign Trade 
System, 24 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 420 (1959).  Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and its trade system, some argued that the Soviet economic trade model mimicked, in one 
important respect, the exploitative traits of Western markets-based trade systems.  See David 
Ray, The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies, 
15(1) J. INTERAMERICAN & WORLD AFF. 7–10 (1973) (arguing that Soviet economic 
imperialism produces economic dependence within the Soviet system similar to that ascribed 
to capitalist states in their relationship with developing states); but see Guy J. Gilbert, 
Socialism and Dependency, 1 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 107 (1974). 
 3  See generally Daniel Hansen, Dayne Batten & Harrison Ealey, It’s Time for the U.S. to 
End Its Senseless Embargo of Cuba, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:36 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-
embargo-of-cuba/; see also Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/cuba/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013) ( news, reference, and archival information as well as 
photographs, graphics, audio, and visual files published on Cuba). 
 4  Among the most important partners are China, Venezuela and Brazil.  See Agence Fr. 
Presse [AFP], China Pledges Financial Aid to Cuba’s Castro, GOOGLE NEWS (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jp478hKoBt_VhSt_Fig-
sg5y7wsw?docId=CNG.729b36b74b4f8c4edaf9dedb0dadc5cb.401 (“China on Thursday 
pledged financial aid to Cuba as it undertakes historic economic reforms, promising visiting 
President Raul Castro a new credit line as well as help in health care and technology.”); Juan 
O. Tamayo, Raul Castro’s Long Trip to China Raises Questions About a Secret Stopover, 
MIAMI HERALD (July 5, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/05/2883487/raul-
castros-long-trip-to-china.html#storylink=cpy (“China is Cuba’s second or third-largest trade 
partner after Venezuela and neck-and-neck with Canada, with bilateral trade totaling $1.8 
billion in 2010. Beijing’s interests in Cuba and other parts of the Caribbean have been 
growing in recent years.”); see generally María Alejandra Calle, A Brief Note About the 
China-Latin American Trade Partnership: An Opportunity for Trade Diversification or a 
Threat to a Green Agenda in the Region?, 3 REVISTA DE NEGOCIOS INTERNACIONALES 57 
(2010), available at http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/rni/article/download/50/48; 
Daniel Erickson, Cuba, China, Venezuela, New Developments, 15 CUBA TRANSITION 410 
(2005), http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume15/pdfs/erikson.pdf; Jorge 
F. Pérez-López, Swimming Against the Tide: Implications for Cuba of Soviet and Eastern 
European Reforms in Foreign Economic Relations, 33 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD 
AFF. 81 (1991); Hernán Yánez, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: ‘Emancipatory Neo-
Bolivarismo’ or Totalitarian Expansion (Inst. for Cuban & Cuban Am. Studies, Occasional 
Paper No. 7, 2005), available at http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/7. 
 5  Larry Catá Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, 
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of this tension, Cuba faces issues of the role and character of property, 
along with the issue of how to divide the power to control and use property 
between the State and individuals.  This Article considers one of the most 
interesting innovations—the Cuban cooperative—both as a theoretical and 
practical solution to the peculiar political and economic problems of Cuba, 
as constrained by its own legal system, and as a vehicle of economic 
activity with application beyond the peculiarities of Cuba. 
In the West, notions of property are at the center of economic and 
political organization.
6
  The law-state—that complex of social, 
governmental, administrative, and economic organization
7
—is to a great 
extent grounded on the elaboration of rules and systems for the taxonomy 
and systemic protection of property.  This means creating systems for 
dividing things and ideas into manageable and negotiable bits, and then 
developing rules to govern transactions in these bits, along with rights to 
exploit these bits.
8
  Individuals can aggregate property for the production of 
private wealth; organized as corporations, this property assumes a double 
character.
9
  In one sense, corporations are understood as property that is 
represented, for example, by shares, which in turn constitute property in the 
hands of shareholders, giving each shareholder certain rights including 
control, income, and assets of the entity.  In another sense, corporations are 
also understood as autonomous entities with a governance architecture 
constructed and existing outside the direct control of the shareholders in 
whose collective interests the enterprise operates.  In this sense, as a 
government independent of investors, but operating to further investors’ 
interests, corporations resemble other institutions formed by communal 




Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 337 (2004); Raj Desai, Can Raúl Castro Revive Cuba’s Private Sector?, BROOKINGS 
POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), no. 165, Mar. 2008, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/03/cuba-desai. 
 6  For an excellent short discussion, see JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: 
PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7–31 (2006); UGO MATTEI, BASIC 
PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 39 
(2000). 
 7  See generally Larry Catá Backer, On the Tension between Public and Private 
Governance in the Emerging Transnational Legal Order: State Ideology and Corporation in 
Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders (Consortium for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper 
Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038103. 
 8   See, e.g., Index of Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND., 
http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (“The more certain 
the legal protection of property, the higher a country’s score; similarly, the greater the 
chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a country’s score.”). 
 9  Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999). 
 10  Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law—Government, Law and the Rule of Law in 
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character though, of course, with a more limited scope.
11
  As an entity, for 
example, corporations may acquire political rights under domestic law
12
 and 
at least some measure of responsibility under international law.
13
 
A very different picture emerges in Marxist-Leninist states.
14
  In such 
states, the means of production traditionally belong to the revolutionary 
elements of society organized within a structure of a democratic 
dictatorship awaiting the transition from socialism to pure Marxism.
15
  
Deeply embedded in these states is the distinction between property 
ownership and property use.
16
  Productive property
17
 is understood as 
inherently political in character—an instrument for the satisfaction of the 
 
Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2000). 
 11  See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2006); David 
Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004). 
 12  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 13  See Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable 
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations’ 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 
25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2012); Larry Catá Backer, Multinational 
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Multinational 
Corporations]. 
 14  See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 5–16 (1988) (offering 
a critical assessment of prominent property theories, from Marxist to libertarian theories); 
Barden N. Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People’s Republic of China: 
Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334, 334–35 (1978) (analyzing Chinese Marxist view 
towards intellectual property). 
 15  See, e.g., XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China), translated in Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited May 15, 2013) 
(“After the founding of the People’s Republic, the transition of Chinese society from a 
newly-democratic to a socialist society was effected step by step.  The socialist 
transformation of the private ownership of the means of production was completed, the 
system of exploitation of man by man eliminated, and the socialist system established.  The 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of 
workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been 
consolidated and developed.”). 
 16  “Indeed, since political power is in the hands of the working class, since this political 
power owns all the means of production, the only task, indeed, that remains for us is to 
organize the population in co-operative societies.”  VLADIMIR I. LENIN, On Co-Operation, in 
WHAT IS SOVIET POWER? 91 (1973). 
 17  “It is important to understand that Marx defines the word property in two senses, as 
personal property and as productive property . . . . By productive property, Marx means 
objects people owned privately which did produce social wealth, such as oil wells, coal 
mines or steel mills.”  GYÖRGY LUKÁCS, THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 8 (Dennis J. 
Schmidt ed., Susanne Bernhardt & Norman Levine trans., 1991). 
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needs of the people.  Conversely, productive property owned or controlled 
by individuals, especially where that ownership is not under state control or 
direction, could be understood as a challenge to the unity of the people and 
a political threat.  Vesting political or economic power in institutions 
through the aggregation of property in the hands of private individuals, such 
as the shareholders of a corporation, is viewed as a challenge.  Like the 
organization of political power, which is assumed to be necessarily centered 
on the state as the sole embodiment of collective power, the organization of 
economic power is understood to be centered on the state apparatus as the 
sole embodiment of economic power.  Corporations could be organized as a 
form for the aggregation of capital and be considered separate legal entities, 
but such enterprises remain instrumentalities of the state.
18
 
The relationship of property to the individual (the proletariat) and the 
state has been at the center of revolutions in Marxist-Leninist theory for the 
last generation.  But the last several decades have seen an ideological split 
about the relationship of the ownership of productive property to the state 
within the Marxist-Leninist community of states.  Led by changes in China 
that accelerated in the years after the late-1970s, China has abandoned the 
traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on productive property and the 
necessity of aggregating for the apparatus of the state all power to direct 
and manage productive assets and the people through which productivity is 
extracted.
19
  Central planning has been abandoned in favor of centralized 
control of key sectors and central direction of the rest, with control 
conforming generally to Marxist-Leninist principles as continuously 
developed within the Chinese Communist Party.  In effect, China has been 
moving from micro to macro management, with exceptions for key 
economic sectors.  Yet, as its critics argue, this is still a Marxist approach to 
property and its relationship to individuals and collective ownership.
20
  The 
process has not been without deep division within the Chinese Communist 
Party at times, as different groups advance distinct visions of the future 
 
 18  A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Relevance of Public International Law in Arbitrations 
concerning International Economic Developments, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 263, 281 (2005).  
Maniruzzaman notes: “As far as we are concerned here . . . it is quite likely that in most 
countries the separation between a State and a State enterprise as parties may be disregarded 
and the presence of the State itself through its State Enterprise can be attributed as such.”  Id. 
at 279. 
 19  See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL 
LEGAL CULTURE (David S.G. Goodman ed., 2001); Mathew S. Erie, China’s (Post-)Socialist 
Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of the Property Law on Illegal Land Takings, 
37 H.K.L.J. 919 (2007) (explaining the tension between reformers and orthodox Chinese 
Marxists). 
 20  See, e.g., Ryan Van Steenis, From Mao to Madison and Back: An Examination of 
China’s National Property Law and Its Diminished Potential, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
35, 58–63 (2009). 
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course of development of Marxist-Leninist economies.
21
 
Cuba, however, is an entirely different story.
22
  Under the leadership of 
Fidel Castro from 1959 to 2006, Cuba remained deeply committed to the 
central planning model.
23
  Though Cuba has been moving away from an old 
Soviet-style model under the leadership of Raúl Castro,
24
 it has retained 
both the state apparatus and communist party ideology to support the idea 
that substantially all control of significant economic activity must be 
directed, as a political matter, by party loyalties according to communist 
principles but as ordered directly through a large state bureaucracy.  
Productive property, for all intents and purposes, retains its direct 
connection to the state along with a strong commitment to the direct 
ownership and management role of the state in economic activity.
25
  In this 
respect, Cuba retains the strongest loyalty to the Soviet model of state 
organization, which all but disappeared after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union nearly half a generation ago.
26
  Though Cuba remains very much in 
 
 21  See generally JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA: POLITICAL 
CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DEBATE (Mark Selden ed., 1994). 
 22  See FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, Cuba’s Revolutions in Economy and Defense, in FIDEL 
CASTRO: SPEECHES 1984–85: WAR AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS 57, 57–81 (Michael Taber 
ed., Pathfinder Press 1st ed. 1985) (documenting Castro’s speech delivered December 28, 
1984 at the close of the seventh session of the National Assembly of People’s Power in 
Havana, Cuba). 
 23  Daniel P. Erikson, The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and 
Rewards, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 691, 694–95 (2004). 
 24  Some in the West have described this as a move away from Marxism toward 
capitalism.  See, e.g., Revolution in Retreat, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012, at S.3 (“Raúl 
Castro, who formally took over as Cuba’s president in February 2008 and as first secretary 
of the Communist Party in April 2011, is trying to revive the island’s moribund economy by 
transferring a substantial chunk of it from state to private hands, with profound social and 
political implications.”). 
 25  As one commentator notes: 
In communist countries, the state repealed or emasculated private law in 
employment relations, land ownership, antitrust, consumer products liability, and 
worker safety.  Once the legal impediments were removed, officials ruled by 
decree.  So, central planning is a way of making law as well as commodities.  
Central planning produced remarkably similar results in vastly different countries, 
such as Poland, Vietnam, and Cuba. Specifically, central planning emphasized 
economic growth through forced savings and expansion of the capital stock in 
heavy industry.  Everywhere, central planning failed to produce consumer goods in 
abundant quantity or high quality. 
Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
141, 146 (1996); cf. George Philip, The Political Economy of Development, 38 POL. STUD. 
485, 486 (1990). 
 26  Edward Yates, Central Planning Meets the Neighborhood: Land Use Law and 
Environmental Impact Assessment in Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2003) 
(discussing Cuba’s alignment with the former Soviet Union). 
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the Soviet orbit long after its center disappeared,
27
 Cuba’s ideological 




Yet, modern realities have produced a strong pull against this form of 
economic organization.
29
  Globalization has substantially changed the rules 
through which global production of goods is organized,
30
 though not 
without criticism.
31
  Liberalized trade regimes have made the movement of 
goods, capital, enterprises, and to some extent people, easier, while 
permitting local diversity that complements global tastes in variety.
32
  
Cuba’s poor economic performance and its difficulty in providing for its 
people has been exacerbated for many years by a state and administrative 
apparatus that seemed oblivious and jealous of its power
33
 and a U.S. policy 
of isolating Cuba from globalization.
34
 
Cuba has both recognized and resisted these realities.
35
  On the one 
hand, over the past decade Cuba has sought to internationalize a counter-
model to that offered by conventional globalization, forming for that 
purpose the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas) (ALBA).
36
  On the 
other hand, Cuba has also embarked on what was a potentially far-reaching 
project of internal self-reflection and change within the parameters of the 
 
 27  See Jorge Pérez López, Coveting Beijing, but Imitating Moscow: Cuba’s Economic 
Reforms in a Comparative Perspective, 5 CUBA TRANSITION 11, 11–20 (1995), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume5/pdfs/FILE04.pdf. 
 28  “In Castro’s ideal socialist world the worker identifies totally with the society, the 
state, and the means of production and covets complete harmony between his work and 
himself.”  SHELDON B. LISS, FIDEL!: CASTRO’S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 61 (1994). 
 29  Cf. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (discussing how 
the modern realities of globalization clash with local culture and efforts to preserve ancient 
traditions). 
 30  Cf. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004) (arguing that 
globalization has the capacity to be a powerful tool to further social goods). 
 31  See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JOSEPH 
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006). 
 32 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 393, 396–
97 (2006). 
 33  See generally SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA: 
CASTRO AND BEYOND (2006). 
 34  See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 §§ 
301–302, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–6082 (2006). 
 35  See, e.g., FIDEL CASTRO, La globalización neoliberal conduce al mundo al desastre 
[Neoliberal Globalization is Leading the World to Disaster], in DE SEATTLE AL 11 DE 
SEPTIEMBRE [FROM SEATTLE TO SEPTEMBER 11] 175, 175–79 (2002). 
 36  Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Alternative 
Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 679 
(2010). 
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current political structure of the Cuban state.
37
  This project produced a 
potentially far-ranging set of economic reforms, undertaken through the 
Cuban Communist Party (CCP), with the objective of establishing a new 
direction in CCP policy to be followed by changes to Cuban law through 
appropriate legislation undertaken by the Cuban government.
38
  The broad 
structures of economic reform policies were memorialized in a set of 
Guidelines, the  Lineamientos de la política económica y social del partido 
y la Revolución (Lineamientos),
39
 which were approved at the Sixth Party 
Congress in 2011.  Subsequently, these Guidelines were expected to be 




As a consequence, what has been emerging—especially since 2009 
and accelerating with the adoption of the Lineamientos—is what appears to 
be significant efforts by Cuba’s leaders to embark on a peculiarly Cuban 
version of economic experimentation.
41
  That experimentation has been 
 
 37  Heather E. Shreve, Note, Harmonization, but Not Homogenization: The Case for 
Cuban Autonomy in Globalizing Economic Reforms, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 365, 
378–81 (2012). 
 38  Lina Forero-Niño, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to Reform Cuba’s 
Economic Model and Develops an Implementation Strategy, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 761 
(2011); Marc Frank, In Cuba, Reforms Bring Cheers but also Jeers, REUTERS (July 13, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/13/us-cuba-reform-
idUSTRE76C4MF20110713. 
 39  LINEAMIENTOS DE LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO Y LA REVOLUCIÓN 
[GUIDELINES ON THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ECONOMY OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTION], 
VI CONGRESO DEL PARIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CUBA] (adopted Apr. 18, 2011) (Cuba) [hereinafter LINEAMIENTOS], available at 
http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/secciones/6to-congreso-
pcc/Folleto%20Lineamientos%20VI%20Cong.pdf (translation available at 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/documentos/2011/ing/l160711i.html); see also infra note 56 
and accompanying text for the state-apparatus implementing measures. 
 40  See Resolución sobre los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido 
y la Revolución [Resolution on the Guidelines on the Political and Social Economy and of 
the Party and the Revolution], CUBA DEBATE (Apr. 18, 2011), http:// 
www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2011/04/18/resolucion-sobre-los-lineamientos-de-la-politica-
economica-y-social-del-partido-y-la-revolucion/.  Among other things, the resolution 
adopting the Lineamientos suggested the creation of a governmental commission to 
implement and further the project of the Lineamientos.  The National Assembly then ratified 
the Lineamientos and committed to move them to implementation through appropriate law 
making.  See Archibald Ritter, El VI Congreso Del Partido Y Los Lineamientos: ¿Un Punto 
De Viraje Para Cuba? [The Sixth Congress of the Party and the Guidelines: A Turning Point 
for Cuba?] ESPACIO LAÏCAL SUPLEMENTO DIGITAL [LAY SPACE DIGITAL SUPPLEMENT], No. 
132, June 2011, http://espaciolaical.org/contens/esp/sd_132.pdf translated in CUBAN 
ECONOMY (June 17, 2011), http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2011/06/a-ritter-espacio-
laical-the-sixth-party-congress-and-%E2%80%9Clineamientos%E2%80%9D-a-turning-
point-for-cuba/. 
 41  See generally John Cairncross, Raúl’s Plan: Examining the 2010 Cuban Reform 
 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:527 (2013) 
536 
carefully circumscribed within the CCP’s sense of its Marxist-Leninist 
organizational principles.  Cuba continues to re-affirm its fundamental 
commitment to some of the ideals of Soviet state organization: strong and 
direct state ownership and control of the principal levers of economic 
activity and a deep suspicion of the allocation and aggregation of 
productive property in the hands of private individuals.  But some key 
factions within the CCP—the intellectuals that support it and state 
officials—are also trying to create spaces beyond a centrally-planned 
control economy, both in the state sector and within what is hoped to be an 
important (although small) non-state sector.
42
  Both are reflected in the 
thrust of the conceptual basis of ALBA and of the Lineamientos, and to 
some extent in the first tentative steps toward regulatory implementation. 
The resulting approach, being slowly and unevenly incorporated into 
the legal structures of Cuban economic regulation,
43
 is grounded in the 
division of economic activity regulation around four distinct spheres.  The 
first is public and centered on the reorganization of state-managed 
economic activity; the second is private and centered on the production and 
delivery of consumer goods and services; the third is national and centered 
on the development of an integrated economy grounded in direct and 
indirect state ownership and management; and the fourth is regional and 
centered on the development of state-to-state economic activity under the 
ALBA model.  Integrating these approaches requires a careful balancing of 
the logic of a centrally-planned and publicly-oriented Marxist-Leninist 
approach to economic control and the logic of the framework of a markets-
based system of economic globalization.  But that balancing produces the 
potential for an important contradiction.  At the heart of this contradiction is 
the tension between the norms and forms of economic globalization, 
grounded in the free movement of capital through market transactions, and 
the current conventional framework of Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist state 
organization, grounded in state control and management of economic 
activity. 
Some of the elements of this experimentation have been widely 
discussed and criticized
44
—from the efforts to produce a rigidly controlled 
 
Initiative, 21 CUBA TRANSITION 265 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/cairncross.pdf. 
 42  Stephen Wilkinson, Cuba Lay-offs Reveal Evolving Communism, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
14, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11302430. 
 43  See Manuel Barcia, Cuba’s Slow Path to the Future, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121883342630706.html. 
 44  For an excellent analysis of this economic experimentation, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, 
Will the VI Communist Party Congress Solve Cuba’s Economic and Social Problems?, 21 
CUBA TRANSITION 292 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/mesalago.pdf. 
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class of proprietorship businesses,
45
 to the limited and highly regulated 
efforts to open agricultural cultivation to farmers.
46
  The institutional forms 
in which economic development is to be undertaken are less developed.  
The Lineamientos strictly limited the availability of the corporate form to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and enterprises involving the state and 
foreigners.
47
  The rationale is that the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the 
state would be undermined if the corporate form were made available to 
individuals or others without the direct oversight of the CCP and operated 
as an instrumentality of the state apparatus.  That rationale, in turn, is 
founded on the idea that only the state may aggregate the ownership of 
property and that the corporate form, in effect, is a manifestation of political 
rather than economic or property power.  The foundational principle is that 
under Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist economic organization, only the people, 
organized through the state sector and directed by the CCP, can aggregate 
the means of production and engage in collective activities for social rather 
than individual profit.  To permit collective activities outside the state 
sector would be understood as a threat to the principal authority of the state 
and its apparatus as the vanguard of popular action.  For those brought up 
under Soviet Socialist theory, this approach sounds familiar.  However, it 
has, to some extent, been abandoned virtually everywhere outside of Cuba, 
at least in the form that the CCP seeks to preserve.
48
  In its place, other, 
more limited vehicles for aggregating productive activity in private ventures 
have been suggested. 
If corporations are prohibited as a means of engaging in private market 
based activities, and reducing private economic activity to prescribed 
 
 45  For an analysis from within Cuba by one of its most prominent independent 
economists, see Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Situación económica, política y social de Cuba 
[Economic, Political, and Social Development of Cuba], 21 CUBA TRANSITION  18 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/chepe.pdf. 
 46  See G. B. Hagelberg, If It Were Just the Marabú. . . Cuba’s Agriculture 2009–10, 20 
CUBA TRANSITION 32 (2010), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/hagelberg.pdf. 
 47  LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, at 11 (“En las Formas de gestión no estatales no se 
permitirá la concentración de la propiedad en personas jurídicas o naturales.”). 
 48  In China, for example, the government has developed a sophisticated regulatory 
framework for corporations, including enterprises owned by non-state parties and has sought 
to develop a socialist approach to the regulation of corporations and corporate governance 
that furthers the governing state ideology while permitting private access to the corporate 
form and the development of robust securities markets in the shares of such enterprises.  See, 
e.g., The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207344.htm.  For an example of Chinese 
corporate governance standards, see Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n & the State Econ. & Trade Comm’n, 
Jan. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf. 
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simple sole proprietorships may not produce the sort of positive economic 
growth necessary to avoid economic stagnation, then the question of finding 
an alternative form of economic activity that permits private aggregations of 
economic activity becomes critical to the forward movement of Cuban 
economic reforms, constrained by its governing ideology.  To be palatable, 
these vehicles cannot be understood as a means of aggregating capital for 
absent owners.  Instead, they must provide a basis for pooling labor or other 
direct contributions by the participants in the enterprise.  These 
aggregations of activity must permit the use of capital while remaining 
grounded in principles of participant control and operation.  And, for Cuba, 
they must be compatible with the organization of the national economy, 
within which only a small place is available for individual activity that must 
be licensed and controlled by the state. 
Among the most important of these alternatives are cooperatives.
49
  
The cooperative device is not new.  It has become an important element in 
the aggregation of efforts around the world.
50
  Since the 1990s, new models 
have emerged that “appear to be not only a reaction to the exogenous 
environmental influences of globalization, industrialization, consolidation, 
technological advances, institutional uniqueness of the country to legal 
environment, and overcapacity in the food sector but also to the intrafirm 
coordination challenges of redirecting strategy.”
51
  Indeed, cooperatives 
 
 49  Int’l Labor Org. [ILO], Promotion of Cooperatives Recommendation, art. 2, R193, 
(June 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:31
2531 (“[T]he term ‘cooperative’ means an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.”); Co-operative Identity, 
Values & Principles, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-
operative-identity-values-principles (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“[A] cooperative is an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-
controlled enterprise.”).  The International Co-operative Alliance (“ICA”) was established in 
1895 and serves as a representative of cooperatives worldwide.  See The ICA, INT’L CO-
OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://2012.coop/en/ica (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).  Cooperatives come 
in a large variety of forms, including producer, agricultural, and marketing cooperatives.  In 
some of the literature, cooperatives are more broadly defined to include partnerships and 
non-profit organizations.  See John P. Bonin et al., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of 
Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1290, 1292 (1993) 
(“The theory of the PC focuses on the changes resulting from replacing the profit-
maximizing objective of the neo-classical firm with some other maxim and reflecting both 
workers’ participation in the decision-making process and workers’ sharing in the residual 
surplus.”). 
 50  Co-operative Identity, Values & Principles, supra note 49. 
 51  Michael L. Cook & Brad Plunkett, Collective Entrepreneurship: An Emerging 
Phenomenon in Producer-Owned Organizations, 38 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 421, 423 
(2006), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/43777/2/421.pdf. 
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“represent a substantial share of the economy in most developed market 
economies. . . . [and are] larger in advanced market economies than it is in 
less developed economies.”
52
  But these traditional models tend to be based 
on the property rights being restricted to members-patrons.
53
 
Since the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the cooperative has served 
principally as a device for managing agricultural production.  But the 
continuing economic crisis in Cuba now may be spurring new and 
potentially more radical economic organization based on the cooperative 
form.  The steps being taken are both tentative and circumscribed by the 
realities of Cuban politics.
54
  Indeed, the Cuban authorities were slow to 
deliver a set of regulations implementing the Lineamientos, promising
55
 and 
then announcing their enactment only at the end of 2012.
56
  Despite this, the 
theoretical premises underlying this movement suggest the possibility of the 
development of a theory for aggregations of productive capacity in which 
capital is not privileged—a theory identified here as a “proletarian 
corporation.” 
 
 52  Henry Hansmann, Cooperative Firms in Theory and Practice. 4 LIIKETALOUDELLINEN 
AIKAKAUSKIRJA [LTA] 387, 387 (1999) (Fin.), available at 
http://lta.hse.fi/1999/4/lta_1999_04_a2.pdf. 
 53  See F.R. Chaddad & Michael L. Cook, Understanding New Cooperative Models: An 
Ownership-Control Rights Typology, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 348, 348–60 (2004). 
 54  See Patricia Grogg, Cubans Want Faster Economic Reforms, INTER PRESS SERVICE 
(May 8, 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/05/cubans-want-faster-economic-reforms/ 
(“Among non-state forms of production, Cuban authorities are prioritising cooperatives, 
although new legislation announced for that sector is still being studied. ‘One of the aspects 
that apparently is being discussed is the scope or degree of autonomy that this type of 
association should have,’ said a source who asked to remain anonymous.”). 
 55  See Peter Orsi, Associated Press, Cuba Economy Czar Says Cooperatives By Year 
End, BIG STORY (July 23, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cuba-economy-czar-says-
cooperatives-year-end. 
 56  These include two decree-laws of the Council of State, one decree from the Council of 
Ministers, and two ministerial regulations.  See Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley Número 305 
[Council of State Decree-Law Number 305] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53,  
Dec. 11, 2012, at 249) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto-Ley No. 305]; Consejo de Estado 
Decreto-Ley Número 306 [Council of State Decree-Law Number 306] (GACETA OFICIAL 
EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 254) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto-Ley No. 306]; 
Consejo de Ministros Decreto No. 309 [Council of Ministers Decree No. 309] (GACETA 
OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 260) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto No. 
309]; Ministerio de Económica y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12 [Minister of 
Economics and Planning Resolution No. 570/12] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 
53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 270) (Cuba) [hereinafter Ministerio de Económica y Planificación 
Resolución No. 570/12]; Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12 [Minister 
of Finances and Pricing Resolution No. 427/12] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53, 
Dec. 11, 2012, at 273) (Cuba) [hereinafter Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 
427/12].  For a discussion of the above regulations, see O. Fonticoba Gener, Cambio a la 
actualización del modelo económico [Updating Changes to the Economic Model], GRANMA 
(Dec. 11, 2012) (Cuba), http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2012/12/11/nacional/artic01.html. 
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This Article examines the potential consequences of the current 
approach to the creation and management of economic enterprises within 
Cuba.  The examination is structured around the work of academics 
organized by Camila Piñeiro Harnecker of the University of Havana’s 
Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana.
57
  The new policies that have 
emerged from this work have had practical consequences on the legal 
regulation and management of economic enterprises can be seen in recent 
actions of the CCP, both in the construction of an internal governance order 
and in the exportation of that order in the construction of multilateral trade 
relations.
58
  The principal insight of this work is that by constraining the 
ability of individuals to aggregate capital, the Cubans may have stumbled 
onto the key to the development of a proletarian corporation.  A proletarian 
corporation can be constructed on the structures of the cooperative by 
emphasizing the contribution of labor, rather than capital, to the firm. 
Following this Introduction, Part II examines the development of the 
new Cuban economic model.  This new structure of economic organization 
in Cuba reveals a limited space for individual economic activity in the 
shadow of but not directly managed by the state.  To operationalize that 
structure, the Lineamientos provides a framework that allocates permitted 
forms of economic activities and specifies their limits: private individual 
enterprise, corporate organization for some state enterprises, and the 
possibility of individual labor aggregation through cooperatives.  Part III 
then considers the cooperative in more depth.  It examines the way in which 
the structures of the agricultural cooperative—a peasant socialization 
technique with roots in Leninist theory—was redeployed as a vehicle for 
the aggregation of productive forces without displacing state ownership and 
management of capital.  Thus re-purposed, the cooperative was 
transformed.  From theoretical transformation, Part III then considers the 
transposition of cooperative theory first the Lineamientos, and then as 
written into law through the measures adopted on December 11, 2012.  The 
analysis reveals the way in which the move toward acceptance of the 
cooperative as a means of aggregating economic activity in the small non-
state sector has opened potentially deep ideological fissures within the CCP.  
Within that context, the analysis also suggests the benefits and limitations 
of this peculiarly Cuban innovation within the confines of Cuban political 
ideology, as well as what the turn to the cooperative form in private 
enterprise may mean for the future course of the development of Cuba’s 
 
 57  See generally COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO: UNA MIRADA DESDE CUBA [COOPERATIVES 
AND SOCIALISM: A CUBAN PERSPECTIVE] (Camila Piñeiro Harnecker ed.,  2011) [hereinafter 
COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO]. 
 58  See Grogg, supra note 54 (“The [policy] changes should be sped up in some economic 
sectors . . . .  [and the] best candidates for obtaining immediate significant results’ through 
the new policies appear to be non-state forms of organising small-scale production . . . .”). 
 




Part IV analyzes Cuba’s approach within the structures of its regional 
economic engagements.  The cooperative is an important element for the 
development of an integrated approach to regional trade grounded in state-
to-state economic transactions.  The focus is the internationalization of the 
Cuban model through the structure of the socialist trade organization, 
ALBA .  The problem of the cooperative highlights a fundamental 
conundrum of Cuban economic development: can Cuba develop a 
conceptually useful vehicle, like the cooperative, that enhances individual 
autonomy, and not hobble it for fear that it will undermine the socialist 
character of the 1959 Revolution?  Cuba’s solution to that problem will 
determine the course of its future. 
II.  ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA: LIMITING POWER OF 
INDIVIDUALS TO AGGREGATE CAPITAL OR LABOR WITHOUT 
DIRECT STATE CONTROL 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of its program of 
subsidized state-to-state trade,
59
 the Cuban economy has suffered a series of 
severe shocks.
60
  From the early-1990s until the end of Fidel Castro’s direct 
control of both the state and Party apparatus in 2006,
61
 the State had tried a 
variety of different programs.  Each was viewed as temporary and 
exceptional during this “Special Period,”
62
 and was meant to reposition the 
economy so that it might revert to “normal”: an economy driven by central 
planning management, and control rather than either by frameworks control 
or by markets.
63
  Markets were viewed as the aggregation of efforts to 
 
 59  See Cole Blasier, The End of the Soviet-Cuban Partnership, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD 
WAR 59, 87 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993) (“Beginning in the late 1980s, Soviet leaders 
began to accept a reality that neither party had been willing to articulate publicly and the 
Cubans have not admitted even to themselves: the Cuban economy is not viable at 
established levels, and with its then partners, without extensive foreign aid.”). 
 60  See, e.g., Carmelo Mesa-Lago & Pavel Vidal-Alejandro, The Impact of the Global 
Crisis on Cuba’s Economy and Social Welfare, 42 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 689 (2010) 
(discussing the most recent financial crisis). 
 61  Fidel Castro Quit as Cuba Communist Party Chief in 2006, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12818651. 
 62  See, e.g., Archibald Ritter, Cuba’s Economy During the Special Period, 1990–2010, 
in 1 CUBA: PEOPLE, CULTURE, HISTORY 232 (Alan West-Durán ed., 2011) (“In a speech in 
1997, President Fidel Castro lamented the pro-market policy moves and implied that they 
were temporary only–possibly only for the duration of the ‘Special Period.’”); see also CUBA 
IN THE SPECIAL PERIOD: CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 1990S (Ariana Hernandez-Reguant 
ed., 2009). 
 63  Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Introduction: Cuba, the Last Communist Warrior, in CUBA 
AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra note 59, at 3, 4–7; Mesa-Lago & Vidal-Alejandro, supra note 
60, at 710 (“Until 2010, the government’s economic response had fundamentally relied on 
centrally implemented expenditure cuts.”). 
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manipulate consumers as part of a complex system of global economics 
designed to maintain the economic and political hegemony of developed 
states.
64
  The transfer of control over the state and Party machinery from 
Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl after Fidel’s hospitalization
65
 and the 
shocks of the global economic crisis that began in 2007
66
 produced further 
stress on the viability of the Cuban economy as it operated,
67
 and 
diminished the taste of the elite for maintaining the status quo.
68
 
It is in this context that the State commenced what would eventually 
result in a somewhat tentative, though from their perspective somewhat 
profound, effort to re-set Cuba’s economic model.  That process of 
attempting the development of a new(er) model of Cuban economics 
catalyzed the development of a new theory of cooperatives and their role in 
the economy.  Cooperatives, which had been a backwater of Cuban 
economic planning for some time, suddenly assumed a central role in the 
development of a vibrant, though small and tightly controlled, non-state 
sector that would be permitted to develop in response to market forces.   
This Part sets the context for the more detailed examination of 
cooperatives that follows in Part III.  It first describes the context in which 
economic change was effectuated.  It then considers the form of the 
proposed transformation, one grounded in the division of economic activity 
into separate but highly regulated state and non-state sectors. 
A.  Resetting the Regulatory Context: From Command to Lineamientos 
Over the last decade, two great factions within the Cuban governing 
elite have been debating the future course of Cuban economic development.  
On the one side stood the governing apparatus of traditionalists tied to the 
old Soviet model of development.  This group assumed there was no flaw in 
the Soviet model and were determined to show that they could succeed 
where the Soviet sphere failed.  On the other side stood a group that might 
 
 64  Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the 
IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 497, 517–33 (2006); Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears 
Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt 
Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2007, at 1, 
16–24. 
 65  Peter Whoriskey, Cubans in Miami Cheer Castro Illness, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006, 
at A08. 
 66  See Lorenzo L. P rez, The Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on 
Cuba, 19 CUBA TRANSITION 116, 116–23 (2009), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/perez.pdf. 
 67  See  Mesa-Lago & Vidal–Alejandro, supra note 60. 
 68   See Nick Miroff, Cuba Examines Asian Model for Economic Reforms, NPR (Aug. 21, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/21/159466378/cuba-views-china-vietnam-as-economic-
hope; cf. Julie M. Bunck, Market Oriented Marxism: Post-Cold War Transition in Cuba and 
Vietnam, in CUBAN COMMUNISM 182 (Irving Louis Horowitz & Jaime Suchlicki eds., 2001). 
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be identified as “progressives,” with significant elements in the Cuban 
military (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias)
69
 “that increasingly looked 
to East Asian models of development as a means of preserving the political 
system while modifying the economic system to preserve political stability 
and the legitimacy of the leadership role of the [CCP].”
70
  Traditionalists 
grounded their opposition to change on the ideology developed by Fidel 
Castro; the other side was supported if only tacitly by Raúl Castro.
71
 
The battle between the two sectors of the governing elite appeared to 
tip in favor of the progressives at the beginning of September, 2010, when, 
in a carefully staged interview with a U.S. journalist, Fidel Castro appeared 
to concede the point.  “It was a casual remark over a lunch of salad, fish and 
red wine but future historians are likely to parse and ponder every word: 
‘The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us any more.’”
72
 
The interview, of course, produced a bit of misdirection in the west, 
where analysts would predictably misread the meaning and effect of the 
 
 69  See Terry L. Maris, Revolutionary Management: The Role of the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias in the Cuban Economy, MILITARY REV., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 63, 66.  The 
Cuban military has a significant stake in the national economy, providing a substantial 
amount of industrial capacity.  Its website, Industria Militar, notes somewhat critically that 
military deploys a part of its industrial activity toward meeting the needs of the national 
economy.  This is possible because the military’s industrial capacity exceeds its needs and 
the needs of the State have increased.  See Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Reconverción 
iIndustrial [Revolutionary Armed Forces, Industrial Reconstructuring], INDUSTRIA MILITAR 
[MILITARY INDUSTRY], 
http://www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/minfar/industria/industria_militar.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 
2013). 
 70  Larry Catá Backer, Cuba Responds to Globalization and Reorganizes Its Political 
Economy: Revolution, Retrenchment or Small Steps Towards Market Engagement Within a 
Marxist Framework Under the Leadership of a Vanguard Party Apparatus, LAW END DAY 
(Sep. 24, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/cuba-respondes-to-
globalization-opening.html; see also Pin Zuo, A Survey of the Relationship Between Cuba 
and China: A Chinese Perspective, 20 CUBA TRANSITION 193, 199 (2010), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/pinzuo.pdf (“ ith Ra l 
Castro’s takeover of the presidency from his brother, Cuba has entered a period of 
adjustment of its policies and potential reconsideration of the Chinese path. Cuba is now 
very interested in the Chinese reform. This would be a good point of confluence for building 
a positive relationship between Cuba and China.”). 
 71  See PHILIP PETERS, LEXINGTON INST., A VIEWER’S GUIDE TO CUBA’S ECONOMIC 
REFORMS 4–6 (2012), available at 
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/View
ersGuide.pdf. 
 72  Rory Carroll, Fidel Castro Says His Economic System Is Failing, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 
2010, 5:31 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/09/fidel-castro-cuba-economic-
model (“Towards the end of a long, relaxed lunch in Havana, Jeffrey Goldberg, a national 
correspondent for the Atlantic magazine, asked Castro if Cuba’s economic system was still 
worth exporting.  The reply left him dumbfounded. ‘Did the leader of the revolution just say, 
in essence, Never mind?’  Goldberg wrote on his blog.”). 
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  Westerners and the enemies of the regime  found it too 
difficult to resist the urge to over-read into the statement their own hopes, 
desires, and long term perspectives.
74
  Yet, the evidence of its effect within 
Cuban conversations about the future of economic organization was not 
hidden.  In fact, “Raúl Castro has been saying the same thing in public and 
private since succeeding his older brother two years ago.”
75
  Stephen 
Wilkinson, a Cuba expert at London Metropolitan University, better 
contextualized the remark: 
The remark should not, however, be interpreted as a condemnation 
of socialism, added Wilkinson.  “That is clearly not what he means, 
but it is an acknowledgement that the way in which the Cuban 
system is organised has to change.  It is an implicit indication also 
that he has abdicated governing entirely to Raúl, who has argued this 
position for some time.  We can now expect a lot more changes and 
perhaps more rapid changes as a consequence.”
76
 
Yet, a directional shift was clearly anticipated by Raúl Castro.  And so it is 
important to ask, at this point, what the Cuban elite is permitting to be said 
about this change. 
Reports published in Granma in 2010 suggested indirectly that over 
the last several years, it is Raúl and not Fidel who has been asserting the 
leadership role with respect to economic issues.
77
  Rather than referring to 
Fidel’s observation, the author starts with Raúl’s address to the National 
Assembly in early August, a month before the carefully staged interview 
with Fidel, describing the plans to reduce public employment.
78
  Raúl 
 
 73  See id. (“Fidel Castro’s nine-word confession, dropped into conversation with a 
visiting US journalist and policy analyst, undercuts half a century of thundering 
revolutionary certitude about Cuban socialism.”). 
 74  See, e.g., Jim Wyss & Luisa Yanez, Fidel Castro: Cuba’s Economic Model Is Broken, 
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9, 2010, at A1 (“‘He is either crazy or senile. This certainly does not 
sound like something Castro would say,’ said Jaime Suchlicki, a long-time Castro observer 
and head of the University of Miami’s Research Institute for Cuban Studies.  ‘But if he was 
quoted accurately, then I guess he’s come to the realization, like everyone else, that Marxist-
Leninist governments do not function.  So the real question is, what is he going to do about it 
now?  Is he going to bring about change in Cuba since the Cuba model doesn’t work?’”). 
 75  Carroll, supra note 72. 
 76  Id. (quoting Stephen Wilkinson). 
 77  See Leticia Martínez Hernández, Mucho más que una alternative [Much More Than 
an Alternative], GRANMA (Sept. 24, 2010) (Cuba), 
http://www.granma.cu/espanol/cuba/24sept-trabajo.html.  Granma is the official publication 
of the Central Committee of the CCP.  It is circulated online at 
http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/. 
 78  In 2010, Raúl Castro announced the State’s decision to increase the availability of 
opportunities to work for one’s own account, which will serve as an alternative means of 
employment for dismissed state workers.  Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (“El pasado 
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Castro also indicated a substantial revision to the legal impediments to 
private economic activity, at least at the lowest levels of such activity.
79
  
The western press reported that he also indicated that any such opening up 
would be limited and controlled: “Cuban President Raul Castro has ruled 
out large-scale market reforms to revive the communist island’s struggling 
economy.  But Mr. Castro said the role of the state would be reduced in 
some areas, with more workers allowed to be self-employed or to set up 
small businesses.”
80
  Thus, at least in the public discussions within Cuba, it 
was clear that there would be no revolutionary opening up, even when 
judged by the Chinese or Vietnamese standards.
81
 
Instead, the public discussion and hint-dropping served as the 
foundation for small incremental steps away from the model of almost 
complete state control in economic planning and decision-making.  The 
most important comment was made in late-2010 in an address by Raúl 
Castro in which he “admitted: ‘We have to erase forever the notion that 
Cuba is the only country in the world in which people can live without 
working.’  He further admitted that the decades old US embargo—’a 
crippling, punitive measure’—could no longer be blamed for all the island’s 
woes.”
82
  The reforms opened a very small space for private economic 
activity, but that opening came with limits.
83
  It was restricted to a set of 
very specific occupations or services, each of which required a separate 
permit, and all of which were confined to the lowest level in the retail 
sector.
84
  These were made necessary by the previous announcement of 
 
primero de agosto el General de Ejército Raúl Castro Ruz anunció en la Asamblea Nacional 
la decisión de ampliar el ejercicio del trabajo por cuenta propia, y utilizarlo como una 
alternativa más de empleo para los trabajadores que queden disponibles luego del proceso de 
reducción de plantillas infladas que deberá asumir el país.”). 
 79  Id. (“En la reunión parlamentaria se conoció, además, que se eliminarían varias de las 
prohibiciones vigentes para el otorgamiento de nuevas licencias y la comercialización de 
algunos productos, además de flexibilizar la posibilidad de contratar fuerza de trabajo en 
determinadas actividades.”). 
 80  Raúl Castro: No Reform but Cuba Economy Control to Ease, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10834192. 
 81  See Enrique Pumar, The Arduous Paths of Political Transitions: A Comparison of 
Cuba, China and Vietnam, 19 CUBA TRANSITION 56 (2009), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/ volume19/pdfs/pumar.pdf. 
 82  Michael Kline, Economic Reforms in Cuba?, AM. DIPL. (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline_cuba.html. 
 83  See Martínez Hernández, supra note 77. 
 84  Kline, supra note 82.  As Kline notes: 
The plan does little more than to encourage laid off workers to start “small 
businesses,” or form cooperatives for farming, construction, taxi services, auto 
repairs, etc.  On 24 September, Granma printed the entire list of 178 approved 
private activities, only seven of which are entirely new—including accountants, 
bathroom attendants, tutors and fruit vendors.  The remaining 171 approved 
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potentially large mass terminations of state workers and the intention to 




These efforts were followed by a much more substantial effort at 
systemic reform.  That effort was sanctioned by Raúl Castro, who “kicked 
off a national ‘discussion’ to reinvent socialism . . . . The aim was 
straightforward enough: shake up the dysfunctional Cuban economy in 
order to save the revolution.”
86
  The process was meant to produce the 
guidelines (Lineamientos) toward economic reform.  The Lineamientos 
were the product of what for Cuba was a fairly open process, directed by 
the CCP, to seek popular input for a framework of reform that would move 
toward resolving Cuba’s economic crisis without changing its political 
system or the foundations of its economic system. 
The origins of the Lineamientos, at least in its broad outline, are well 
known.
87
  It was circulated widely in a draft form
88
 and there was an effort, 
significant in the historical context of post-Revolutionary Cuba, to promote 
greater circulation and consultation of the draft version in and outside of 
Cuba.
89
  The Lineamientos were considered, modified, and approved at the 
 
activities include such everyday jobs as bricklayer, garbage collector, automobile 
mechanic, hairdresser, etc. 
 Id. 
 85  See Elisabeth Malkin, Cuba Details New Policies on Budding Entrepreneurs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at A7. 
 86  Mac Margolis, Cuba’s Leaders Talk of Reform, but It Doesn’t Add Up to Much, 
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 26, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2012/10/26/no-country-for-old-dictators.html (“He encouraged Cubans to ‘discuss 
openly and without worry’ how to ‘upgrade the national economy.’”). 
 87  Larry Catá Backer, “Order, Discipline and Exigency”: Cuba’s VIth Party Congress, 
the Lineamientos (Guidelines) and Structural Change In Education, Sport and Culture?, 21 
CUBA TRANSITION 148 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/backer.pdf. 
 88  PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA], PROYECTO DE 
LINEAMIENTOS DE LA POLITICA ECONOMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO [DRAFT GUIDELINES OF 
THE ECONMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY] (2010), available at 
http://lapupilainsomne.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/proyecto-lineamientos-pcc.pdf. 
 89  As one commentator notes: 
Perhaps the most important early initiative of Raúl Castro was the call for a 
consulta (consultation) with the Cuban people. Barrio committees, factory 
workers, local party organizations, and others were encouraged to meet and 
register their thoughts and complaints. By August 2009, 5.1 million people out of a 
total Cuban population of 11.2 million had participated in the consultation.  There 
were 3.3 million registered comments of which almost half were critical. 
Roger Burbach, Cubans Seek Change, Not End to Revolution, NEW AM. MEDIA (June 26, 
2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/06/cubans-seek-change-not-end-to-revolution.php. 
 Whatever one believes about the legitimacy of the consultation process, and whatever 
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Sixth Congress of the CCP.  In its final version, 313 sections of the 
Lineamientos suggest action affecting nearly every aspect of Cuban 
economic life.
90
  A companion booklet summarizes the changes made to the 
draft Lineamientos and the official reasons for the changes.
91
 
The Lineamientos now serve as a basis for reordering the failing 
economic framework within Cuban socialism.  They also suggest a change 
in the internal politics of Cuba, though this change suggests the extent of 
the caution among Cuban leaders that appears to slow down the pace and 
scope of reform.  That the Lineamientos were modified at all, and in some 
respects in significant fashion, suggests deep changes in the relationship 
between the CCP, as a body, and the leadership, which can no longer count 
on unquestioning approval of its programs.  It also indicates a deep strain of 
suspicion behind the wisdom of substantive reform, which was grudgingly 
adopted in the Lineamientos,
92
 and appears to be even more narrowly 
implemented in the regulations.
93
 
There is little dispute that the Lineamientos arose from a recognition 
that the system of managing the Cuban economy at that time was not 
working.
94
  More importantly, that economic model was unsustainable even 
in the short run.  The Lineamientos were not undertaken in a vacuum.  Nor 
did they emerge without foundation.  The State had been moving for years 
to develop public sector enterprises, at the national and transnational level, 
 
one thinks of its real effectiveness, the call for such a process of consultation, and its use, 
even marginally, marks a very different culture of governance from that in effect in the 
decades before.  But it also raised the stakes.  If the Cuban population is engaged in the 
process and buys into it, there is a greater expectation of success and follow-through and a 
greater penalty to be paid in the event of failure.  See Marcelo Vieta, Cuba’s Coming Co-
Operative Economy? Reflections From Two Recent Field Trips, GLOBAL RES. (July 18, 
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31966 (“The release of the 
‘Draft Guidelines’ of the economic reforms in the fall of 2010, and the promising public 
consultations that were had between December 2010 and February 2011 with over 1 million 
Cubans in the process of developing the lineamientos, has, most certainly, committed Cuba 
to a massive reform of the economy such as it has never seen before.  Cuba is, in a word, at a 
crossroads right now.”). 
 90   See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39. 
 91  VI CONGRESO PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CUBA], INFORMACIÓN SOBRE EL RESULTADO DEL DEBATE DE LOS LINEAMIENTOS DE 
LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO Y LA REVOLUCIÓN [INFORMATION ON THE 
OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE OF THE POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
ECONOMY OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTION] (2011) (Cuba), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55084978/Tabloide-Debate-Lineamientos-VI-Congreso-Partido-
Comunista-de-Cuba [hereinafter TABLOIDE]. 
 92  See infra Part III.C.1. 
 93  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 94  See, e.g., Oscar Echevarría, Cuba—A Glance at the Future: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 21 CUBA TRANSITION 143 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/oa_echevarria.pdf. 
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as vehicles through which it could engage in economic activities, especially 
with foreign partners.  In the year preceding their introduction, the State had 
moved dramatically in attempt to open up private sector activity.
95
  That 
opening, such as the development of state sector corporations, reflected a 
deep suspicion of autonomous economic activity, and a presumption that 
opening up had to be tightly regulated and supervised.  As is typical in 
Marxist-Leninist states, the ideas behind these efforts originated in the CCP 
and were then implemented through the state apparatus.  But the 
Lineamientos also suggest that Raúl Castro’s reform efforts have generated 
opposition within the CCP and state sector leaders.  That opposition was 
most evident in the success that the Sixth Party Congress achieved in 
significantly narrowing the reforms proposed by Raúl Castro, especially in 
the opening and management of the non-state sector.
96
  This is both good 
and bad news—good news for those seeking to strengthen an 
institutionalized CCP apparatus to preserve stability in government,
97
 bad 
news because the price of that stability appears to be a significant 
conservatism in political views of the appropriate implementation of 
Marxist-Leninist statecraft. 
The Lineamientos start from a presumption that they are directed 
toward the preservation of the fundamental character of the 1959 
Revolution, and effectuated to preserve its gains.  But within this 
framework, the Lineamientos appear to nod in the direction of the realities 
of the economic situation that has brought the CCP to the reevaluation of its 
values.  Thus, the Lineamientos sought to guarantee changes to the system 
by which services are provided, but to limit those promised changes to 
those possible under existing economic circumstances. 
At a 2011 Conference in New York, Cuban economists from the 
University of Havana’s Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy 
(Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubano) addressed these tensions and 
provided a window on the way in which these issues are approached within 
Cuba.
98
  First, and perhaps the most important conceptually, was a point 
raised by Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, who forcefully argued that 
 
 95  See PETERS, supra note 71. 
 96  See infra Part III.C.1. 
 97  The need to strengthen the institutional party is an important one.  See Arturo López 
Levy, Change in Post-Fidel Cuba: The Challenges of Political Liberalization and Economic 
Reform, 21 CUBA TRANSITION 374, 382–86 (2011), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/ volume21/pdfs/lopezlevy.pdf. 
 98  For an overview of the programming, see Symposium, Cuba Futures: Past and 
Present, BILDNER CTR. FOR W. HEMISPHERE STUDIES (2011), available at 
http://cubasymposium.org/Cuba%20Futures%20Final%20Program%20With%20Updates.pd
f; see also, Larry Catá Backer, The State of the Cuban Economy: Divergent Views of 
Economists from Inside Cuba, LAW END DAY (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/08/state-of-cuban-economy-divergent-views.html. 
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Cuban economists, political theorists, and government officials should 
embrace the construction of internal markets in which individual small and 
medium sized enterprises might play a role that would aid in the 
development of the Cuban economy without doing damage to its political 
framework.
99
  His review of the willingness of China and Vietnam to 
embrace a vigorous internal market, even as they preserved their Marxist 
social and political framework,
100
 provided strong evidence that, though 
capitalism used markets in accordance with the logic of its ideology, there 
is a place for markets within socialism.
101
  Indeed, the move toward 
pragmatism suggested that it might be possible to take a fresh and more 
sophisticated approach to socialist markets both within Cuba and as a 
means of Cuban engagement with global markets in which “the state should 
study a future role for itself regulating enterprises rather than directly 
administering them.”
102
  This move toward pragmatism was based on the 
utility of opening internal markets to small and medium sized enterprises as 
well as to cooperatives that both reflected global trends,
103
 and that 
furthered the Cuban Marxist project of socializing the economy.
104
 
A second point was the recognition that, even if markets were to be a 
means of reform, the private sector markets envisioned would remain small 




 99  Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, La Actualización del Modelo Económico Cubano 
[The Updated Cuban Economic Model], in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA 1, 2–3 
(2011), http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/PEchangeCuba.pdf (“Pero el tiempo 
transcurrido en el decursar del proyecto socialista, más el análisis de las experiencias de 
otros países socialistas asiáticos, colocan al estado cubano ante la imperiosa necesidad de 
actualizar su modelo económico, donde el mercado deba tener un papel cada vez más 
creciente en la economía cubana, aunque se manifieste que revalecerá la planificación y no 
el mercado.”). 
 100 Id. 15–18; see also CAROLYN L. HSU, CREATING MARKET SOCIALISM (2007). 
 101 Villanueva, supra note 99, at 3–4 (“Y ya se reconoce que el estado puede ceder 
actividades que no le son estratégicas, y que sean capaces de absorber la gran cantidad de 
trabajadores que quedarán disponibles en los próximos años, en la nueva reorganización en 
curso en las empresas y en las unidades presupuestadas.”). 
 102 Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, The Cuban Economy: A Current Evaluation and 
Proposals for Necessary Policy Changes (Japan Trade Org., Inst. of Developing Econs. 
Discussion Papers, Paper No. 217, 2009), available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/217.pdf. 
 103 Villanueva, supra note 99, at 14 (“Lo interesante es que ese término no es derivado de 
la coyuntura que atraviesa la economía cubana, es una tendencia mundial que se está 
imponiendo de estructurar la producción sobre la base de pequeñas y medianas empresa.”). 
 104 Id. at 14–15 (“Es cierto que en la actualidad se analiza por parte del gobierno cubano 
la necesidad de implementar algunas de las variantes de las llamadas PYMES, especialmente 
las llamadas cooperativas por la socialización de la producción y los beneficios que la misma 
trae consigo.”). 
 105 Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Las restricciones de divisas en la economía cubana al 
terminar el 2010: crisis, ajuste y salida paulatina [Currency Restrictions in the Cuban 
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There were two parts to this point.  The first was that the private enterprise 
would remain small because of the inability of the state to provide capital.  
That inability was both structural and functional.  Structurally, Cuba has no 
system for easily providing access to capital for individuals.  Functionally, 
even if it had such a system, there are few funds available for that purpose, 
and little use for the funds with a wholesale market still essentially 
undeveloped.
106
  Second, the solution to this approach of state control of 




The last point, raised by Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, is also telling.
108
  
Among the reforms contemplated in the Lineamientos is permitting 
individuals to hire others in their small businesses.
109
  This reform reflects a 
substantial change in the Cuban economic system in which only self- 
employment and employment by the state were possible.  Piñeiro 
Harnecker, however, suggested that this new form of an employment 
relationship might be tightly controlled by the state.
110
  She suggested that 
Cuba was considering, for these private enterprise employees, creating a 
state-sponsored union that would have substantial authority to determine the 
terms and conditions of employment available in the private sector.
111
  
These might well mimic the state enterprises that now determine both the 
conditions of employment and the wages of Cuban workers hired by foreign 
enterprises.  The reforms, then, do not contemplate the creation of 
independent or private labor markets.  Nor do they contemplate vesting 
individuals with authority over the control of capital.  Rather, to emphasize 
the limited nature of the market opening, the reforms reinforce the limits of 
aggregated economic activity outside the state sector by emphasizing 
aggregation of labor rather than of capital.
112
  This is a framework that is 
 
Economy at the End of 2010: Crisis, Adjustment and Gradual Solution], in POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA, supra note 99, at 19, 43. 
 106 Id. at 61–63. 
 107 Id. at 63 (“[E]ro si se promueve el microcrédito con colaboración internacional, ello 
significaría una entrada de divisas al país que posibilitarían abrir la importación para los 
uentapropistas, microempresarios y cooperativistas.”). 
 108 See Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, New Forms of Enterprise in Cuba’s Changing 
Economy, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA, supra note 99, at 43, 67. 
 109 See infra notes 360–362 and accompanying paragraph (discussing provisions of 
Lineamientos governing cooperative authority to hire labor). 
 110 Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 108, at 67–68. 
 111 Id. at 74–75. 
 112 See Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, Las cooperativas en el Nuevo modelo económico 
cubano [The Cooperatives in the New Cuban Economic Model], in MIRADAS A LA EC N M A 
CUBANA: EL PROCESO DE ACTUALI ACI N [LOOKS TO THE CUBAN ECONOMY: THE UPGRADE 
PROCESS] 73, 86 (2009) (“Esto refle a la preocupaci n redistributiva y la despreocupaci n 
por la naturaleza de las relaciones sociales de los sujetos que construyen, o no, la sociedad 
post-capitalista; enfoque este que ha marcado las experiencias socialistas y lleva a desestimar 
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replicated at the inter-governmental level.  For example, the only corporate 
enterprises the ALBA framework calls for are state-owned or state-based 
joint ventures (empresas grannacionales).
113
  And, indeed, there was a 
suggestion made that Cuba expected to hire these proprietors in a sort of 
state-supported privatized sector. 
Taken together, these insights help explain the role of the 
Lineamientos not just in reshaping the Cuban economy through limited 
privatization, but also in the re-organization of the economy as well.  This 
was an important objective, with significant regulatory consequences, as 
Cuba moves from a monolithic central planning model to one in which the 
economy is divided between a state and a non-state sector, and where both 
may be affected by internal and external trade.  To understand the scope and 
direction of approaches to cooperatives in the non-state sector, it is 
necessary to understand the premises of the framework within which the 
organization and division of the economy is structured under the 
Lineamientos. 
The Lineamientos allocate distinct forms of economic organization 
between two spheres of economic activities: the small-scale local and 
regional/national activity.  This is a division that is then carried forward in 
the construction of Cuba’s form of global engagement through socialist 
regional trade organizations, principally ALBA.
114
  Small-scale activities 
are to be open to individuals, but remain limited and target local retail 
sectors.
115
  The private sector is allocated a precise set of activities that may 
be undertaken as sole proprietorships or through collectives.  In either case, 
the focus is on the aggregation and utilization of labor, and avoiding the 
means of aggregating and allocating capital in economic activities outside 
the control of the state.  Property remains firmly attached to the state under 
the direction of the CCP.  In contrast, the bulk of economic activity is to be 
organized at the national/regional level.
116
  This activity is to remain an 
instrument to national control and marked by direct micro state planning or 
organization into well-controlled juridical persons (mostly in corporate 
forms).  The state sector dictates the overall direction of economic activity 
and includes enterprises understood to have national impact.  These are 
organized by sectors and may be run via direct state control or devolution of 
 
las potencialidades productivas y transformadoras de las cooperativas y otras formas 
autogestionarias.”). 
 113 Conceptualización de Proyecto y Empresa Grannacional en el Marco del ALBA 
[Conceptualization of  Company and Project Grannacionals under ALBA], ALBA-TCP, 
http://www.alba-tcp.org/contenido/conceptualizacion-de-los-grannacional (last visited Mar. 
29, 2013) [hereinafter ALBA Grannacional]. 
 114 See Backer & Molina, supra note 36. 
 115 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 116 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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SOEs.  Their use is also bound by the conceptualization of globalization 
within the ideological parameters of ALBA.  It is to this re-organization of 
the economic sector of Cuban state activity that the Article turns to next. 
B.  Economic Organization After the Lineamientos 
The development of the new Cuban economic model suggests a 
pattern of both tight control of the means and substance of economic 
activity and a tentative willingness to tolerate a small space in which 
control is devolved to individuals.  In return for this greater autonomy, the 
State eliminates a need to support individuals and individuals are viewed as 
sources of funds, in the form of taxes and fees that might then subsidize 
other public activities.  But the limits of the devolution from tight state 
control are severe.  While individuals may now engage in economic activity 
in the non-state sector, the forms of permitted economic activity are tightly 
controlled.  Licensing makes supervision and control more powerful.  And 
this oversight substantially constrains individual autonomy and flexibility in 
meeting demands.  The State remains in direct control of the economy and 
reserves for itself any form of economic activity that implicates ownership 
of productive property.  Loosening comes only at the very bottom of the 
retail and service sector.  The regulatory ideal
117
 of great state enterprises 
and a small army of small proprietors satisfies the specific needs of 
consumers for everyday items. 
1.  The Omnipresent State Sector  
Corporations constitute property in the hands of their owners, but they 
also constitute collective persons.
118
 As great autonomous collectives of 
people and resources, operating in accordance with their own constitution 
and serving the needs of their own constituents, corporations are institutions 
that exercise significant social, political, and economic power. In the latter 
 
 117 The regulatory ideal describes the normative conception of a thing that then serves to 
determine the rules used to ensure the coherence of that normative conception.  See JUDITH 
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 1 (1993) (“The 
category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault called a ‘regulatory ideal.’ 
In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions as a norm, but it is part of a regulatory practice 
that produces the bodies it governs.”).  In this case, the regulatory ideal of the economy 
serves not merely as a norm (Marxist-Leninist economic organization), but also as its 
regulatory practice (SOEs and individual-cooperatives) that creates a self-referencing loop 
where each reinforces the other through constant invocation.  It thus produces what it names.  
See id. at 7–8 (“The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated 
inculcation of a norm.”).  This is a powerful and stable (if contextual) relationship that 
makes the rejection of the norm unlikely merely by suggesting a distinct regulatory ideal—
for example, U.S. style-free market regulatory normativity. 
 118 See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 583 (1999). 
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respect, their organization and operations tend to mirror those of the state.
119
 
This close connection between corporate and state forms created a 
conceptual problem for European Marxist Leninist states, and for the Cuban 
Communist Party as well.   
Marxist-Leninist “socialist” states are grounded in the fundamental 
notion of state monopoly over the social, political, and economic 
organization.  Collectives of people and things, operating independent of 
the state, even if subject to state regulation, deprive the state of its 
monopoly position, and, if they can amass enough power, threaten the 
fundamental ordering principles of state organization.  Retaining an 
organizational form based on the suppression of all collectives other than 
those “owned” by the state provides the simplest and most effective form 
for safeguarding the Marxist-Socialist character of the state.  Even when 
organizations, like corporations, are permitted to mimic the state, they serve 
as convenient means to allocate resources within the state apparatus and 
divide authority for its use. 
The Lineamientos do little to change this basic set of premise that have 
guided Cuban economic policy since the 1959 Revolution.  The corporation 
remains an instrument of state policy.  The socialist system continues to 
frame economic organization, and for that purpose socialist state enterprises 
are formed.
120
  These constitute the principal form of national economic 
activity.
121
  Cuba allows additional forms of economic organizations to be 
recognized—mixed enterprises, cooperatives, individuals operating as sole 
proprietorships, and various agricultural ventures—aimed at improving 
economic efficiency.
122
  However, individuals are not permitted to 
aggregate property in juridical or natural persons.
123
  While the 
Lineamientos seek to separate administrative from economic activity, since 
the original version, the Sixth Party Congress inserted a provision ensuring 
that the process of separation will be gradual and ordered.
124
  Under the 
Lineamientos, corporations are viewed as ways to efficiently organize the 
economic sector on productive rather than competitive lines.
125
  Thus, 
 
 119 It is replication, in part, that suggests the premises underlying recent efforts at the 
international level to impose state obligations directly on multinational corporations.  See 
Backer, supra note 13; Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations 
and International Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INTL L. 1 (2003). 
 120 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 1. 
 121 Id. ¶ 2. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. ¶ 3. 
 124 Id. ¶ 6. 
 125 Id. ¶ 7 (“Lograr  ue el sistema empresarial del pa s est  constituido por empresas 
eficientes, bien organizadas y eficaces, y ser n creadas las nuevas organizaciones superiores 
de direcci n empresarial.  Se desarrollar  la cooperaci n entre las empresas para garantizar 
mayor eficiencia y calidad.  Se elaborar  la norma  ur dica  ue regule todos estos 
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cooperation rather than competition is privileged.  This represents a retreat 
from the provision as originally proposed that spoke of strong and well-
organized enterprises, but did not speak to any sort of enforced cooperation 
among them.
126
  That was added during the course of debate, again 
suggesting the difficulty of control for those who sought to put forward 
more aggressively progressive structural reforms. 
Central planning remains the heart of the economic system;
127
 and 
state sector planning is meant to take into account the management of 
emerging market sectors as well.
128
  While the form of planning may 
change to meet the realities of new forms of activities, the object remains 
the effective control and integration of all aspects of economic activity in 
Cuba by bringing them all under the political direction of the state.
129
  
However, the opening of a private space for economic activity and the 
recognition of the need to deal with foreigners also requires the elaboration 
of a system to regulate and enforce agreements between these enterprises.
130
  
It also contemplates the organization of wholesale markets to service both 





  The focus on reorganizing at least part of the 
state sector through state enterprises continues, refining a slow-developing 
process dating back to the efforts at enterprise optimization of 1998,
133
 but 
is now more clearly tied to the preservation of state control of economic 
activity. 
Since the 1990s, Cuba has revised its Constitution and laws to permit 
joint ventures between state enterprises and foreign corporations, and to 
 
aspectos.”). 
 126 See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 7, col. original ( “Ser  necesario lograr  ue el sistema 
empresarial del pa s est  constituido por empresas fuertes y bien organizadas, y creadas las 
nuevas organizaciones superiores de direcci n empresarial.  Se elaborar  el Reglamento 
General para estas organizaciones.”). 
 127 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 1 (“El sistema de planificaci n socialista continuar  
siendo la v a principal para la direcci n de la econom a nacional, y debe transformarse en sus 
aspectos metodol gicos, organizativos y de control.”). 
 128 Id. (“La planificaci n tendr  en cuenta el mercado, influyendo sobre el mismo y 
considerando sus caracter sticas.”). 
 129 Id. ¶ 5 (“La planificaci n abarcar  el sistema empresarial estatal, la actividad 
presupuestada, las asociaciones econ micas internacionales, y regular  otras formas de 
gesti n no estatales  ue se apli uen y ser  m s ob etiva en todos los niveles.  Los nuevos 
m todos de planificaci n cambiar n las formas de control sobre la econom a.  La 
planificaci n territorial tendr  en cuenta tambi n estas transformaciones.”). 
 130 Id. ¶ 10. 
 131 Id. ¶ 9. 
 132 TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 9. 
 133 See generally Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Cuba’s Perfeccionamiento Empresarial Law: 
A Step Towards Privatization?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 119 (2002). 
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provide for the operation of foreign corporations within Cuba.
134
  “Cuba 
further increased this flexibility in October 1994, when it officially 
declare[d] that all sectors of the economy, with the exception of public 
health, education, and the armed forces, were open to foreign 
investment.”
135
  Notwithstanding these permissive revisions, the internal 
Cuban economy is substantially insulated from the activities of these 
enterprises, and Cuban individuals are substantially prohibited from 
forming or investing in these export-oriented enterprises.
136
  The difficulty 
lies in the arbitrariness built into the approval process, one that is 
multilayered and substantially opaque.
137
  In other respects, Cuba retains a 
commercial code, which is not much different from the Spanish colonial 
law it inherited at the end of the nineteenth century, and the primitive and 
largely outdated codification of corporations law.
138
 
Cuban foreign investment is governed by Decreto-Ley No. 77,
139
 
which permits inbound foreign investment and the establishment of joint 
ventures, but only with Cuban state enterprises and subject to a fairly 
complicated system of approvals under the direction of the Ministry of 
Foreign Investments and Economic Cooperation.
140
  Moreover, foreign 
ventures may take a majority stake in joint enterprises, but may not invest 
in domestic corporations in Cuba.
141
  Though Decreto-Ley No. 77 “allows 
for 100 percent foreign ownership . . . only six such wholly foreign-owned 
firms exist today: three in petroleum and energy, two in maritime transport, 
 
 134 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The Status of 
Current Foreign Investors in a Post-Transition Cuba, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 885, 887 
(2005). 
 135 Id. 
 136 See RICHARD E. FEINBERG, THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY: WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT? 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20fei
nberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg%209.pdf?_lang=en (“The more orthodox factions 
within the government and Communist Party seem to have gained the upper hand in drafting 
the section on foreign investment.  The conservatives inserted language revealing their 
enduring distrust of foreign capital and underscored the need to carefully screen projects, as 
well as to monitor closely those projects that are allowed to proceed.”). 
 137 Id. at 12–13. 
 138 See Backer, supra note 5, at 365–75. 
 139 See Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular Ley No. 77: Ley de la Inversion Extranjera 
[National Assembly of the People’s Power Law No. 77: Foreign Investment Law] (GACETA 
OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 3, Sept. 6, 1995, at 5) arts. 1.1, 3 (Cuba). 
 140 Kathleen Claussen, Engaging Closed Societies Through International Arbitration: 
Lessons From the Cuban Experience, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 11, 15–18 (2011). 
 141  Feinberg notes that “whereas in the 1990s the government often granted the foreign 
partner majority control, now it is seeking to revert 51 percent or more of the voting shares 
to the SOE partner.”  FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 13.  For the earlier framework, see Joy 
Gordon, Cuba’s Entrepreneurial Socialism, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1997, at 18, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97jan/cuba/cuba.htm. 
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and one in the financial sector.”
142
  There is nothing that would prevent 
Cuban state enterprises operating in a corporate form from taking a 
minority stake in a foreign corporation operating abroad.  Individual 
authorization is required for every foreign entity.
143
  Scholars outside of 
Cuba have criticized Cuban foreign investment law.
144
  Some have argued 
that the system is highly inefficient.
145
  The areas set aside for investments 
are limited and designed more like quarantine zones than economic zones.  
They are meant to prevent all but the most controlled contact between 
Cubans and foreigners.  Moreover, the underlying law of contract through 
which business and investment relationships must be effectuated within 
Cuba remains primitive by global standards.  Lastly, recent Cuban 
government anti-corruption efforts have negatively impacted investment.
146
 
Cubans have generally rejected the Chinese approach to economic re-
organization, especially in the matter of permitting individuals to use the 
corporate form.
147
  Such a variant of Marxist-Leninist structuring permits 
too much individual autonomy for Cuban tastes.  Moreover, the resulting 
disparities of wealth that arise, as has been the case in China, are still 
unacceptable in Cuba, especially as between individuals.  These 
observations are usually deployed to support a basic line—that the Chinese 
model does not work.  Indeed, from the perspective of some, any sort of 




There are other arguments that have been made to resist the Chinese 
approach and in defense of substantially greater state direction of economic 
activity.
149
  First, neither Maoism nor Stalinism has overcome the 
contradictions of Marxist-Leninism and the autonomous private economic 
 
 142 FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 13. 
 143 See María C. Werlau, Foreign Investment in Cuba: The Limits of Commercial 
Engagement, 6 CUBA TRANSITION 456, 474–75 (1996), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf. 
 144 See FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 12–17; Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P. 
Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 903, 908–09 (2003). 
 145 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 136. 
 146 Marc Frank, Cuba Crackdown Sees Foreign Companies Exit, FIN. TIMES (May 21, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e76f3952-a34b-11e1-8f34-00144feabdc0.html (“It 
was hoped that sweeping reforms adopted by the Communist party last year would open the 
way for significant foreign investment. But the government has instead re-examined existing 
agreements and stalled new projects, foreign business sources said.”). 
 147 See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 3 (prohibiting individuals from holding 
aggregations of property for non-state purposes). 
 148 Helen Yaffe, El Ché Guevara: las cooperativas y la economía política de la 
transición al socialism [Ché Guevara: Cooperatives and the Political Economy of the 
Transition to Socialism], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 132. 
 149 See generally Backer, supra note 5. 
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collective.  Second, Cuban Stalinism is fundamentally incompatible with 
Deng Xiaoping-style Marxist-Leninism and the evolving Chinese model.  
Third, the Chinese model is impossible to implement because Cuba remains 
isolated from global capital flows, both by design and because of Cuba’s 
poor record of paying its debts.
150
  Fourth, the U.S. embargo and aggressive 
American policies makes adoption of the Chinese model impossible., 
principally because it makes access to markets more costly and because any 
global engagement might provide an opening for U.S. inspired regime 
change efforts  While the U.S. facilitated Chinese economic reform even as 
they remained critical of its political system, they would hinder similar 
moves by Cuba precisely because it remains U.S. policy to destabilize and 
aid in the overthrow of the current Cuban government.  That leads into the 
last argument—that Cuba may not be yet able to compete in the global 
marketplace, because of its size, its lack of infrastructure, and its inability to 
access capital through global institutions, most notably the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
2. The Role of Private Enterprise 
Large-scale, capital-intensive, and nationally significant economic 
activity remains the sole province of the state in Cuba.  That does not 
preclude the possibility of opening a sector of the economy to private 
activity.  The structures of these new regulatory structures center on the 
scope and objectives of efforts to privatize economic activities, the role of 
the state in that revised system, and the extent of autonomy of privatized 
occupations from state control.  The issue is where to draw the line between 
state control and private initiative.  The real danger for Cuba is that these 
reforms, like the lukewarm reforms of the 1990s—which also followed the 
familiar pattern of opening at the bottom to a limited number of individual 
entrepreneurs—will not produce the self-sustaining local economic market-
oriented enterprises at the core of Chinese-style progress.
151
 
Though the pieces of this puzzle are messy, the basic parameters 
developed since 2006 are becoming clearer.  Private enterprise is to be 
limited to the non-state sector.  Though undefined, it is structured along the 
lines of specific occupations and services that are made lawful to deliver by 
individuals for their own account.  State control and management remains 
paramount and pervasive: licenses are needed for each listed occupation, 
the state continues to control all markets for goods and distribution channels 
not otherwise covered by a licensed activity, pricing of materials remains 
 
 150 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba 
and the IMF, 24 PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 497-561 (2006). 
 151 Roger Betancourt, Cuba’s Economic ‘Reforms’: Waiting for Fidel on the Eve of the 
Twenty-First Century, 9 CUBA TRANSITION 276, 278 (1999). 
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essentially driven by state planning rather than by demand or supply, and 
the state aggressively taxes all activities in the non-state sector. 
The central focus of privatization is centered on individual economic 
activity, grounded on the sole proprietorship connected to local small-scale 
production or service delivery.  The idea, effectively, is that it might be 
more efficient to permit some individual autonomy at the lowest and 
smallest levels of economic activity because the cost of state supervision at 
this level far exceeds its value.  The issue remains, though, the extent to 
which even in this privatized space, the state ought to assert a more or less 
aggressive regulatory or supervisory presence. 
Control is most effectively exercised by strictly limiting the kinds of 
activity that might qualify for privatization.  The State has carefully and 
perhaps over-precisely limited the sorts of occupations or economic 
activities to which liberalization applies.  Each of the 178 occupations listed 
requires a separate license.  The types of occupations listed are not capital-
intensive activities.  Nor do they directly challenge the state’s control of the 
non-retail sector.  This suggests a focus on the lowest level of economic 
activity, that is, on activity with respect to which aggregation of labor or 
capital is not required.  The official account, as elaborated in Granma,
152
 
suggested that the privatization of a small retail sector was meant to 
respond to popular demand for a wider variety of goods and services and 
the need for the State to reduce its support for goods already made available 
through state enterprises, especially in difficult financial times.
153
  Despite 
the limitations, many Cubans have sought to apply for licenses—some 
regularizing current unregulated private activity, and others seeking entry 
into the non-state sector for the first time.
154
 
The small, local sole entrepreneur is, therefore, the model that is to be 
cultivated at the heart of the reformation of the political economy of 
Cuba.
155
  One can view this either as bottom up development or as the 
necessary bifurcation of the economy, with a market-based local sector and 
a state sector for everything else.  Privatization was characterized as a 
means of revamping the political economy of Cuba to increase productivity 
and efficiency, to increase a collective sense of worker self-worth, and to 
move away from the consequences of a communist party line in the 1990s 
that seemed to condemn private enterprise legitimately permitted (and 
 
 152 Martínez Hernández, supra note 77. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Nick Miroff, Cuba Issues Thousands of Self-Employment Licenses, NPR (Jan. 18, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/18/133020988/cuba-issues-thousands-of-self-
employment-licenses (reporting the issuance of over 75,000 licenses by January 2011). 
 155 Cf. Tracy Wilkinson, Cuba Opening to Private Enterprise Spurs Service Sector Start-
ups, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), http:// www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
cuba-entrepreneurs-20110807,0,7604565.story. 
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regulated) by the state.
156
 
Even before the process of formulating the Lineamientos moved to 
center stage, the strategy of dumping state workers into a newly opened 
non-state sector of sole proprietors and simple cooperatives was taking 
shape.  This was confirmed by internal Cuban state documents that surfaced 
in late 2010
157
 and suggested that a limited amount of aggregation would be 
permitted: cooperatives of individuals but not corporations.
158
  That 
document appeared to premise privatization on the willingness of 
individuals to take advantage of a new form of cooperative in ordering their 
economic activities, but only economic activities within professions 
identified and permitted by the State and subject to appropriate licensure, 
regulation, monitoring, and the like.  But it was also anticipated that “many 
of the fledgling businesses won’t get off the ground because laid-off 




While one of the objectives is to reduce the State’s obligation to 
support its working age population through public sector jobs, another 
equally significant objective was to use non-state sector activity to generate 
what was hoped to be significant tax revenue to fund Cuban social services, 
which are under stress.
160
  All signs, therefore, indicate that the principal 
 
 156 Martínez Hernández, supra note 77.  The need to expand the availability of self-
employment was appropriate in light of official efforts to redesign the political economy of 
the state, and to do so in a way that contributes to the sense of worker self-worth.  More 
importantly, in a way that signalled the scope of the change of the CCP line, Martínez 
Hernández also described the move toward this opening as a means of abandoning the old 
1990s conceptions of private economic activity and the state policy of stigmatizing those 
who engaged in it. 
 157 Paul Haven & Andrea Rodriguez, Document Charts Cuba’s Path to Economic 
Reform, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 2010, reprinted in JAM. OBSERVER (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/Document-charts-Cuba-s-path-to-economic-
reform_7963709. 
 158 It was reported that the intent of the government was both to push individuals into the 
newly created small private retail and basic services sector and to manage the choices for 
private sector activity: 
The document obtained by AP—which is dated August 24 and laid out like a 
PowerPoint presentation with bullet points and large headlines—said many laid-
off workers will be urged to form private cooperatives.  Others will be pushed into 
jobs at foreign-run companies and joint ventures.  Still more will need to set up 
small business—particularly in the areas of transportation, food and house rental. 
Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Services in Cuba: Antecedents, Quality, Financial 
Sustainability, and Policies for the Future, in THE CUBAN ECONOMY: RECENT TRENDS 51 
(José Raúl Perales ed., 2011).  Mesa-Lago notes: “Raúl Castro (2010) has stated: ‘The 
sustainability and preservation of our social system depends on the economic battle, today 
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objective of the State is to convert workers from cost items to revenue 
generators.  The hope is that as a result people will have a larger assortment 
of goods and services available to them and the State will not be burdened 
with the subsidies necessary to provide these items.  Work flexibility is 
taken to redesign the political economy of Cuba to increase individual 
productivity and efficiency as well as to provide a means through which 
workers can feel more useful, change popular conceptions of work, and 
reduce the country’s stigma.  Furthermore, the revenue generated is not 
merely available to the producers, but also to the State in the form of 
taxes.
161
  This income is meant to fund state activity in ways not currently 
available.
162
  And so these private operators of commercial activity will be 




A further review of the government’s presentation of these changes 
also provides evidence of objectives and approaches.
164
  The government 
suggested that, in addition to strict controls on the sorts of occupations 
subject to liberalization, it will tightly control economic activities only for 
some of which private markets will be permitted.
165
  Market control is 
indirect—it is focused not on the markets for permitted activities, but rather 
on markets for materials necessary to conduct business in a wide variety of 
activities that might otherwise have been permitted.  Access to these 
markets will be carefully controlled and changes made slowly over the 
course of 2011 and beyond.
166
  At its base, these secondary markets will be 
 
more than ever our principal task.’”  Id. at 71 (quoting Raúl Castro, Closing Remarks at the 
Ninth Congress of the Young Communist League in Havana, Cuba (Apr. 4, 2010)). 
 161 The initial Granma report explained the State’s intent to tax private activity and the 
anticipation that such activity would be both profitable and generate tax revenue that could 
serve to redistribute wealth and maintain a socialist character.  Martinez Hernández, supra 
note 77. 
 162 See Mesa-Lago, supra note 160. 
 163 Martinez Hernández, supra note 77 (noting obligation to pay taxes to extend to 
personal income, services rendered, for hired labor and in addition to contribute to the state 
social security system). 
 164 Thus, the reliance, in the next several paragraphs, is on the report prepared by 
Martínez Hernández.  See id. 
 165 Martínez Hernández notes that new forms of permitted private economic activity 
would be limited because of the lack of legitimate product markets necessary to carry on 
such activities.  Id. 
 166 Martínez Hernández quotes Marino Murillo Jorge, vice president of the Council of 
Ministers, who suggested the need for additional planning to meet the need for infrastructure 
to support even the small private sector contemplated by the Lineamientos reforms.  
Particularly important was the need to develop a wholesale market, without which even the 
limited private sector contemplated would struggle.  But such a development, Murillo Jorge 
warned, would take years to develop.  See id. (“[E]stamos diseñando en el plan de la 
economía del año próximo qué debemos incorporar teniendo en cuenta las nuevas 
transformaciones que demandarán ferreterías, exigirán de equipamientos gastronómicos que 
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treated as part of the controlled sector.  And space for private market 
activities—especially in foodstuffs—will be expanded a little.
167
 
These changes are treated not so much as a deviation from prior 
practice as a return to the practices of the early post-revolutionary period.  
The fig leaf for this opening of economic activity is the regulations that 
grandfathered professionals in the practice of their profession entered into 
before 1964; but it is a fig leaf that also drew the outer boundaries of 
reform.  The State characterized its reforms largely as a ratification of more 
fundamental policy first articulated in the grandfathering provisions of 1964 
and as building on the premises on which this grandfathering was 
structured.
168
  It was made quite clear that the framework for opening a 
private enterprise sector would be the connection between the need to 
identify a narrow band of professions as the only permitted basis for private 
activities and the conversion of a visible portion of currently illegal and 
underground activities into regulated ones.
169
 
This additional benefit has important ramifications beyond the small 
opening of the retail sector at the heart of the Lineamientos project.
170
  This 
is especially the case with respect to markets in real estate.
171
  With 
appropriate licenses from the State, a limited market in rentals will be 
tolerated, available for the most part to those who receive permission to 
leave the country for a certain amount of time.
172
 The difficulty, though, 
 
hoy no se venden. Tenemos que conducir el plan para lograr coherencia con lo hecho. Lo 
óptimo es un mercado mayorista con precios diferentes para ellos. Pero eso no lo vamos a 
poder hacer en los próximos años. Ahora tenemos que lograr un mercado donde ellos puedan 
comprar lo necesario aunque sin diferenciar los precios minoristas.”).  During that time, of 
course, the development of socialist private markets contemplated in the Lineamientos 
would be vulnerable to the still-considerable power of the CCP’s conservative elements, 
which opposed any deviation from a wholly state directed economy. 
 167  The efforts represent an expansion of current practices rather than a transformative 
opening up.  The suggestion focused on increasing the room for private activity already 
permitted, and even this opening would be highly managed at a level of detail that might 
effectively transform what appears to be opening up into little more than indirect state 
regulation.  See id. (“Valhuerdi comentó que, cuando entre en vigor la resolución, podrán 
utilizarse hasta 20 plazas en las “paladares”, donde antes se podían tener 12; que se permitirá 
comercializar en ellas productos alimenticios elaborados a base de papa, mariscos y carne de 
res.”). 
 168 Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (suggesting the grandfathering as a ratification but 
one justified because the few number of people involved makes such an exception tolerable). 
 169 Id. (explaining that in opening the private sector there was taken into account its 
potential to reduce the scope of underground and illegal market activities). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. (“Igualmente, y para apoyar el trabajo por cuenta propia, se concede la posibilidad 
de alquilar viviendas, habitaciones y espacios para su ejercicio.”). 
 172 Id.  Yet these markets, like those to be developed around cooperatives, remain highly 
regulated, at least indirectly—in this case principally through the retention by state 
authorities of the power to review and approve these transactions and to do so in a way that 
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remains formidable.  Such a transformation requires an equivalent change 
in the institutional structures of administration that have been notorious for 
cronyism, arbitrariness, and lack of accountability.
173
 
A careful review thus suggests that the great changes to the Cuban 
political economy assume a coherent shape that is hardly revolutionary or 
that otherwise point to a rejection of its current framework.  This is change 
at the margins, even if understood as significant within the framework of 
Cuban political thinking.  As such, control remains the key, and the 
avoidance of the creation of potential challengers to state-party power is 
critical.  The State controls private economic activity in three ways: first, it 
does not permit aggregations of economic power by individuals; second, it 
limits the occupations with respect to which private activity is permitted; 
and third, it tightly controls markets open to private activity however it is 
described. 
The great opening, so emotively received in the West, in actuality 
provides a very tightly regulated set of activities within sectors that would 
not compete with the State for financial power, or otherwise threaten to 
open society to the possibility of aggregations by private individuals other 
than through state-approved (and -controlled) organs.  And, indeed, 
Martínez Hernández ends with an explicit reminder of the framework 
within which these changes are made.  The government clearly intends to 
tolerate a small non-state sector at the level of individual basic needs.  The 
State will also manage this non-state sector to ensure that it does not 
otherwise interfere with the power of the state to command the economy at 
the macro-level and in its dealings with global actors.
174
 
For all of that, it is not clear that those who continue to defend the 
traditional control economy model have given up.  The newspapers in 
Miami reinforce this point.  There, both the scope of the attempted reform 
(at least by the internal measure of these changes within Cuban politics) and 
the strongly voiced expectations of failures (and thus of reversion to 
traditional models) were acknowledged.  They were described as “a cold 
dose of reality for those who think reforming one of the last bastions of 
 
may leave applicants little recourse against arbitrary decisions.  Id. (“Es oportuno señalar 
que el dueño de la vivienda puede designar a un representante para pedir una licencia de 
arrendamiento, lo cual viabilizará la gestión a quienes no estén en el país y deseen alquilar su 
domicilio.  La aprobación será, en todos los casos, del director municipal de Vivienda.”).  As 
such, the costs of licensing will likely be seen both as an impediment to an exuberant market 
and as a source of revenue to the State—and sadly, possibly also a source of graft for front 
line officials. 
 173 See generally SERGIO DIAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE F. PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA: 
CASTRO AND BEYOND (2006). 
 174 According to Martínez Hernández, the object is to defend, maintain, and continue to 
perfect socialism, not to destroy it.  See Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (“[E]l fin es 
defender, mantener y continuar perfeccionando el socialismo, no destruirlo.”). 
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Soviet-style communism will be easy: It warns that many of the new 
businesses will be shuttered within a year.”
175
 
There is a tension here between the State’s carefully crafted, 
ideologically harmonious efforts to manage a small, potentially lucrative 
opening and the reality that, once open, the State will not be able to control 
the non-state sector in the way that it controls the rest of the economy.
176
  
This is a frightening prospect within orthodox circles of the CCP, especially 
where foreign states, and particularly the United States, can substantially 
impact Cuban state control of wholesale markets, including supplies and 
pricing, merely by the expedient of permitting Cuban émigrés the right to 
travel more freely to Cuba.
177
  But as Roger Betancourt explains, the 
tension is more complex, grounded in the relationship between political and 
economic control in Cuba: 
This outcome is not an accident, but the result of a conscious attempt 
by the Cuban leadership to maintain absolute political control.  It 
seems to have two basic policies in the economic realm.  One is 
adopting economic mechanisms that yield control of foreign 
exchange for the leadership, which allows them to buy the support of 
the elite that makes up its power base and throw some crumbs to the 
rest (in dissident circles the crumbs are known as la jabita, la 
merienda and la propina).  The other one is rejecting mechanisms 
that provide permanent and independent access to wealth creation for 
anyone who is not a member of the nomenklatura, and even to some 
who think they are members.
178
 
What economic reform has produced, then, is an extension of what 
Javier Corrales described as the development, between 1989 and 2002, of a 
gatekeeper state.
179
  The object of economic reform consists of a strong 
rejection of privatization.  But it also opens, if somewhat timidly, a door for 
devolution of control.  That devolution is substantially focused on the state 
sector.  There, the State might consider a form of organization in which 
economic planning is shifted from the ministries to SOEs.  These are 
understood as functional centers of planning, now more autonomous and 
also expected to function more efficiently (as that term is generally 
understood) but that may still be obliged to take their overall direction from 
 
 175 Haven & Rodriguez, supra note 157. 
 176 See, e.g., Sean Goforth, Cuba’s Economic Desperation, NAT’L INT. (July 31, 2012), 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cuba%27s-economic-desperation-7269. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Betancourt, supra note 151, at 280–81.  The terms la jabita, la merienda and la 
propina are derogatory slang terms for “official graft.” 
 179 See Javier Corrales, The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime 
Survival in Cuba, 1989–2002, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 35 (2004). 
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the ministries.  Yet, devolution also recognizes a space for non-state sector 
activity.  These are more tightly regulated—the particular activities that 
might be undertaken are specified quite precisely.  The system of licensing 
provides a mechanism for substantial control, surveillance, and monitoring 
of private activity.  Sadly, it also permits the development of corruption 
among low-level CCP cadres and state officials charged with permits, tax, 
form filling, and the like.  
III.  IDEAL AND REALITY: FROM AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
TO PROLETARIAN CORPORATION 
The possibility of aggregating effort for economic activity is severely 
curtailed in Cuba.  Individuals may not aggregate capital.  Nor may they 
join together to form corporate entities—that is a privilege left to the State, 
and such entities must remain organs of state power.  Yet, if the non-state 
sector is to survive, some measure of aggregation must be permitted.  To 
that end, the CCP has chosen to focus not on the aggregation of capital, but 
of labor, goods, and services.  For that purpose, Cuban intellectuals, now 
joined institutionally by the CCP and the State, ironically revive and revise 
a form of collectivization developed by Lenin and enforced under Stalin 
from the 1920s for the solution to the problem of agricultural production 
and to eliminate capitalist tendencies among peasants,
180
 most notable for 
its failures.  But in revised form, Cuban authorities believe they can turn to 
the old agricultural cooperative to provide the structural bones of something 
related but quite different, to expand productive capacity without losing 
control of markets.  No longer merely a means for organizing agricultural 
production, cooperatives now are meant to serve as the framework for the 
aggregation of economic forces for mutual production that would not divert 
ownership or control of capital away from the State but which might shift 
the focus of production from the dictates of central planners to the demands 
of consumers, while retaining an obligation to operate for the benefit of its 
members and also of the broader social good.
181
  This is a tall order 
demanded of a system in which there is no consensus about the extent to 
which economic activity might escape, even in small measure, the control 
of management of the State. 
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For cooperatives to work as an acceptable alternative under the current 
regime’s assumptions about the corporate form, it would be necessary to 
distinguish between the autonomous governance form at the foundation of 
the corporate form and a cooperative form more amenable to state 
supervision and control.  It is to the transformation of the Cuban 
agricultural cooperative from a vestigial form of collectivism to something 
akin to a proletarian corporation that this Article turns to next.  This Part 
considers the cooperative as a mediating device between the state-sector 
corporation and the sole proprietorship as the basic building block of 
private economic activity in Cuba.  It suggests the political and cultural
182
 
as well as the economic dimension of the project of theorizing a proletarian 
corporation. 
A.  Structural Template: The Agricultural Cooperative in Cuba Post-1959 
The Cuban government has sought to follow, in some respects, the 
Leninist pattern of collectivization through agricultural cooperatives.
183
  
That framework, developed over the first half-century of the current 
government, emphasized aggregation of labor, control of pricing, state 
ownership of means of production, and some degree of autonomy in the 
actual production of crops.
184
  Agricultural cooperatives also have served as 
a venue for experimenting autonomous collective activities.
185
  Though 
these models of cooperatives have been criticized recently as fatally 
flawed,
186
 orthodox and experimental structures have provided a framework 
for broader application since 2010.
187
  The development of cooperatives in 
Cuban agriculture is based on the first and second laws of the agrarian 
reform in May 1959 and 1963.
188
  With the enactment of the two laws, more 
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than seventy percent of farmland was expropriated by the Cuban 
government, creating the state agricultural sector in Cuba.
189
  
Collectivization followed, along with a growing exodus of people to the 
cities and intermittent agricultural crises.
190
 
The first cooperatives created in the revolutionary period were known 
as peasant associations.
191
  These were embryos of the latter cooperatives.  
With the exit of financial institutions that provided credits to cooperatives 
from Cuba, the Credit and Services Cooperative (CCS) was founded in 
1960.
192
  The CCS was voluntarily formed by peasants that benefitted from 
the agrarian law reforms.
193
  The sugar cane cooperatives were created after 
much of the land which was nationalized or retaken in 1959  was harvested 
in 1960.
194
  The first sugar cane cooperatives were organized by peasants, 




To respond to the strain placed on agricultural production after 1975, 
the Agricultural Production Cooperatives (Cooperativa de Producción 
Agropecuaria) (CAP) were created.  They were formed voluntarily by 
peasants who owned land and means of production. Unlike members of the 
CCS, members of the CAP who sold their properties to the cooperatives 
were paid, and became owners and collective workers.
196
  The Cuban 
agricultural model was characterized by the state-owned business with large 
scale of production and elevated centralization.  It was an industrial 
agricultural model, with a high rate of consumption of its inputs and 
immense investment and equipment per area. With the collapse of the 
socialist nations, the Cuban agricultural sector was hit by an economic 
crisis.
197
  The basic units of cooperative production were created in 1993, 
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and it was established that these units were going to be owners of their 
production and that they would sell their production to the state through a 
business venture or any other way the State chose.
198
 
The Cuban agriculture sector is an integration of five types of 
productive entities:
199
 Basic Unit of Cooperative Production (Unidad 
Básica de Producción Cooperativa) (UBPC), CAP, CCS, private, and the 
state.  The first three are considered cooperatives.  The forms that are most 
efficient are the CCS and private peasants.
200
  The UBPC has been offered 
as a model for a generalized form of cooperative structure outside the 
agricultural sector.
201
  In addition, Cuban farmers have sought to develop an 
independent cooperative movement, which was effectively discouraged by 
the state about a decade ago.
202
  The restructuring that produced the 
Lineamientos has not left agricultural cooperatives untouched.  In 2011, the 




The regulatory forms of these cooperatives were similar.  Private 
activity was tolerated, but highly managed.  State approvals and review 
were required at critical points in cooperative formation, operation, and 
production.  The state controlled productive property but made it available 
to cooperative members.  Cooperatives were viewed as cash generators 
from which the state would take the first, and to the extent possible, a 
substantial cut.  The state reserved to itself the right to modify and direct 
operations of cooperatives when necessary, and the objectives of 
cooperatives tended to privilege their social obligations.  But the 
Lineamientos framework has exerted pressure to allow some autonomy for 
farm cooperatives as well,
204
 reorganizing UBPCs, liquidating some of their 
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debt, and granting them greater autonomy from the state control.
205
  By the 
early-twenty-first century, cooperatives had become a backwater.  But the 
economic crisis of the first decade of the twenty-first century provided an 
impetus to rethink about economic relationships.  That rethinking moved 
from capital-privileged form of conventional corporation to labor-privileged 
forms of cooperatives.  These structural characteristics would serve as the 
foundation for the regulatory structure of non-agricultural cooperatives,
206
 
even when the intellectual movement seeking the expansion of cooperatives 
into the non-state sector focused on the socialist character of economic 
aggregations of productive power, which de-centered capital and 
shareholders from construction of viable economic enterprises. 
207
 
B.  The Cooperative as a Proletarian Corporation: the Debate Within Cuba 
With ideological barriers against the use of corporate form in the non-
state sector of Cuba, its intellectual elites have been exploring cooperative 
as the socialist form of individually aggregated enterprise.  Much of the 
theoretical justifications and arguments supporting this form as an 
acceptable alternative for organizing private economic activity have been 
recently explored in a collection of important essays assembled by Camila 
Piñeiro Harnecker.
208
  The Cuban intellects assembled around this problem 
have attempted to develop a theoretical framework within which the 
cooperative form can be legitimated and applied to meet the objectives of 
the state in its retail sector privatization efforts.  These efforts are worth 
considering in some detail both to examine the difficulties of translating 
theoretical advances into law, and to understand the tight conceptual 
connection between the internal and external economic policies of Cuba, 
faced with internal financial difficulties and the challenge of contesting 
globalization in Cuba’s relations abroad. 
One of the problems for them is the looseness in the current 
application of the term “cooperative.”  It currently serves as the name for 
various enterprises with little in common other than that they are neither 
sole proprietorships nor corporations.
209
  Indeed, cooperatives have evolved 







 and non-governmental organizations 
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  Piñeiro Harnecker also notes the predominance of 
cooperatives in the agricultural sector, a characteristic of cooperatives that 
she, like Henry Hansmann,
214
 believes is not necessarily inevitable.
215
 
Perhaps a bigger problem is the close connection or convergence 
between the cooperative and corporation.  Hansmann notes that there are 
few functional differences between a consumer cooperative (owned by its 
customers), a producer cooperative (owned by individuals selling a factor of 
production to the firm), and a business corporation.
216
  As he notes, “the 
same is true of the standard business corporation, which is a firm that is 
owned by persons who supply capital to the firm.  In fact, the conventional 
investor-owned business corporation is nothing more than a special type of 
producer cooperative—namely a lenders’ cooperative or a capital 
cooperative.”
217
  Enterprise organization, then, can be understood in terms 
of factors of its respective organization, as a function of the way in which it 
is built on a particular set of factors of production.  Hansmann thus suggests 
a basis for separating these organization  forms in ways that address the 
political economy of states: “A business corporation is different from a 
dairy cooperative or a wheat cooperative or a workers’ cooperative only 




And that insight may be the key to the development of a proletarian 
corporation using the cooperative structure.  A proletarian corporation can 
be constructed by emphasizing the contribution of labor rather than capital 
to the firm.  It may be possible to offer a labor cooperative in place of a 
capital cooperative (the corporation), but one tied to the mass politics and 
solidarity norms of classical Marxist-Leninist theory within which such 
labor privileging enterprises remain subject to the political requirements of 
the state identified by the party in power.
219
  Thus, Piñeiro Harnecker and 
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her colleagues suggest there is a way of emphasizing the solidarity aspects 
of cooperative organization and from the start, better merging its form and 
operation with the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist state organization as 
practiced in Cuba.
220
  In contrast to the work of western economists, then, 
this is as much a political enterprise as it is an economic one, but one in 




Piñeiro Harnecker, for example,
222
 starts with the ICA’s seven 
principles of cooperative practice: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2) 
democratic member control; (3) members’ autonomy and independence in 
economic participation; (4) education, training, and information; (5) 
cooperation among cooperatives; (6) concern for community; and (7) the 
proletarian element.
223
  Emphasizing the political element of choice of 
organizational form, she suggests that cooperatives are inherently socialist 
precisely because they reject the fundamental organizing principal of 
capitalism—the privileging of capital in the formation of enterprises.
224
  
Just as it is natural for the political objectives of capitalism to treat the 
capital cooperative as a unique entity and fashion its law around its 
development, so it may be natural of socialist states to do the same for labor 
cooperatives, in which the emphasis is on labor contribution in determining 
ownership and rights to direct the productive factors of joint or aggregate 
enterprises.  For Cruz Reyes and Piñeiro Harnecker, the labor cooperative is 
essentially anti-capitalist because it does not build on the premise of an 
inevitable connection between capital and ownership.
225
  They thus argue 
against the corporation as a special type of producer cooperative, tied to the 
values and hierarchies of capitalism, and for the labor cooperative (referred 
to as the proletarian corporation in this article), which is a special type of 
producer cooperative tied to the values and hierarchies of Marxist-Leninist 
states. 
For this to work, at least at the retail service level, a strong 
governmental hand is required to suppress the usual determinants of 
demand—markets and price.  The proletarian corporation operates in a 
world in which demand is measured internally by the decision making and 
planning functions of the associates of the cooperative, rather than 
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externally through market and price mechanisms.
226
  This is not as strange 
as it may sound, especially to western ears.  Hansmann notes that one of the 
strengths of cooperatives was their ability to measure success in terms 
beyond wealth production in the form of dividends.  He links the need for 
strong member control in cooperatives to the “benefits that the members of 
a cooperative receive . . . in the form of higher quality goods or services.”
227
  
This is the suggestion made by Piñeiro Harnecker as well.
228
  And it makes 
sense from an economic perspective: if “ownership need not be, and 
frequently is not, associated with investment of capital,” then neither 
organizational form nor assessment of welfare maximization need follow 
corporate models, and an approach more compatible with Marxist-Leninist 
ideals might be reached.
229
 
But in the Cuban context, this may not be possible.  Cuban 
cooperatives do not operate autonomously; their operations are substantially 
constrained indirectly through regulation that has the effect of vesting the 
state with substantial control over the kind, amount and pricing of good 
produced or services provided. Thus, the State is interposed between labor 
and the cooperative.  The State, which continues to operate on the basis of 
capital and as the monopoly capitalist within the national economy.  The 
cooperative necessarily takes on the control and decisional characteristics of 
the enterprises that control capital. These are anchored in large state 
corporations and state control of capital, guided by the ideals of welfare 
maximization based on that ownership in the public sector..  It follows that 
the move from price and market to socially privileged production appears to 
lead inevitably back to the state.  The proletarian corporation, then, 
becomes a vehicle through which state planning mechanisms and the 
incorporation of the political sensibilities (expressed as policy and 
economic choices) of CCP and state officials can be exported and 
outsourced.  In the absence of price and market structures, cooperative 
associates must engage in the same patterns of planning and production as 
state functionaries for production in the national economy.  Indeed, Avelino 
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Fernández Peiso has suggested that Cuban cooperatives have been seen in 




In this respect, the autonomy of the private sector is meant to be 
constrained by a normative structure that requires each enterprise to act as if 
it were an instrumentality of the state, even as these enterprises are 
encouraged to develop closer connections with the small subpart of the 
population they are meant to serve.  The effect is privatization in 
appearance, but with the retention of the structures of state control in a way 
that parallels control-economy planning mentality now applied at the 
cooperative level.  This approach can give rise to problems of sustainability 
similar to those that required the Cuban government to privatize in the first 
place.  To resolve that problem, Piñeiro Harnecker suggests that state 
institutions should not demand that cooperatives provide services at prices 
that do not generate sufficient revenues to sustain the cooperatives as going 
concerns.
231
  To increase the likelihood of success, state intervention is 
required.  Piñeiro Harnecker suggests that the issue is to design regulatory 




The solution to privatized central planning offered through the 
cooperative, then, might be more indirect planning at the state level.  
Indeed, the consequence is that the cooperative becomes dependent on state 
pricing policy; since enterprise inputs are not market-driven as to 
availability and price, market distortions in inputs markets will be reflected 
in the viability of cooperatives.  That is not encouraging and might require 
substantially more development.  If the object is to embrace the upsides of 
cooperatives, even in the form of proletarian corporations, then the 
operationalization of the cooperative framework ought not to impose those 
structures and norms that led to privatization in the first place.  Yet, this 
may be precisely the result sought by the Lineamientos, which insists that 
all sectors of the economy, including the non-state sectors, are to be 
managed by the state.  New methods of planning may change the form of 
control, but autonomy of the private sector is not to be undertaken outside 
the premises of the central planning model at the heart of the conventional 
Cuban economic system.
233
 Indeed, Piñeiro Harnecker also emphasizes 
 
 230 Avelino Fernández Peiso, Notas características del marco legal del ambiente 
cooperativo cubano [Characteristic Features of the Legal Framework of the Cuban 
Collaborative Environment], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 366. 
 231 Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214, at 28. 
 232 Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 112, at 14 (“El asunto es dise ar mecanismos de 
regulaci n y espacios de coordinaci n  ue permitan a las cooperativas internalizar intereses 
sociales.”). 
 233 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, at 5. 
 
The Cooperative as a Proletarian Corporation 
33:527 (2013) 
573 
institutional intervention.  For example, she suggests that when it is 
necessary for the state to manage cooperative decision-making, the state 
could include necessary terms within leases, concessions and franchises 
obtained from or through the state, or when direct intervention is required, 
by placing a government official as a member of the cooperative itself.
234
 
For that purpose, the ICA principles
235
 are necessary but not sufficient.  
They suggest additional principles of organization that emphasize the 
privileging of labor and the marginalization of capital ownership in the 
organization of the proletarian corporation.
236
  These include what Piñeiro 
Harnecker identifies as redistributive solidarity and social transformation.
237
  
But as an instrument of political and social goals, the traditional markers of 
enterprise success (based perhaps on the logic of the corporation as a capital 
cooperative) become problematic—in lieu of risk and profit, they favor 
solidarity and risk aversion.
238
  Cooperatives must be differentiated from 
capitalist corporations in a substantive manner.  Table 1 shows the 








Control of decision-making  Rests in stock holders, who 
are not necessarily workers 
The collective of the 
associates, i.e. all workers 
Destiny of the enterprise Decided by the stock holders Decided by the associates 
Workers’ income Decided by the stock holders Decided by the associates 
Democratic rights of the 
workers 
Workers might have a say 
through a union, but they do 
not have a vote 
Each worker has both a 
voice and vote 
Main objective Maximize the revenue of the 
stock holders 
Satisfy the needs of the 
associates 
Primary motivation of the 
proprietors 
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Because proletarian corporations favor labor rather than capital, Piñeiro 
Harnecker suggests such enterprises may define efficiency differently—not 
grounded in the minimization of labor for the production of profit, but the 
minimization of capital for the production of worker satisfaction.
240
 
This proletarian corporation would operate within a limited field of 
production—one that parallels the Cuban retail sector liberalization 
policies.  In those areas, such a model of economic activity could be 
understood as socially productive.  The targets are those activities where 
economies of scale are absent (and with respect to which the state, through 
its corporate enterprises would be expected to operate alone).  Another 
advantage of cooperatives in the retail and small production sector
241
 is their 
ability to adapt quickly to local needs without the need to reduce their 
workforce (and thus meet the government’s objective of keeping people 
employed).  Small and medium businesses have their fundamental strength 
in the capacities of their workers and not so much on technology; they have 
more flexibility to modify or add new lines of production, and thus offer 
new products that satisfy the variables and different preferences of the 
consumers.  This focus suggests the tendency to criticize efforts—like those 
on Mondragon, the Basque cooperative
242
—that appear to leverage labor 
(for example, by permitting the hiring of labor that is not part of the 
management structure); the fear is that bureaucratization and 




Yet, the lessons of cooperative organization can also have potential for 
challenging the cultural norms that currently exist in Cuba in the operation 
of state enterprises.
244
  Drawing heavily from Istvan M sz ros,
245
 Novaes 
argues that Marx’s vision of a post-capitalist society corresponds to a self-
managed socialism that is not concerned only in distributing material 
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COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 167. 
 245 E.g., ISTVAN M S  R S, LA ED CACI N M S ALL  DEL CAPITAL [EDUCATION BEYOND 
CAPITAL] (Maria Maneiro & Ernesto Grance trans., 2008); IST  N M S  R S, LA TE R A DE 
LA ENA ENACI N EN MARX [MARX’S THEORY OF ALIENATION] (2003); IST  N M S  R S, 
PARA AL M D  CAPITAL [BEYOND CAPITAL] (Paulo Cezar Castanheira & Sergio Lessa trans., 
2002). 
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wealth under certain criteria of equality, but instead is focused on the 
production of wealth in a superior form.
246
  That form replaces material 
with intangible markers—one that focuses on human dignity rather than 
wealth accumulation, that is what he refers to as a society beyond capital.
247
  
Cooperatives can overcome the alienation that is present in the private 
corporation but also in the state corporation managed in an authoritarian 
manner where the participation of the workers is just a formality.  He 
proposes democratic management of the corporation, even the SOE, as a 
way around the socialist conundrum of worker collectives in which labor 
has no voice in the operation of the enterprise.  Others take this notion 
farther, suggesting that cooperatives are a central element in the 
construction of a solidarity economy
248
—one whose principles become 
closely intertwined with the organizational paradigms of ALBA. 
An emerging enterprise-like culture of cooperative management might 
have an effect on the operation of the state sector, even as the state sector 
appears to mold cooperative organization in its own image.
249
  Within Cuba, 
that dialogue would have profound possibilities if not suppressed.  And 
indeed, the possibility of cooperative autonomy and its effects on state 
enterprises concerns Cuban theorists.  Yet, the idea of increasing the 
autonomy of labor in cooperatives beyond the direct control of the State is 
also viewed by traditionalists as a dangerous adventure that will destabilize 
the Cuban economic system.
250
  Thus, rather than suggesting greater 
autonomy for non-state sector enterprises, like cooperatives, some call for 
closer control of these entities along the lines already in place for SOEs.  
Ironically, Hansmann’s notion of the fundamental similarity of the 
cooperative and the corporation tends to serve as a brake on the possibility 
of creating a class of private enterprises outside the control of the State, 
where the State has all control of productive activity. 
The potential to challenge economic cultural norms through 
cooperatives is limited by ideological divisions within the CCP that have 
been transposed into a set of structural constraints on cooperative activity.  
Ideological constraints are grounded in the reluctance to open up even a 
very limited space for private activity.  This approach is based on a very 
conservative perspective of the requirements of Marxist-Leninist economic 
 
 246 Novaes, supra note 244. 
 247 Id. at 174–78. 
 248 Claudio Alberto Rivera Rodríguez, Odalys Labrador Machín & Juan Luis Alfonso 
Alemán, Retos del cooperativismo como alternativa de desarrollo ante la crisis global. Su 
papel en el modelo económico cubano [Challenges of Development Cooperation as an 
Alternative to the Global Crisis: Cooperatives’ Role in the Cuban Economic Model], in 
COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 397–415. 
 249 Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 112. 
 250 Gil de San Vicente, supra note 181, at XX. 
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organization, one at variance with the official positions in other Marxist-
Leninist states but consistent with the majority view within the CCP 
leadership before 2006.
251
  The strength of this perspective is evidenced by 
the finalization of the Lineamientos provisions on cooperatives.  But there 
is also growing support among cadres and CCP leadership for an approach 
grounded in state direction, and ultimate control, but with a larger space 
within which economic activity can be devolved to individuals, either in a 
private sector or through the operation of state enterprises.  However, the 
state-directed model, rather than state-control model, has not yet been 
accepted among a majority of CCP leaders. 
As a consequence, cooperatives (and SOEs) remain subject to a 
number of structural constraints.  In addition to the formal constraints 
described in the Lineamientos, the rules are grounded on a premise of 
cooperation, rather than competition, with the state sector.  One 
consequence is that the operation of the private sector is understood as 
functioning for the production of income first for the state and then for the 
participants.  Additionally, the cooperation premise serves as a justification 
for retaining the regime of tightly constrained and licensed private sector 
vocations and the control of basic goods and products necessary for 
cooperative activity.  Limited to the contribution of goods (usually retail 
ready) and labor (for direct service provision), the cooperative operations 
are limited by the availability of goods and the scope of permitted 
occupations, both of which are controlled by the State.  Even if 
cooperatives could be structured for the contribution of unfinished goods or 
components for assembly and sale through the cooperative, something 
contemplated for second-level cooperatives in the proposed Lineamientos 
but perhaps eliminated in the final version, the State would still control 
cooperatives’ sizes and operations through control of the provision of goods 
and the approval of activity to which those goods are directed.  As a 
consequence, cooperatives are structured to remain small and contribute to 
the residual economy, something in line with the general re-organization of 
the Cuban economy, but they remain dependent on state planning because 
there is no access to goods markets and the scope of activities are tightly 
controlled.  The State remains very much in control—but now that control 
is indirect, something contemplated in the Lineamientos.
252
 
Piñeiro Harnecker understands the challenges.  She acknowledges that 
 
 251 Piñeiro Harnecker highlights this conflict, between those she identifies as followers of  
the ideological framework associated with Ché Guevara, who viewed any sort of private 
activity as impossible without direct guidance of the state, as opposed to those who viewed 
that state control could be indirectly asserted through structural regulation of non-state 
enterprises.  Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 112, at 13–14 (referencing in part Yaffe, supra 
note 148). 
 252 Lineamientos, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1–10. 
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new cooperative theory is criticized by some as merely utopian.
253
  Others 
criticize it for being unrealistic within the context of the regulation of the 
Cuban economy by the State—cooperatives will never have sufficient 
autonomy to be effective.  Still others fear cooperatives; even labor 
cooperatives are a threat to the state precisely because they will be too 
autonomous and fracture the unity of proletarian power on which the 
ideology of the organization of the state rests.
254
  These were the themes 
raised in the essays Piñeiro Harnecker assembled.
255
  More broadly, those 
difficulties also continue to make the form of corporate organization 
(whether as a capital cooperative or in the new labor cooperatives form) 
particularly troublesome for regimes like Cuba, which view juridical or 
legal persons that constitute the aggregation of popular power as a threat to 
the state unless the state owns or controls these organizations.
256
 
Cooperatives are viewed as a means of economic aggregation that 
avoids the problems of corporations in their relationship to the state and 
society—shareholder wealth maximization, avoidance of corporate social 
responsibility principles, and labor exploitation.
257
  Yet, like the corporate 
form that remains the sole province of the state, the problem of autonomy 
 
 253 See Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214. 
 254 According to Piñeiro Harnecker: 
When it is proposed that the production cooperative be one—though not the 
only—form of enterprise in Cuba, three concerns above all are frequently 
encountered: some consider it too “utopian” and therefore inefficient; others, on 
the basis of the cooperatives that have existed in Cuba, suspect that they will not 
have sufficient autonomy or that they will be “too much like state enterprises”; 
while others still, accustomed to the control over enterprise activities exercised by 
a state that intervenes directly and excessively in enterprise management, reject 
cooperativism as too autonomous and therefore a “seed of capitalism”.  This book 
tries to take account of all these concerns, though there is no doubt that more space 
would be required to address them adequately. 
Cameron, supra note 215 (translating Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 215 (“Cuando en Cuba 
se propone a la cooperativa de producción como una —no la única— forma de organización 
empresarial, es común encontrarse sobre todo con tres preocupaciones: unos la conside- ran 
demasiado “utópica” y por tanto ineficiente; otros, a partir de las formas que ha tomado en 
Cuba, sospechan que será insuficientemente autónoma o “demasiado parecida a la empresa 
estatal”; y otros, habituados a un control de la actividad empresarial por un Estado que 
interviene de manera directa y excesiva en la gestión, la rechazan como demasiado autónoma 
y por tanto un “germen del capitalismo”.  Este libro intenta tener en cuenta todas estas 
inquie- tudes, aunque sin dudas se requiere de más espacio para tratarlas adecuadamente.”)). 
 255 Id. 
 256 See Backer, supra note 5, at 384. 
 257 See Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214, at 28 (“Asimismo, para evitar la concentración 
de riqueza que explica los altos impuestos aplicados a los cuentapropistas, debería sobre todo 
promoverse que el nuevo sector no estatal adopte preferentemente el modelo de gestión 
cooperativo, donde los beneficios son distribuidos de forma equitativa entre sus miembros y 
que favorezcan en alguna medida las comunidades aledañas.”). 
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remains a key issue in the academic debates in ways that mirror the political 
debate of the Sixth Party Congress.  It is the issue that raises, for the Cuban 
political economy, the ideological question of the extent of the role of the 
state in planning economic decisions: should the state set the general goals 
and objectives of economic activity, or should it direct more precisely the 
economic choices of individuals and cooperatives at an operational level?  
The framework of analysis is quite clearly tailored to Cuban circumstances: 
The managerial autonomy of the collective that makes up the 
cooperative—the ability of this group of people to make decisions 
independently—is the key reason why the historical experiences of 
socialist construction have rejected their relevance to the building of 
socialism and have relegated them to agriculture or marginal 
economic spaces.  Some see in autonomy a disconnection from, or a 
wanting to have nothing to do with, social interests and the strategic 
objectives embodied in the socialist economic plan, and ask the 
following questions: Is it possible to “hitch” an autonomous 
enterprise to a planned economy?  Can a cooperative respond not 
only to the interests of its members but also to wider social interests?  
When one thinks in terms of absolute autonomy and authoritarian 
(i.e. undemocratic) planning, if the interests of collectives (groups) 
are considered a priori to be indifferent to social interests, then the 
answer is obviously negative.  The authors of this book are 
motivated by the certainty that the answer is affirmative.  We argue 
the case here, though we are unable to respond to all of the questions 
about how this can be achieved in practice.
258
 
Piñeiro Harnecker highlights both the peculiarities of the Cuban 
discussion about economic reform and engagement in global economic 
movements, and its distance from the path followed by the Chinese 
Communist Party since the 1980s.  Cuba is seeking to forge a third path 
between the market oriented economic model of the West and the pattern of 
economic control developed by the great Asian Marxist–Leninist states.  It 
remains committed to a significant degree of central planning, and 
suspicious of autonomous aggregations of capital or individuals not directly 
controlled or managed by the State.  It has sought to build these notions into 
its international and regional economic planning to the same extent it seeks 
to base its internal economic model on those principles.
259
  But Piñeiro 
Harnecker may not be fully considering the institutional challenges of 
creating the rule system contemplated in the Lineamientos—founded on 
contract law that is viewed as legitimate and fairly enforced, the absence of 
which substantially raises the risks and costs of forming these enterprises as 
 
 258 Cameron, supra note 215 (translating Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214). 
 259 Backer & Molina, supra note 36, at 687–89. 
 




The case of the Cabildo nightclub
260
 is quite telling in this respect, both 
for the difficulties of drawing entrepreneurs out of the so-called black 
market (unregulated) sector and for what it portends for creating rule-of-law 
based (that is, non-arbitrary) regulatory systems managing cooperatives: 
El Cabildo is the product of one man’s moxie and of changes in 
government policy aimed at improving Cuba’s struggling economy.  
Ulises Aquino, a 50-year-old opera singer who founded Opera in the 
Street in 2006, was looking for a home for the company, so when 
President Castro announced a series of reforms two years ago 
promoting private businesses he decided to seize the 
opportunity . . . . In 2011, Aquino, whose performers were 
accustomed to playing in rudimentary conditions, including in the 
street, convinced authorities in Havana’s upscale Playa district to let 




By July 2012, the enterprise had about 130 employees operating a 150-
seat venue.  However, to get to this size, Aquino had to deal with the 
complex system of rules governing the licensing of private activity in the 
non-state sector.
262
  His solution illustrated the objective of those 
regulations—to ensure that private enterprises remain small and local, to 
avoid a threat to the economic dominance of the state sector.  No sooner 
had the Cabildo nightclub garnered international attention than it was 
closed by state authorities: 
A week ago[,] government inspectors burst into the El Cabildo 
cultural center to the shock of patrons, artists and staff attending 
musical performed by its theater company, the “Opera in the Street.”  
The local authorities, citing a recent Reuter’s story on the center that 
mentioned a cover charge for customers, took away El Cabildo’s 
license on the grounds of “illicit enrichment.”  The vast majority of 
El Cabildo’s clients were Cuban, paying a 50-peso cover charge, the 
equivalent of $2, while foreigners paid more.  The inspectors 
searched El Cabildo for hours and interrogated its young artists and 
 
 260 Marc Frank, In Cuba an Opera Singer Builds an Empire, REUTERS (July 11, 2012, 
5:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/11/us-cuba-theater-reform-
idUSBRE86A1B620120711. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. (“The new entrepreneurs had to get a license for their business and private 
restaurants were limited to a maximum of 50 seats. Aquino got around the limit by taking 
out three restaurant licenses, which enabled him to put in 150 seats, and then another as an 
‘organizer of events and other activities.’ Using the latter, he plans to expand the business by 
offering boat rides on the Almendares River, which flows beside El Cabildo just before 
opening into the Straits of Florida.”). 
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restaurant staff, but found nothing more amiss than two cooks 
working on a trial basis without proper papers, employees said.
263
 
The original international news story piqued the interest of state 
bureaucrats, who called Aquino to discuss his operations.
264
  What he 
described suggested a cooperative, in which all workers shared in the 
revenues of the enterprise.
265
  There was a sense that the operations were 
allowed to continue in the absence of publicity, but were shut down when 
news stories revealed not merely the extent of the operation, but more 
significantly, that the workers in that enterprise were able to make 
substantially more money than in the state sector, even after the payment of 
all state tax and other obligations.  Rather than seeing this as a challenge for 
the state sector to do better, the bureaucracy appeared to take the operations 
as a challenge to the system itself.  If success is interpreted as a threat, then 
it is unlikely, at least with this generation of CCP and state cadres, that the 
reforms developed at the elite level will be successfully implemented on the 
ground.  The decision to shut down the operations rather than to fine it and 
the lack of the appearance of process, suggested the possibility of 
arbitrariness that will impede other risk-takers seeking to take the State up 
on its offer to invigorate the non-state sector.  As a solution, the government 
announced that it would allow the presentation of the artistic part of the 
operation as a state-subsidized activity.
266
  It seems that, here, the 
consequence of private sector success is incorporation into the state sector. 
In this story, the scope of the challenges facing Cuba can be seen: a 
bureaucracy that may be resisting changes proposed at the top of the state 
 
 263 Marc Frank, Cuban Opera Singer Challenges “Jealous” Bureaucrats Over Closed 
Theater, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2012, 6:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-
cuba-theater-reform-idUSBRE8701R120120801 (“A Cuban economist said El Cabildo’s 
cover charge may have fallen into a gray area in Cuban law.  Though private establishments 
were not prohibited from having cover charges, establishments associated with the Culture 
Ministry, such as such as El Cabildo, might be more restricted in what they can charge.”). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. (“Reuters also had reported that El Cabildo’s proceeds were shared after expenses, 
taxes, and investments, resulting in monthly wages four times greater than the country’s 450 
pesos average, or around $19.  ‘The earnings of the Opera of the Street are divided among 
everyone . . . including me . . . .  All the artists perform with a subsidy from the Culture 
Ministry, but as our president has said, salaries do not correspond with the cost of living,’ 
Aquino said in his letter.”). 
 266 El Gobierno prefiere subvencionar la Ópera de la Calle antes que permitir su gestión 
privada [The Government Prefers to Subsidize Street Opera Before Allowing Private 
Management], DIARIO DE CUBA (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:12 PM), 
http://www.diariodecuba.com/cultura/12378-el-gobierno-prefiere-subvencionar-la-opera-de-
la-calle-antes-que-permitir-su-gestion-p [hereinafter The Government Prefers] (“Un 
comunicado del Consejo Nacional de las Artes Escénicas, dependiente del Ministerio de 
Cultura, señala que la Compañía de Teatro Lírico y Espectáculos Ópera de la Calle 
‘mantiene sus actividades como proyecto cultural comunitario subvencionado.’”). 
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and CCP hierarchies; limited ability to manage implementation of economic 
reforms for lack of deep cultures of non-state sector management; limited 
rule structures for determining conformity to the new economic model; and 
the lack of a set of procedures for challenging government action.  In a 
sense, the closure is as much a challenge to senior CCP leaders as it is to the 
emerging non-state sector.
267
  It also illustrates the determination of Cuban 
authorities to maintain the division of economic activities within which the 
private sector always occupies a small part.  It is clear that, whatever the 
shape of the reforms, the state sector will not be challenged, and challenge, 
for the moment appears to be quite broadly construed.
268
  But the Cabildo 
affair also suggests the power of Raúl Castro’s efforts to move from a state-
controlled to a state-directed economic model.  These enterprises can 
operate successfully as cooperatives; Mr. Aquino was creating a sort of 
proletarian corporation whose success suggests that reform might have been 
on the right path.  The Cabildo appeared to provide a substantial boost to 
the Cuban economy.  It did so on a cooperative basis whereby the members 
contributed labor to provide a local service through an enterprise in which 
the workers shared in the governance and the proceeds while meeting local 
needs.  The Cabildo paid its taxes and generated income for the State.  It 
operated in a sector that posed little danger to the integrity of the national 
economy.  If the Cabildo can be considered to pose a threat to the 
organization of the Cuban economy, then it is not clear that there will be 
much space for the non-state sector or that effective reform will be possible 
soon.
269
  The cooperative, like the rest of the reform agenda, will remain an 
elegant theory with powerful insights into the operation of a Marxist–
 
 267 Nick Miroff, Opera Unfolds When a Cuban Cabaret Is Closed Down, NPR (Jul. 31, 
2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/31/157656452/opera-unfolds-when-a-cuban-
caberat-is-shut-down (“Raul Castro himself told Cubans in a recent speech that bureaucrats 
who stand in the way of change will be swept aside.  He’s laid out plans to resuscitate 
Cuba’s state-run economy by creating millions of jobs in new small businesses and 
cooperatives.  But the process is dragging.  Closing El Cabildo has eliminated 130 of the 
jobs created for Cubans like Angel Basterrechea, who fears he may have lost the highest-
paying job he’ll ever have.”). 
 268 The Government Prefers, supra note 266. 
 269 Indeed, among Cuban intellectuals committed to the regime, this affair has been 
reported as revealing the real intent of the government with respect to reforms.  See El 
Gobierno cierra un centro cultural considerado la mayor empresa privada de Cuba [The 
Government Closed a Cultural Center Considered the Largest Privately Cuba], 
EUROPAPRESS (Aug. 3, 3012) (Sp.), http://www.europapress.es/latam/cultura/noticia-cuba-
gobierno-cierra-centro-cultural-considerado-mayor-empresa-privada-cuba-
20120803154826.html (“El destino del centro cultural El Cabildo está en el centro de 
atención de intelectuales y artistas de la isla, y se ha convertido en una prueba de fuego en 
los esfuerzos impulsados por Castro para expandir el sector privado mientras reduce 
drásticamente la burocracia estatal.”). 
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Leninist economy without any possibility of effective implementation.
270
 
Additionally, the cooperative structure envisioned in Cuba, with its 
focus on the possibilities of producer–labor cooperatives but dependent on 
the state apparatus as the holder of productive capital, presents a more 
fundamental challenge.  That challenge suggests the extent to which Cuba 
may be missing an opportunity for change in line with the basic tenets of its 
system.  Many of those focusing on labor issues tend to overlook a 
potentially powerful form of labor organization that might tilt the balance of 
power away from capital on the capital’s home turf.  When labor controls 
labor through the mechanics of power that operate within a dominant 
system of institutionalized power, labor will be able to meet capital on its 
own terms: domiciled within the network of nation states but free to move 
globally and to take advantage of disjunctions in capital markets.  It might 
be worth thinking through the possibilities of a global system in which 
labor controls labor, and in which the individual laborer is no longer 
arrayed against aggregations of capital, but is able to aggregate itself within 
markets in which labor and capital both engage in markets on a amore equal 
basis. 
Yet, this requires labor to lose its dependence on the state by taking the 
step that capital took two centuries ago when it effected what would be an 
increasing independence from the state.  When labor begins to use the state 
in the way that capital has learned; when labor ceases to organize itself like 
an element of civil society and becomes more like a value–optimizing 
factor of production, then perhaps the global conversation about labor may 
take on a different hue.  However, this is not possible under a construct in 
which cooperatives are constituted formally as autonomous and labor–
driven while organized as little more than privatized centers of central 
planning that reinforce traditional (and now clearly failed) approaches to 
economic governance even within Marxist–Leninist premises. 
Within this environment, cooperatives—so benign in China and 
Vietnam—assume a more problematic place in the Cuban political 
economy.  Whether the experiment will succeed remains to be seen.  
However, the search for forms of economic organization that are not 
necessarily grounded in shareholder–wealth maximization, and that serve 
social goals (even those controlled by the state apparatus) may provide 
insights and models that can be used elsewhere for other purposes.  Indeed, 
it is precisely this model that underlies an important element of Cuban 
 
 270 Frank, supra note 263 (“A staunch advocate of socialism, Aquino charged in his letter 
that the forces behind the closing of his center were ‘jealous’ of its success. ‘Those who fear 
that the worker, the intellectual and the artist might find their own productive road are not 
revolutionaries, they are conservatives,’ he wrote. ‘They enjoy the benefits of power that 
gives them the ability, as in this case, to decide the destiny of human works, not to help them 
flourish, but to destroy them,’ Aquino charged.”). 
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foreign policy as it seeks to develop a counter-approach to regional trade 
that challenges the norms and structures of conventional economic 
globalization.  In the face of continued governmental policy incoherence 
evidenced by the Cabildo affair, the transposition of the theoretical 
developments of a cooperative model, first into policy guidelines (the 
Lineamientos) and then into a coherent regulatory system, suggests the 
power of theory and the substantial limits of politics, even in the face of 
economic crisis.  It is to that transposition that this Article turns to next. 
C.  The Cooperative in the Lineamientos and Regulation—From Political 
Guidelines to Regulatory Program 
It is clear that the determination to limit the private sector to 
cooperatives, preserving the corporate form to the state, is not essential to 
preserve the socialist character of the state, and might make little sense 
from the perspective of increasing the efficiency and scope of the private 
sector.
271
  The Chinese have shown how a Marxist–Leninist state can 
extend the corporate franchise to individuals and still retain overall control 
over the direction of the economy and the Marxist basis of state 
organization.  They have moved from a system of direct command of all 
facets of productivity to an objectives-based system of regulation for the 
private sector and a more closely monitored control of the state sector.  If 
the object was merely to foster productivity and increase wealth, the 
division does no more than impede progress while retaining the need for a 
bloated public sector of managers who would substitute themselves for 
pricing and market mechanisms for productivity and wealth creation. 
But, the Lineamientos suggest that economic efficiency and wealth 
production are not the only, or even perhaps the most important, objectives 
of privatization.  Equally important in the ideological debates about 
economic reform are the social role of economic collectives—whether 
organized around capital, labor, production, or otherwise—and the role of 
the state in the management of economic activities (up to and including the 
role of the state as a substitute for the market).  It is ultimately the central 
role of the state in economic affairs and the mistrust of the market on 
political grounds that reinforce Cuba’s unwillingness to follow the Chinese 
 
 271 This is a view shared within and outside Cuba by people sympathetic to the current 
government: 
Cuba’s economic model has suffered from excessive concentration in decision 
making and ownership of the means of production, as well as lack of incentives 
and low efficiency.  These problems have impaired output and productivity and 
have worsened during the last decade due to structural weaknesses in the pattern of 
growth. 
Mesa-Lago & Alejandro, supra note 60, at 714. 
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model.  Markets shift power over economic planning from the state to 
producers and consumers.  It shifts the power to set prices and allocate 
resources from central planners to those involved in production, 
manufacturing, sales, and consumption.  It changes the role of the state 
from serving as the nexus point of demand and supply to the manager of 
economic goals.  There is a struggle over the role of the state, even within 
the very limited space reserved to the non-state sector.  Debates over the 
form of the cooperative that took place in the development of the final form 
of the Lineamientos, one characterized by the tension between the necessity 
of permitting autonomous economic activity and the desire to retain strong 
and direct state control of all economic activity,  is much in evidence in the 
structure of the new cooperatives law. It is a tension that remains 
unresolved in either Lineamientos or law. 
1.  The Lineamientos 
At first glance, the Lineamientos cooperative provisions appear fairly 
straightforward and liberal.  First-level (primer grado) cooperatives are 
recognized as an economic organization with a legal personality that 
aggregates goods and labor.
272
  Interests in cooperatives have the character 
of social property that may not be negotiated (in contrast to shares).
273
  
They may enter into contracts with other entities and natural persons.  They 
may also determine the distribution of funds to participants.
274
  Second-
level (segundo grado) cooperatives are collections of first-level 
cooperatives.
275
  They can be formed as separate juridical persons and their 




 272 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crearán las cooperativas de primer grado 
como una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva, en diferentes sectores, las que constituyen 
una organización econó-mica con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio, integradas por 
personas que seasocian aportando bienes o trabajo, con la unalidad de producir y prestar 
serviciosútiles a la sociedad y asumen todos sus gastos con sus ingresos.”). 
 273 Id. ¶ 26 (“La norma jurídica sobre cooperativas deberá garantizar que éstas, como 
propiedadsocial, no sean vendidas, ni trasmitida su posesión a otras cooperativas, a formas 
de gestión no estatal o a personas naturales.”). 
 274 Id. ¶ 27 (“Las cooperativas mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras cooperativas, 
em-presas, unidades presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales, y después de cumplido el 
compromiso con el Estado, podrán realizar ventas libremente sin interme-diarios, de acuerdo 
con la actividad económica que se les autorice.”). 
 275 Id. ¶ 29 (“Se crearán cooperativas de segundo grado, cuyos socios son cooperativas de 
pri-mer grado, las que tendrán personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio y se formancon el 
objetivo de organizar actividades complementarias afnes o que agreguenvalor a los 
productos y servicios de sus socios (de producción, servicios y comer-cialización), o realizar 
compras y ventas conjuntas con vistas a lograr mayor eficienci.”). 
 276 Id. ¶ 28 (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo establecido en la norma jurídica 
correspon-diente, después de pagar los impuestos y contribuciones establecidos, 
determinanlos ingresos de los trabajadores y la distribución de las utilidades.”). 
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But, a closer reading of the Lineamientos suggests both the tensions 
within the CCP over liberalization and a clear tilt in favor of state control.  
The final version of the cooperative form in the Lineamientos contains  
certain significant changes from the initial version, which suggest a 
conservative pushback from elements in the CCP that viewed the 
liberalization of economic activity, even in this small space, as potentially 
threatening to the core values of the Revolution.  Thus, for example, the 
Lineamientos originally provided for a broader conceptualization of the 
cooperative, grounded in the basic premise that workers were free to join 
together in cooperative enterprises.
277
  This power of association for 
cooperative economic activity extended to ownership, lease, and use of the 
means of production in permanent usufruct
278
—echoing the idea of usufruct 
being developed for the lease of non-productive agricultural land.
279
  As 
modified, the emphasis was distinctly directed away from a focus on the 
right of association for the exploitation of productive capacity to an 
emphasis on the character of these enterprises as the instrument through 
which economic activity is devolved from the state and incorporated within 




 277 See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. original (“Estarán basadas en la libre 
disposición de los trabajadores a asociarse en ellas. Pueden ser propietarias de los medios de 
producción, arrendarlos o emplearlos en usufructo permanente.”). 
 278 Usufruct is a civil law concept that describes a cluster of rights of an individual to 
enjoy the use of property either titled to another or held in common as long as the property is 
neither damaged nor destroyed.  Usufruct is a legal concept that was in place at the time of 
Cuban Independence and survived into the post-Revolutionary period after 1959.  See  CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] tit. VI, ch. 1, art. 467 (1899) (Cuba) translated in U.S. War Department, 
Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, I LAW OF CUBA, PUERTO RICO AND THE PHILIPPINES 
69 (1899), available at 
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=rySvAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=r
eader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP1. 
 279 Marc Frank, Cuba Grants Land to Thousands of Farmers, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2009, 
9:59 AM), http:// www.reuters.com/article/globalNews/idUSTRE5113IY20090202.  On 
usufruct in the agricultural sector, see Laura Enríquez, Economic Reform and 
Repeasantization in Post 1990 Cuba, 38 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 202–18 (2003).  According to 
Pujol: 
To stimulate the domestic production of foodstuffs and substitute imports, the 
government started to allow the leasing of small plots of State owned land in 
usufruct by private individuals and corporate bodies.  To this end, landless 
individuals could obtain up to 13.42 hectares and existing landholders could bring 
their total up to 40.26 hectares under licenses valid for up to 10 years, with the 
possibility of being renewed. 
Joaquín P. Pujol, The Cuban Economy in 2010 as Seen by Economists Within the Island and 
Other Observers, 20 CUBA TRANSITION 1, 8 (2010), 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/pujol.pdf. 
 280 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crearán las cooperativas de primer grado 
como una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva en diferentes sectores, las que constituyen 
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Rather than promote free association of workers with control in 
usufruct over the means of production, the final version of the Lineamientos 
emphasizes the socialist collective nature of the cooperative and its 
property.  It underscores the power of the State to manage the scope of the 
economic sectors within which it can operate.  Significantly, it also limits 
the forms of contributions to the enterprise specifically to goods or labor 
and only for the production or offer of socially useful services.  For that 
privilege, these collectives would assume their own expenses.  The 
explanation for the change was quite clear: uneasiness with the idea of 
private aggregation or collectivization outside the direct control of the 
State.
281
  One can understand this as a means of privatizing central planning 
and exploiting operation costs. 
Likewise, the limitations on the power of cooperatives to negotiate 
cooperative assets to other private enterprises was strengthened to 
emphasize that cooperative property was public property (propriedad 
social) devolved to the use of the cooperative participants.
282
  The scope of 
cooperative activity was also subtly restricted, permitting private 
transactions but strengthening the direct power of the State to manage those 
relations.  The original provision permitted economic activity in the non-
state sector as long as these conformed to pre-approved social objectives.
283
  
As revised, the provision imposes a requirement that cooperatives first 
satisfy whatever economic needs the State imposes before it can engage in 
private economic activities in the non-state sector.
284
  The provision also 
reinforces the limits of private activity as authorized for individual 
proprietorships.
285
  This last imposition represents a significant effort to 
 
una organización económica con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio, integradas por 
personas que se asocian aportando bie- nes o trabajo, con la finalidad de producir y prestar 
servicios útiles a la sociedad y asu- men todos sus gastos con sus ingresos.”).  For the 
original version of paragraph 25, see TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. original. 
 281 See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. fundamentación del cambio (“Aclara y 
especifica el concepto de cooperativas de primer grado, 1 13  dudas en todo el pa s. Agrega 
que la cooperativa es una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva, por 29 opiniones en 9 
provincias.”). 
 282 See id. ¶ 26, col. original (providing original draft language of paragraph 26 of the 
Lineamientos: “El Reglamento  eneral de las Cooperativas deber  garantizar  ue la 
propiedad cooperativa no sea vendida, alquilada o arrenda- da a otras cooperativas o formas 
no estatales de producci n”). 
 283 Id. ¶ 27, col. original (“Las cooperativas mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras 
cooperativas, empresas, unidades presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales, y realizan 
ventas di- rectas a la poblaci n de acuerdo con el objeto social aprobado.”). 
 284 Paragraph 27 of the revised, final version of the Lineamientos provides, in part that 
the cooperative may engage in private economic activity only after satisfying their 
commitment to the State.  LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, pt. I, ¶ 27. 
 285 For the full version of the final revised paragraph, see id. (“Las cooperativas 
mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras cooperativas, empresas, unidades 
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bring the cooperative back into the state sector.  Cooperatives will have to 
service the State before they can engage in private activities; state ministries 
can effectively devolve state sector obligations to the cooperatives. 
Rather than create an autonomous private sector that responds to local 
needs, the cooperative appears to run the danger of becoming a vehicle for 
privatizing the state sector without a loss of state control.  The commentary 
made clear that the presumption for cooperatives must be to service and 
supplement the state sector—non-state sector transactions must be 
understood, from that perspective, as the exception rather than the rule, and 
possible only after all of the needs of the state sector have been satisfied.
286
  
The resulting narrowing of the activities of cooperatives could be 
significant. 
The provisions on the tax obligations of cooperatives
287
 reinforce the 
Lineamientos’ focus on expense and fiscal responsibility in the 
Lineamientos.
288
.  As originally proposed, Paragraph 28 provided that 
cooperatives, within the requirements of any enabling rules, would set the 
income allocation for its workers, provide for additional distributions, make 
public contributions, and pay taxes.
289
  As adopted, the primary obligation 
of the cooperative is to pay its taxes and other contributions to the State, 
then to determine worker income, and then to make additional 
distributions.
290
  The change is subtle but telling.  The initial focus was on 
the wealth creation possibilities of the cooperative—the benefits of private 
sector activity.  The final focus was on the utility of the cooperative for the 
production of wealth for the State—to be distributed as the state apparatus 
determines.  It reduces the scope of the autonomy of the cooperative and 
ties it more closely to the state sector by re-focusing the purpose from one 
centered on the activities of the workers to one centered on the production 
of income for the State. 
 
presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales y despu s de cumplido el compromiso con el 
Estado, podr n realizar ventas libremente sin intermediarios, de acuerdo con la actividad 
econ mica  ue se les autorice.”). 
 286 That, perhaps, explains the somewhat curious explanation for the change from 
paragraph 27’s original draft version to its final version.  See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 27, 
col. fundamentación del cambio (“Agrega la posibilidad de venta sin intermediario y se 
mejora la redacción. Responde a 438 opiniones en 14 provincias.”). 
 287 Id. ¶ 28. 
 288 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25. 
 289 TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 28, col. original (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo es- 
tablecido en su Reglamento  eneral de la cooperativa, definen los ingresos de los 
traba adores y la distribuci n de las utilidades, y li uidan al Estado los impuestos y las 
contribuciones establecidas.”). 
 290 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 28 (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo esta- 
blecido en la norma  ur dica correspondiente, despu s de pagar los impuestos y 
contribuciones establecidos, determinan los ingresos de los traba adores y la distribuci n de 
las uti lidades.”). 
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The last provision deals with second-level cooperatives, which are 
meant to be aggregations of first-level cooperatives.  As originally 
conceived, second-level cooperatives had the object of organizing common 
processes of production or services among cooperatives or the aggregation 
of cooperatives to buy and sell goods with greater efficiency.
291
  As 
adopted, the objectives of second-level cooperatives changed in some 
respects: their principal objective is now described as organizing similar or 
complementary activities that add value to products and services of their 
partners (production and marketing services), or joint purchases and sales in 
order to achieve greater efficiency.
292
 
The proposed formal changes in the Lineamientos, of course, suggest 
only half of the challenge for the State and CCP.  Beyond the formal 
aspects of economic reorganization lies the potentially more intractable 
problem of suppressing, or at least managing, the so-called black market, 
better known as the informal sector system within Cuba.
293
  That, in turn, 
will require a substantial movement toward popular confidence in the 
ability of the State to fairly and consistently enforce the rules it has formally 
imposed, and to enforce them through appropriate public organs.  The 
informality of the current legal system in Cuba reflects, in part, earlier 
generation Marxist-Leninist notions of the convergence between law and 
politics, in which systems of rules consistently applied were understood as 
contingent on the needs of the State as determined by the CCP.
294
  But a 
move toward state-directed economic activity necessarily requires a rules-
based system of managing that enterprise, and a system for the enforcement 
of those rules that may be distinct from the traditional approaches of a 
centrally directed economic model. 
The CCP recognized, in limited ways, this need for a system of rules 
and enforcement.  Lineamientos Paragraphs 2 and 27 speak to the need to 
arrange relations among state and non-state sector enterprises, including 
 
 291  TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 29, col. original (“Las cooperativas de primer grado, de 
forma voluntaria, pueden acordar entre ellas la constituci n de cooperativas de segun- do 
grado, con personalidad  ur dica y patrimonio propio, con el ob etivo de organizar procesos 
comunes (de producci n y servi- cios), realizar compras y ventas conjuntas con vista a lograr 
mayor eficiencia.”). 
 292 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crear n cooperativas de segundo grado, 
cuyos socios son cooperativas de primer grado, las  ue tendr n personalidad  ur dica y 
patrimonio propio y se forman con el objetivo de organizar actividades complementarias 
afines o que agreguen valor a los productos y servicios de sus socios (de producci n, 
servicios y comercializaci n), o realizar compras y ventas con untas con vistas a lograr 
mayor eficiencia.”).  The change was justified on grounds of producing greater clarity but it 
also noted a large number of questions about second level cooperatives.  See TABLOIDE, 
supra note 91, pt. I, ¶ 25, col. fundamentación del cambio. 
 293 See JORGE F. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, CUBA’S SECOND ECONOMY: FROM BEHIND THE SCENES TO 
CENTER STAGE (1995). 
 294 Cf. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 185 (3rd ed. 2006). 
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cooperatives, which Paragraph 22 emphasizes are to be implemented 
through contracts.
295
  Lineamientos Paragraph 16 includes a provision for 
the liquidation of SOEs that fail to meet their contractual obligations.
296
  
Linemientos Paragraph 73 expresses the ideal that the State will increase its 
international credibility through strict compliance with its obligations.
297
  
Lineamientos Paragraph 181 emphasizes the need to arrange contracts in a 
form that encourages compliance with their terms.
298
  This suggests both the 
increasing importance of systems of contract rules, but also the absence of 
such a system in Cuba today.  It also suggests that the rules for the 
enforcement of obligations among individuals remains informal and 
customary—and is situated well below the structures of state enforcement 
vehicles.  Lastly, it points to the absence of certain and consistently applied 
practices at the state level.  The result may be a fear of arbitrariness in the 
management of economic activity, especially economic activity in the non-
state sector.  That fear might be fed by the very public narrowing of the 
scope of cooperative activity.  The consequence is a likelihood that, for 
small operators, the risks of investing and doing business will increase.  
Increased risk substantially increases the transactions costs of operation.  
This may make transactions uneconomic in general.  But more importantly, 
it may substantially impede the value of forming cooperatives. 
In 2012, Cuba announced that it was moving from theory and intent to 
practice.  It announced that Mafrino Murillo, the Vice President of the 
Counsel of Ministers, had confirmed the preparation of new rules for the 
operation of cooperatives outside the agricultural sector
299
 to include 
services, transport, and restaurants.
300
  The announcement was timed to 
coincide with the visit of Pope Benedict XVI and was meant to suggest 
sustained movement to implement the previously approved Lineamientos, 
 
 295 See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 22 (“El contrato constituir  una herramienta de 
traba o en la planificaci n y control de todas las etapas del proceso inversionista, asegurando 
el resultado final de la inversi n, con la calidad re uerida y dentro de los plazos previstos en 
el cronograma de e ecuci n.”). 
 296 Id. ¶ 16. 
 297 Id. ¶ 73 (“Traba ar con el m ximo rigor para aumentar la credibilidad del pa s en sus 
relaciones econ micas internacionales, mediante el estricto cumplimiento de los 
compromisos contra dos.”); see also id. ¶¶ 90, 98. 
 298 Id. ¶ 181 (“Adecuar la producci n agroalimentaria a la demanda y la transformaci n 
de la comercializaci n, elevando la calidad y exigencia en los contratos, para  ue las partes 
cumplan sus obligaciones; limitando la circulaci n centralizada a a uellos renglones 
vinculados a los balances nacionales; otorgando un papel m s activo a los mecanismos de 
libre concurrencia para el resto de las producciones.”). 
 299 Cuba priorizará sector cooperative [Cuba Prioritizes Cooperative Industry], INTER 
PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.ipscuba.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3773%3Acuba-
priorizar%C3%A1-sector-cooperativo&Itemid=42. 
 300 Cooperatives in Cuba, supra note 186. 
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without encouraging political reform.
301
  The priority was to be given 
principally to the reorganization of the most important posts of the state 
sector—agriculture, mining, tourism, and the biotech industry—followed 
by a review of the public health and education sectors.  But the most 
important tasks were the reorganization of the SOEs to make them more 
efficient, and the need to stimulate economic productivity in the non-state 
sector.
302
  It is this move from theory to guideline to statute that this Article 
turns to next. 
2.  The December 2012 Regulatory Framework 
This Article has shown how the cooperative form is thought to hold 
much potential for Cuba (and other developing states).  For Cuba, the most 
innovative part of this economic reconstruction project was the 
development of a new governance framework for cooperatives.  But this 
experiment will not succeed if the regulatory framework used to manage it 
seeks merely to replicate and privatize the system of state management—
the failures of which, acknowledged by the highest levels of the CCP, were 
the very impetus for the reform reflected in the new socialist cooperative. 
The regulatory policy reflected in the Lineamientos suggests that this 
tension between potential and fear remains quite strong.  The cooperative 
regulations were announced only after a long period of gestation and with 
the strong support for an innovative approach from influential Cuban 
academics.  On December 11, 2012, the Cuban government published the 
long awaited regulations on cooperatives.
303
  The new cooperative 
regulations comprise a cluster of related regulations, including two decree-
laws of the Council of State,
304
 one decree form the Council of Ministers,
305
 
and two ministerial resolutions.
306
  i.  Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley No. 
305: the “Proletarian” Corporate Law of Cooperatives 
The Council of State’s Decreto-Ley No. 305, which implements 




 301 Cuba priorizará sector cooperative, supra note 299. 
 302 Id. 
 303 See supra note 56. 
 304 See Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56; Decreto-Ley No. 306, supra note 56.  
 305 See Decreto No. 309, supra note 56. 
 306 See Ministerio de Economía y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12, supra note  56 
Ministerios de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12, supra note 56.  
 307 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, pmbl (“POR CUANTO: La Ley número 59, 
“Código Civil,” de 16 de julio de 1987, reconoce a las cooperativas como personas jurídicas, 
y una for-ma de propiedad colectiva, que contribuye al desarrollo de la economía nacional.  
POR CUANTO: En el proceso de actualiza-ción del modelo económico cubano es necesario 
la creación, con carácter experimental, de coope-rativas en sectores no agropecuarios, lo que 
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substantially restates the justifications for the development of non-
agricultural cooperative regulations that were included in the 
Lineamientos.
308
  But it also quite clearly suggests the tentative nature of 
the reforms and the limited scope within which these regulations will be 
given effect.  It notes that since 1987, cooperatives have been recognized as 
separate juridical persons and as a legitimate form of collective property 
that contributes positively to the national economy.
309
  More importantly it 
reluctantly concedes that in order to develop the Cuban economic model, it 
is necessary, but only as an experiment, to create a legal framework for 
non-agricultural cooperatives.
310
  These conceptual constraints structure the 
framework that guides the organization, powers, and authority of non-
agricultural cooperatives elaborated in the decree-laws, decrees, and 
resolutions that follow. 
The regulations follow the Lineamientos,
311
 dividing cooperatives into 
two classes—primer grado cooperatives and segundo grado 
cooperatives.
312
  Primer grado cooperatives are the focus of Decreto-Ley 
No. 305; segundo grado cooperatives are governed by the rules of this law-
decree unless the rules are incompatible with its operation.
313
  Beyond this 
division, the Decreto-Ley is divided into thirty-two substantive articles 
covering cooperative regulation from formation to dissolution and 
liquidation. 
Articles 1 through 10 of Decreto-Ley No. 305 focus on general 
principles and provisions.  Article 1 sets out the objectives of the 
experimental decree-law: to establish the norms that regulate the 
constitution, operation, and dissolution of cooperatives within non-
agricultural sectors in the national economy.
314
  The decree-law’s self-
characterization as fundamentally experimental in nature is especially 
troubling.  It suggests the impermanent nature of the legal structure being 
created, provides notice that the State might at any time end or change the 
rules of the experiment, and that the legitimacy of the project within the 
Cuban economic model is still unsettled.  The importance of this 
 
re-quiere de una norma jurídica que instrumente su creación y funcionamiento.”). 
 308 Id.; see also LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 
 309 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, pmbl. 
 310 Id. 
 311 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 312 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 5.1. 
 313 See id. at cuarta disposiciones especiale [fourth special provision].  It is likely that the 
state ministries will have the discretion to make that determination and not the members of 
the segundo grado cooperatives. 
 314 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 1 (“El presente Decreto-Ley tiene por objeto 
establecer con carácter experimental las normas que regulan la constitución, funciona-miento 
y extinción de cooperativas en sectores no agropecuarios de la economía nacional, en lo 
sucesivo cooperativas.”). 
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characterization cannot be understated—by signalling that the rules may not 
survive, it serves to substantially increase the risk of forming and operating 
a cooperative.  It deprives people of legal certainty.  This may well reduce 
the number of people willing to take the risk of investing substantial effort 
or resources into a cooperative form that may be yanked out from under 
them at any time. 
Article 2 emphasizes that cooperatives have economic and social 
objectives—that they are invested with private and public obligations that 
extend beyond the individuals involved.
315
  This reflects the debate in the 
Sixth Party Congress about the social role of economic aggregations, such 
as cooperatives, and their insistence that, whether public or private, such 
enterprises must serve the State and its economic policy objectives even as 
it serves to increase the well being of its operators.  The principal objectives 
of cooperatives are to serve the retail sector through the production of goods 
and the offer of services, all of which must be compatible with social 
objectives (managed by state organs and the CCP) and the interests of the 
cooperative’s members.  As long as it meets these objectives it may enjoy 
autonomous juridical personality, use and distribute its property, meet its 




Articles 3 and 4 deal with the internal organization of the cooperative. 
Article 3 describes the universe of rules that define the regulatory universe 
of cooperatives.
317
  These include the relevant law-decrees, decrees, 
resolution of ministries, as well as its own internal organizational 
documents.  Article 4 sets out the core substantive premises that define the 
fundamental characteristics of the cooperative and the standards under 
which they are to be operated.  More specifically, Article 4 articulates the 
seven basic organizing principles of operation of cooperatives: (1) 
cooperatives are voluntary organizations formed and dissolved by mutual 
consent (Voluntariedad); (2) all members are expected to collaborate in the 
work of the cooperative (Cooperación y ayuda mutual); (3) management 
decisions are to be made by all members, each of whom have the same 
participation rights; decision making is guided by democratic principles 
 
 315 Id. art. 2.1 (“La cooperativa es una organización con fines económicos y sociales, que 
se constituye voluntariamente sobre la base del apor-te de bienes y derechos y se sustenta en 
el trabajo de sus socios, cuyo objetivo general es la producción de bienes y la prestación de 
servicios mediante la gestión colectiva, para la satisfacción del interés social y el de los 
socios.”). 
 316 Id. art. 2.2 (“La cooperativa tiene personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio; usa, 
disfruta y dispone de los bienes de su propiedad; cubre sus gastos con sus ingresos y 
responde de sus obligaciones con su patrimonio.”). 
 317 Id. art. 3 (“Las cooperativas se rigen por el presente Decreto-Ley, su Reglamento, las 
disposiciones complementarias a estos, sus estatutos, y de forma supletoria las disposiciones 
legales que les resulten aplicables.”). 
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(Decisión colectiva e igualdad de derechos de socios); (4) cooperative 
expenses must be paid out of its revenues, and after payment of taxes and 
other impositions owing to the state, net revenues may be distributed to the 
members but only in proportion to the members’ contribution (Autonomía y 
sostenabilidad económica); (5) all members are to comply with their work 
obligations in conformity to the terms of the agreements establishing the 
cooperative and in conformity to the direction of those charged with its 
administration (Disciplina cooperativista); (6) the social obligations of the 
cooperative are to be emphasized in establishing and managing its 
objectives, in addition to which cooperatives must in their operations 
contribute to the economic and social development of the nation, protect the 
environment, avoid speculation, and ensure compliance with law; the 
members of the cooperative must work to promote cooperative culture and 
to satisfy the material, training, social, cultural, moral, and spiritual needs 
of its members and their families (Responsabilidad social, contribución al 
desarrollo planificado de la economía y al bienestar de sus socios y 
familiars); and (7) the cooperative will express its relations to other 
enterprises through contract, collaboration agreements, exchanges, and 




These organizing principles are notable, at first blush, not merely for 
their breadth and ambiguity.  That is too easy a charge to lodge against 
these provisions, and ultimately, a distraction.  The principles are useful for 
establishing the conceptual limits of cooperatives.  It is clear that these 
enterprises are meant to remain small and closely tied to the primary 
contributions of its members.  The efficiencies of corporate form have 
denied this form of organization.  Yet there is a hint of movement toward 
conventional rule of law notions in the emphasis of the use of contract in 
managing relationships among entities.  That may well open the door to the 
construction of state organs (judicial) for the vindication of these rights, and 
might contribute in that way to the development of a body of private and 
commercial law that may in turn contribute to the development of a more 
robust commercial sector. 
More important, though, is the emphasis on the social obligations of 
cooperatives.  This is not meant as mere rhetorical bluster.  Rather, it is the 
gateway through which state management of the business of cooperatives 
may be effectuated.  Because the State may control the meaning and 
application of social obligations, it may also control the functioning of 
cooperatives.  It is in this way that the state ministries may still be able to 
control cooperatives even as they appear to be directed by their members.  
In effect, the State seeks to transfer the risk of the enterprise to the members 
 
 318 Id. art. 4. 
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but retain substantial control over its operation, at least at a macro-level.  It 
remains to be seen how aggressively state organs, and functionaries seek to 
use this power to interfere in the operations of cooperatives, and to what 
ends.  It will also be interesting to see if in these powers the law provides an 
opening to corruption in the relations between cooperatives and the 
functionaries responsible for their oversight. 
But social objectives can be liberating principles as well.  Free of 
bureaucratic micro-management, and perhaps subject to review and 
reporting on a periodic basis, requiring businesses to adopt something like a 
broad stakeholder model and reject the traditional shareholder or investor 
model of conventional enterprises can provide a values-based foundation.  
This foundation can help in assessing the value of enterprise activity that 
can much more efficiently produce socially useful objectives than the 
traditional system of control and regulation managed by state bureaucrats.  
The reason for this is simple: incorporating a stakeholder model as the 
foundational basis of the assessment of the value of enterprise activity 
internalizes the values and objectives of socially conscious activities.  As a 
consequence, monitoring and management costs (to the state) are reduced 
substantially as the objective becomes internalized and self managed.  That, 
for example, is the objective of moves outside of Cuba to provide a 
regulatory space for socially conscious enterprises.
319
  The difficulty of 
traditional control policies is that it remains something that is exogenous to 
the cultures of enterprises, is imposed and controlled by state actors who are 
not intimately connected with enterprise activity and who may impose 
transaction costs in the form of corruption.
320
 
In effect, because the enterprise itself does not own its own obligation 
to increase stakeholder (or social) value, and because it appears alien to the 
operation—something imposed by an outside actor—it will not be easy to 
internalize the values of social welfare within the cultures of enterprise 
operation.  The concern with the system created by Decreto-Ley No. 305, 
then, is precisely this: it points to a system of internalizing the requirements 
of stakeholder operations while retaining the inefficient structures created 
by the specific implementation of social objectives through state 
management and control.  That is the potential tension between the general 
operational principles of Article 2 and the impositions of the regulatory 
 
 319 See Larry Catá Backer & Edward Waitzer, Edward Waitzer on Fiduciary Duty and 
Corporate Social Responsibility; Are Benefit Corporations a Step in the Right Direction?, 
LAW END DAY (Mar. 6, 2012),  http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/edward-waitzer-
on-fiduciary-duty-and.html. 
 320 See Larry Catá Backer, Corruption in Cuba—The Cuban Communist Party Signals 
Public Recognition and Party Obligation, LAW END DAY (July 16, 2011), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/corruption-in-cuba-cuban-communist.html. 
 






Article 6 of Decreto-Ley No. 305 describes the lawful types of 
contributions (only by natural persons) for the formation of primer grado 
cooperatives.  These include: (1) cash aggregated for collective activity;
322
 
(2) the use of property or services contributed to the venture without 
transferring ownership;
323
 (3) the use of the means of production owned by 
the state, the right to which must be acquired lawfully (including state 
enterprises whose operations might be privatized through leaseholds or 
otherwise);
324
 and (4) any combination of these.
325
 
The contribution of state assets under Article 6(c) is particularly 
noteworthy.  It suggests the possibility of privatizing state operations 
through cooperatives under appropriate circumstances, none of which are 
specified.  That suggests, in turn, that the State might contribute or not 
under standards that may be non-transparent, non-uniform, and arbitrarily 
applied.  The transfer of the rights to use state assets is treated further in 
Articles 7 through 9, which focus on the use of state property.  Article 7 
limits lease transfer contributions of state assets to a maximum term of ten 
years.
326
  Article 8 permits state entities to sell equipment and other goods 
to cooperatives in accordance with the law.
327
  Article 9 permits 
cooperatives (whether or not they are fully established in accordance with 





 321 See generally Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 11; Decreto No. 309, supra 
note 56 (the implementing regulations). 
 322 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 6(a) (“A partir del patrimonio integrado por 
los aportes dinerarios de personas naturales que deciden voluntariamente asociarse entre sí 
bajo el régimen de propiedad colectiva.”). 
 323 Id. art. 6(b) (“Por personas naturales que decidan voluntariamente asociarse entre sí, 
solo con la finalidad de adquirir conjuntamente insumos y servicios, comercializar productos 
y servicios, o emprender otras actividades económicas, conservando los socios la propiedad 
sobre sus bienes.”). 
 324 Id. art. 6(c) (“A partir de medios de producción del patrimonio estatal, tales como 
inmuebles y otros, que se decida gestionar de forma cooperativa y para ello puedan cederse 
estos, por medio del arrendamiento, usufructo u otras formas legales que no impliquen la 
transmisión de la propiedad.”). 
 325 Id. art. 6(d). 
 326 Id. art. 7 (“El término del arrendamiento, usufructo u otras formas legales que no 
impliquen la transmisión de la propiedad a la cooperativa, a que se refiere el inciso c) del 
artículo anterior será de hasta diez (10) años, prorrogables por igual término en períodos 
sucesivos.”). 
 327 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 8 (“Las entidades estatales podrán vender a 
las cooperativas que se constituyan, equipos, medios, implementos u otros bienes muebles 
que se determinen, de acuerdo a lo legalmente establecido.”). 
 328 Id. art 9 (“[P]odrán participar en la licitación de arrendamientos de inmuebles y de la 
venta de otros activos fijos de un establecimiento estatal . . . . podrán impugnar la decisión 
firme en la vía judicial conforme a lo legalmente establecido.”). 
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Cooperative formation is the subject of Articles 11 through 16,
329
 most 
of which are supplemented by the implementary regulations of the Council 
of Ministers.
330
  Article 10 specifies the mechanics of cooperative 
formation.  Members are limited to natural persons, at least eighteen years 
of age, who are permanent residents of Cuba who are able to perform 
productive work for the cooperative.
331
  Where state enterprises contributed, 
the workers of those enterprises will have priority in becoming cooperative 
members.
332
  Lastly, new members may be added in accordance with the 
operating principles of Article 4.
333
  Articles 11 through 16 focus on the 
governing documents for a cooperative and the process for obtaining state 
consent for operation.  They specify the appropriate review agency,
334
 the 
type of review provided by local authorities and the Council of Ministers,
335
 
the supervision and control responsibilities of state agencies authorizing 
cooperative formation,
336
 the writing requirements for cooperative 
constitutions,
337
 the authority of cooperatives to merge or modify,
338
 and the 
sources of governing law.
339
 
These provisions raise a number of interesting issues related to the 
control, supervision, and ongoing relationships between the State and these 
enterprises.  The framework for formation and supervision highlights the 
issues and choke points of the regulation.  Article 11 specifies the 
governmental unit from which approval must be obtained in order to form a 
cooperative, distinguishing between cooperatives formed from private 
contributions and those organized from privatized state enterprises.
340
  The 
request must include the cooperative’s constitution, though it is not clear 
what kind of review process is necessary or which forms must be filled out.  
Article 14 lists the formalities required in the preparation of a cooperative 
constitution.
341
  Article 12 indicates that the Council of Ministers and the 
appropriate local regulatory bodies must review all applications for 
cooperative formation.
342
  Article 13 provides that approval for cooperative 
 
 329 Chapter II of Decreto-Ley No. 305 is entitled “De la Constitución.” Id. arts. 11–16. 
 330 Decreto-Ley No. 309, supra note 56. 
 331 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 10.1. 
 332 Id. art. 10.2. 
 333 Id. art. 10.3.  These principles include non-coercion, collective decision-making, and 
equal rights for members.  Id. arts. 4(a), 4(c), 4(f). 
 334 Id. art. 11. 
 335 Id. art. 12. 
 336 Id. art. 13. 
 337 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 14. 
 338 Id. art. 15. 
 339 Id. art. 16. 
 340 Id. art. 11. 
 341 Id. art. 14. 
 342 Id. art. 12. 
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formation must contain, in some detail, the enterprise’s authorized activities 
and any other obligations the approving agencies might deem 
appropriate.
343
  Article 13 also notes that the approving agency remains 
responsible for the control and evaluation of the cooperative’s operations.
344
  
Indeed, under Article 15, a cooperative may not merge, dissolve, split up, or 
modify its organization or operations without the approval of the state organ 
that approved its constitution.
345
 
What is clear is that even though anyone who meets the requirements 
for cooperative formation may apply, the State has reserved the right to 
refuse the formation of any cooperative, apparently for any reason.  Those 
reasons are likely to be based on an assessment that the cooperatives do not 
appropriately meet the social or national objectives.  This is a significant 
method of control of both individuals and cooperative activity.  The State 
stands as the gatekeeper in a way that has no parallel in the West, where 
most enterprise formations that comply with formal requirements are not 
subject to particular review.  It also substantially limits cooperatives in their 
engagement with market changes.  Any change in the operations, business, 
or focus of the cooperative will require governmental review and approval.  
This is another way by which the State retains substantial control over the 
operations of cooperatives—it effectively serves as the ultimate controlling 
entity with respect to changes in operations or scope of business.  That 
authority extends not just to consent rights for cooperative business 
decisions that change its operations, but also to evaluation and control of 
the cooperative.  
The structure of corporate governance is the subject of Articles 17 
through 19, which regulate the internal organization of cooperatives.  
Article 17 provides that each cooperative has a General Assembly of its 
members that serves as the supreme governance unit of the cooperative.
346
  
The General Assembly elects a president, presidential alternate, and 
secretary by direct and secret ballot.
347
  It also may appoint an administrator 
or administrative committee,
348
 and elect a board of directors (Junta 
Directiva) overseen by the cooperative’s president.
349
  These provisions are 
similar to organizational provisions for private companies.  Article 18 
provides a waiver of these organizational requirements for small and less 
 
 343 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 13. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. art. 15. 
 346 Id. art. 17.1 (“El  rgano superior de direcci n de la cooperativa es su Asamblea 
General, de la cual forman parte todos los socios.”). 
 347 Id. art. 17.2. 
 348 Id. art. 17.3. 
 349 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 17.4. 
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  Whatever their organizational form, Article 19 
provides that all cooperatives must administer their financial affairs through 
a specially designated member or through a Control and Audit Committee 




Issues of cooperative finance are the focus of Articles 20 through 25.  
Article 20 specifies the accounting standards to be applied by 
cooperatives,
352
 while the Council of Ministers Regulations still define the 
requisite accounting conventions.  Article 21 specifies the initial capital of 
the cooperative using a qualitative standard.
353
  The focus is on “work 
capital” (capital del trabajo) rather than financial capital,
354
 which 
constitutes the cooperative’s assets under Article 22.
355
  Article 23 provides 
an important disciplinary element—it requires all members of a cooperative 
to participate in the work of the enterprise.
356
  That, of course, is at the heart 
of this form of economic organization—the notion that labor and 
production rather than capital is at the heart of the organization and 
operation of the enterprise.  Lastly, Article 24 deals with profit 
distributions, providing for the development of rules for the distribution of 
net revenues (utilidades or profits) to members in conformity with the 
principles and other limitations of law.
357
  More importantly, and implied in 
 
 350 Id. art. 18.  Cooperatives with twenty members or less may operate by appointing an 
administrator.  Cooperatives with more than twenty but no more than sixty members may 
operate through an Administrative Council (Consejo Administrativo).  Id.  Cooperatives with 
more than sixty members may elect both an administrative council and a board of directors.  
Id. 
 351 Id. art. 19 (stating that the form of the financial oversight will vary by the number of 
members and the complexity of the cooperative organization). 
 352 Id. art. 20.  The type of accounting standards adopted is based on the organizational 
characteristics of the cooperative.  See id. (“Las cooperativas aplican normas espec ficas de 
contabilidad y elaboran sus planes de ingresos y gastos en correspondencia con el nivel de 
producci n y servicios proyectado, tomando en cuenta los v nculos contractuales  ue 
establezcan con las empresas, unidades presupuestadas y dem s formas de gesti n 
econ mica.”). 
 353 Id. art. 21 (“[Q]ue le permita sostener sus operaciones al nivel previsto.”). 
 354 Id. 
 355 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 22 (providing that corporate assets include 
work capital, other contributions, and any bank loans). 
 356 Id. art. 23 (“ E st n en la obligaci n de participar con su traba o.”). 
 357 Id. art. 24.  The provision is ambiguous about the need to distribute profit.  It is clear 
that at year end the cooperative must determine the: profits to be distributed in each 
cooperative.  Id. art. 24.1 (“[U]tilidades a distribuir en cada cooperativa”).  But it also 
provides that the cooperative must establish rules for distribution from profits, subject to the 
limitations of the Regulations (of Council of Ministers).  Article 56 of the Regulation 
provides for setting aside reserves for obligations to the state, as well as other reserves 
established by the General Assembly, limiting distributions to net profits.  Decreto No. 309, 
supra note 56, art. 56.1. 
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Article 24, distribution rules must also conform to the conditions for 
approval imposed by the state agencies with regulatory and supervisory 
authority over each cooperative under Articles 13 and 15. 
Articles 25 and 26 deal with issues of cooperatives in markets.  More 
specifically, they deal with pricing authority and the authority to hire labor.  
Article 25 regulates the particularly sensitive issue of pricing goods and 
services.
358
  The provision nicely illustrates the conflicted nature of the 
cooperative regulations—at once solicitous of a small market sector and 
deeply suspicious of markets as a driver of economic activity.  On the one 
hand, its basic premise is that the cooperative may set prices for goods and 
services in accordance with market conditions.  Yet, the provision also 
specifies that this rule may be altered by rules promulgated by competent 
state authorities.
359
  In effect, the provision makes it possible for the State to 
privatize its operations without loss of any power over the management of 
pricing.  Markets for goods and services may be tolerated only to the extent, 
and for as long as, competent state agencies permit them.  But clearly the 
State has the discretion to step in at any time and regulate pricing.  For 
cooperatives seeking welfare maximization, and even ones sensitive to their 
social obligations, this may work against the creation of robust enterprises 
that might be able to survive.  Worse, to the extent that pricing is not 
centrally controlled, it is possible that pricing schemes for cooperative 
goods and services may vary among regulatory regions, creating incentives 
for strategic behavior and corruption. 
Article 26 deals with the equally sensitive issue of labor hiring by 
cooperatives.
360
  The provision represents a compromise between an 
enterprise view of cooperatives that would treat them like other economic 
enterprises able to hire capital and labor and a social view of cooperatives 
that understands this form as grounded in the equality of labor participation.  
Article 26.1 gives cooperatives a very limited power to hire labor: 
individuals may be hired for no more than three months, and hiring is 
permitted only when there are no members able to perform the task.
361
  The 
object of this regulation, of course, is to create incentives to eventually 
convert hired labor into cooperative members.  In effect, the labor hire 
 
 358 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 25 (“Los precios y tarifas de los productos y 
servicios  ue comercialicen las cooperativas se determinan por estas, seg n la oferta y la 
demanda, excepto a uellos  ue se establecen por los  rganos estatales competentes.”). 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. art. 26.1 (“Las cooperativas pueden contratar traba adores asalariados hasta tres 
meses en el per odo fiscal, para las actividades y tareas  ue no puedan asumir los socios en 
determinado per odo de tiempo.”).  The provision is sensitive because, at its limit, the ability 
of hiring labor is fundamentally incompatible with an enterprise founded on the premise that 
all labor will contribute to the production of revenue to be divided among the participants 
articulated in Article 2. 
 361 Id. 
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provision appears to be meant to serve as a means of creating something 
like a probationary period for potential members.
362
 
Conflict resolution among members is the subject of Articles 27 
through 29.  Article 27 urges negotiation as the first step to resolving 
conflicts among members or between members and the cooperative.
363
  
Negotiation is initially between the principals to the dispute.  The provision 
leaves open the possibility of setting up some sort of institutional 
mechanism within the cooperative for mediating disputes.  Article 28 
provides that after sixty days without resolution, the dispute may be taken 
to the administration of the cooperative, again under rules that may be 
organized by the cooperative.
364
  If this does not resolve the dispute, it may 
be taken to judicial bodies.
365
  Article 29 reminds all participants that 
disputes are to be resolved in accordance with Decreto-Ley No. 305 (rather 
than some other law or principle) along with the regulations developed to 
implement it and the internal cooperative governance documents.
366
 
The last articles of Decreto-Ley No. 305 provide a legal basis for 
dissolution and liquidation.  Articles 30 through 32 deal with dissolution 
and its legal effects.  As in conventional corporate law statutes, cooperative 
extinction is a two-step process: dissolution and liquidation.
367
  Dissolution 
is covered under Article 31,
368




ii.  Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley No. 306: Governmental Impositions and 
the Private Sector Contributions to the National Social Security System 
A companion statute of Decreto-Ley No. 305, Decreto-Ley No. 306, 
sets out an ambitious program for capturing revenues from the operations of 
cooperatives.
370
  Yet, given the extent of state control and management of 
both markets and entities in Decreto-Ley No. 305, it is hard to imagine 
 
 362 See id. art. 26.4. 
 363 See Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 27.  The provisions apply not just to the 
cooperative’s activities, but also to the interpretation of the application of the Decreto-Ley 
No. 305 and the subsequent implementing regulation to the cooperative. 
 364 Id. art. 28 (“[P]odrá someterse al conocimiento de los órganos de dirección o 
administración de la cooperativa; agotada esta vía, queda expedita la acción judicial, según 
la naturaleza del conflicto.”). 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. art. 29. 
 367 Id. art. 30. 
 368 Id. art. 31.  It provides for dissolution triggers, including by operation of the 
cooperative governance documents, by principles of impossibility of engaging in the work of 
the cooperative or its operation, upon the loss of critical leases or use permits, by judicial 
order, and for other lawful reasons.  Id. 
 369 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 32. 
 370 Decreto-Ley No. 306, supra note 56. 
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substantial market-derived revenues for cooperatives, the production of 
which is the premise that animates the financial optimism of Decreto-Ley 
No. 306.  Beyond that, of course, the object of this provision is the same as 
that of similar provisions in western welfare states: to tax economic 
enterprises with the social costs of maintaining public support services for 
individuals.  But taxes are transaction costs to enterprises and these present 
a substantial burden on new enterprises.  Taken together with the potential 
for substantial state control of cooperative activities and internal 
organization and the possibility that the State could rescind the entire 
experiment at its whim, the burden on the cooperative enterprises beyond 
usual business risks becomes formidable indeed.  Ironically, it is unlikely 
that there would have been sufficient political will to undertake even this 
anemic step toward a fundamentally sound Marxist-Leninist approach to 
collective activity without these institutional hobbling mechanisms.  Yet, 
the tensions that result make it as likely that this experiment will fail as a 
consequence of institutional impediments as it is likely that it can succeed 
because it serves the public interest in robust markets to satisfy basic 
consumer demands.   
 
iii.  Consejo de Ministros Decreto No. 309: the Implementing Regulations 
The Council of Minister’s Decreto No. 309 forms an integral part of 
the regulatory governance framework of the cooperative.  Articles 1 and 2 
set out the framework of the regulation.  Article 1 reinforces the character 
of the cooperative as a regulatory experiment and describes the objectives 
of the regulation: to specify rules for the formation, registration, operation, 
and dissolution of cooperatives.
371
  Article 2 emphasizes that, despite the 
rhetoric about the coordination of cooperatives within markets for consumer 
goods and services, cooperatives are subject to the supervision and 
enforcement of tax, pricing, accounting, and other applicable regulations.
372
  
Articles 3 through 6 regulate the constitutions of cooperatives.  The 
requirements are quite specific.  They mandate, for example, the 
articulation of both the activities to be undertaken by the cooperative and 
the expected territorial scope of the activity.
373
  Articles 3 through 5 detail 
the approval path to be taken for the constitution.  All cooperatives must be 
 
 371 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 1 (“El presente Reglamento esta-blece con 
carácter experimental el procedimiento para la constitución, registro, funcionamiento y 
extinción de las Cooperativas no Agropecuarias de primer grado.”). 
 372 Id. art. 2.  This appears to set the time for the rest of the implementing regulation—
that this experiment in markets-based private enterprises will be closely monitored by the 
State. 
 373 Id. art. 3.1.  Cooperatives founded on privatized state operations are subject to a 
special provision.  Id. art. 4. 
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reviewed and approved by the Council of Ministers.
374
  Of course, 
depending on the volume of applications, this procedure requiring local and 
national approvals may substantially slow down cooperative formation.  As 
a result, a less-than-optimal number of cooperatives may be formed, or 
equally as likely, cooperatives will be formed outside of the process.  The 
possibilities for corruption may thereby also be increased.  
As a further alternative, cooperatives “in formation” (en formación) 
may be tolerated while they await approval from the Council of Ministers.  
Those will only exist in a semi-official limbo, however, and as a result may 
also increase the temptation of corruption, because officials will have 
greater power to shut them down.  The possibility of a large number of 
cooperatives in formation is the object of Articles 7 through 10 of the 
regulation.  Article 7 contemplates the operation of cooperatives without 
official approval by permitting these entities to operate with an indication of 
their status.
375
  This permits the cooperative en formación to lawfully 
engage in a limited number of transactions to further the development of its 
internal organization.
376
  However, cooperatives en formación are not 
deemed to have acquired juridical personality,
377
 so the individual members 
remain personally liable during this formation period.  While the 
cooperative is in formation, and pending final approval, the local approval 
agency is empowered to negotiate the final form of the cooperative’s 
constitution.
378
  Among the objects of negotiation are (1) the social 
objective of the cooperative (posible objecto social); (2) the organization of 
cooperative financial structures (diseño financiero); (3) the property to be 
leased to acquired (inmuebles y otros bienes a arrendar);(4) goods or 
services to be sold (medios, utensilios y herramientas a vender); (5) goods 
or services to be utilized from the state sector (bienes o servicios que 
constituyen el pedido estatal); (6) the pricing of goods and services to be 
offered by the cooperative (los precios de bienes y servicios que se man 
tendrán  centralmente establecidos); (7) draft contracts or agreements (los 
proyectos de contratos de arrendamiento, usufructo, compraventa y otros); 
(8) if applicable deferments of lease payment provisions (si procede, la 
determinación del período de exoneración del pago del arrendamiento); (9) 
the materials (consumables) necessary for the production of goods or 
services to be rendered (los insumos principales a suministrar); (10) 
 
 374 Id. art. 6. 
 375 Id. art. 5 (“La Comisión Permanente para la Implementación y Desarrollo evalúa las 
solicitudes de creación de Cooperativas a que se refieren los artículos 3 y 4 del presente 
Decreto y con sus consi-deraciones presenta al Consejo de Ministros la pro-puesta sobre su 
incorporación o no a la experiencia.”). 
 376 Id. art. 8. 
 377 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 10 
 378 Id. art. 9. 
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environmental impacts (el impacto ambiental); (11) the ways in which the 
cooperative will comply with land use regulations (el cumplimiento de 
normas y regulaciones so bre el ordenamiento territorial); (12) the 
proposed governance framework (articles of association) (el proyecto de 
estatutos); and  (13) anything else considered appropriate (otros aspectos 
que se consideran de interés).
379
  Some of these items appear better suited 
for agricultural cooperatives (the prior establishment of which provided the 
framework for these new regulations).  Others might be evidence that the 
State intends to treat these cooperatives substantially like any other state 
enterprise within a highly centralized planned economy.  If that is true, the 
regulation considerably impedes all efforts to permit cooperatives to 
develop to serve consumer demand.  Instead, it appears that the planning 
needs of the State take precedence over the ability of the cooperative to 
adjust supply and price in the market.  This is especially true with respect to 
price and objects offered for sale or service.  If these require state approval 
before they can be changed, the ability of the cooperative to operate in 
markets is substantially gutted because cooperatives will not be able to 
adjust to fast-moving market conditions.  
Articles 11 and 12 set out the details for setting up the cooperative.  
The principal focus is on the content of the cooperative’s constitutional 
documents,
380
 and the acquisition of property.
381
  Article 13 focuses on the 
process of bidding for state assets.  The process is also heavily managed by 
the State, whose officials are given approval and supervisory authority.
382
 
The foundational character of the cooperative—its social purpose
383
—
is fleshed out in Articles 14 and 15.  Article 14 defines the social object 
simply as the commercial activities of the cooperative.
384
  This is possible 
because no cooperative can be licensed without approval of the State.  It 
stands to reason, then, that what the State approves must out of necessity 
also include a sufficient social objective. 
Articles 16 through 19 specify requirements for setting up the 
constitution of a cooperative and the role of the general assembly.  Articles 
20 through 22 deal with the articles of association (estatutos).  The 
 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. art. 11.  These include much of the basic information found in a corporate charter; 
in addition, they are also meant to lock in pricing where pricing discretion is not permitted as 
a condition of approval.  Id. art. 11(h) (“[L]os precios de bienes y servicios que se manten-
drán centralmente establecidos, cuando corresponda.”). 
 381 Id. art. 12. 
 382 Id. art. 13.1. 
 383 Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 2. 
 384 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 14 (“El objeto social de la Cooperativa 
comprende las producciones, prestaci n de servicios o la actividad de comercializaci n, a 
 ue se dedicar  de acuerdo con lo  ue se autorice.”).  Article 15 provides the basis for the 
use of trademarks and the like.  Id. art. 15. 
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constitution of the cooperative appears to function like a corporate charter 
while the estatutos seems to have been assigned the function of corporate 
bylaws, but with substantially more detail about the business to be 
undertaken and substantially more limits on the flexibility of operations.  A 
notary (notario) prepares the constitution,
385
 the costs of which are borne by 
the founding members.
386
  The constitution is filed with the Registro 
Mercantil,
387
 and the estatutos must be approved by the General 
Assembly.
388
  The estatutos include the fundamental regulations for the 
operation of the cooperative and form part of the constitution.
389
  The 
minimum content of the estatutos is prescribed in Article 21.
390
  These 
include many of the items usually found in both corporate charters and 
bylaws.  Article 22 presents rules for the modification of the estatutos.  
These include super-majority provisions for cooperatives with more than 
twenty members.
391
  For smaller cooperatives, such rules can be made to 




Chapter III of Decreto No. 309 is devoted to issues involving the 
members of the cooperative,
393
 including the minimum rights of 
members.
394
  These minimum rights include rights touching on labor 
obligations of members as well as rights relating to their interests in the 
cooperative.  Article 29 focuses on member obligations, including the 
obligation to provide the labor services that represent the “benefit of the 
bargain,” in exchange for which the individual obtained an interest in the 
cooperative.
395
  Article 30 lists the basis on which a person can lose his 
status as a cooperative member (including, among other things, expulsion, 
death, retirement, and incapacity).
396
  Articles 67 through 68 elaborate on 
member discipline, which includes fines, suspension, or expulsion.
397
  
Worker discipline is detailed in Article 69. 
 
 385 Id. art. 16. 
 386 Id. art. 19. 
 387 Id. art. 23. 
 388 Id. art. 18. 
 389 Id. art. 20. 
 390 Article 21 includes items such as the number of members in the cooperative, the 
requirements of membership, banking information, distributions for members, conflict 
resolution, amendments to the statutes, and procedures for dissolution and liquidation.  
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 21. 
 391 Id. art. 22. 
 392 Id. art. 24. 
 393 Id. arts. 26–30. 
 394 Id. art. 28. 
 395 Id. art. 29. 
 396 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 30. 
 397 Id. arts. 67–68. 
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Articles 33 through 45 provide rules relating to the governance organs 
of the cooperative.  Much of this is similar to the provisions of corporate 
rules for private companies (such as ordinary and special meetings of 
collective bodies, quorum rules, notice of meetings, and agendas), though 
some of the rules are more specific.  For example, collective bodies are 
required to have an odd number of members.
398
  The General Assembly is 
the supreme organ of cooperative authority.  It elects a president.  It has a 
long list of attributes specified in the regulation.
399
  The General 
Assembly’s authority resembles in a general way that of shareholders.  The 
authority of the President of the General Assembly is also specified,
400
 most 
of which resembles that of the chair of a board of directors.  The authority 
of the Secretary is also specified.
401
  The Junta Directiva appears to act like 
the standing committee of the General Assembly.
402
  The administrator (or 
the administrative council) functions like a chief executive officer.
403
  
Lastly, the Control and Audit Commission functions like a legal and audit 
committee of a board of directors.
404
  
Articles 46 through 59 deal with issues of cooperative capital and 
accounting.  Cooperatives account for the operations using the Normas 
Cubanas de Información Financiera.
405
  The cooperative is required to 
prepare an annual business plan,
406
 though its scope appears to be more like 
the plans required for ministerial action in a centrally-planned economy 
than in a market driven one.  This again suggests that the pull of traditional 
patterns of planning may hamper the already small opening that exists for 
market based economic activity within the consumer retail sector. 
Dividend distribution is tightly managed.
407
  Decreto No. 309 
effectively mandates that at least thirty percent of profits (understood in this 
case as revenues net of expenses and taxes) above reserves set aside to act 
like a corporate stated capital account
408
 are meant to be reinvested by the 
 
 398 Id. art. 33.1(2).  
 399 Id. arts. 37(a)–(j). 
 400 Id. 
 401 Id. arts. 39(a)–(d). 
 402 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, arts. 40–41. 
 403 Id. arts. 43–44. 
 404 Id. art. 45. 
 405 Id. art. 52 (“La Cooperativa est  obligada a llevar la contabilidad de sus operaciones a 
efectos fiscales, a partir de las Normas Cubanas de Informaci n  inanciera, con las 
especificidades que al respecto se establezcan.”); see also Larry Catá Backer, Cuba Issues 
New Cooperatives Regulations: Tentative Experiment in Socialist Market Enterprise or a 
Privatization of State Management?, LAW END DAY (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/creating-legal-structure-for-experiment.html. 
 406 Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 54. 
 407 Id. arts. 56–62. 
 408 See id. art. 56.1. 
 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:527 (2013) 
606 
cooperative in a number of specified areas.
409
  Reserves are meant to 
provide funds for payment of workers in lean years and to pay 
obligations.
410
  Advances are possible, and Article 60 specifies the 
proportion of distribution to members.
411
  Lastly, Articles 70 through 74 
provide procedures and structures for mediating conflict,
412
 while Articles 
75 through 77 deal with dissolution and liquidation of cooperatives.
413
 
iv.  The Ministerial Resolutions 
Two ministerial resolutions were included in the basic package of 
cooperative resolutions.  The first resolution provides the procedures for 




The second resolution deals with issues of taxation, accounting, and 
pricing for goods and services provided by cooperatives.
415
  Its object is to 
embed cooperatives within the state-based planning for prices and 
production.  This resolution is based on the premise that prices are set by 
the market unless they are otherwise required to be set at a particular 
amount by the State.
416
  Prices may be set in CUP (pesos cubanos) or CUC 
(pesos convertibles).
417
  The State continues to regulate the price margins 
between wholesale and retail markets.
418
  This can significantly limit 
competition among cooperatives.  It would follow that the State may be 
discouraging price competition, evidenced by a regulatory web with the 
potential to significantly affect the development of markets. The 
consequence might be that cooperatives are expected to operate like 
 
 409 Id. art. 57.1(3) (“La diferencia con el 100% de las utilidades que no se distribuyen a 
los socios, se destinan al fondo de operaciones, inversiones, actividades socio-culturales, 
incrementar el fondo de contingencia y otros, seg n se aprueben en los estatutos.”). 
 410 Id. art. 59 (“Las Cooperativas que tengan pérdidas las solventarán, en primera 
instancia, por medio de la reserva para cubrir contingencias.”). 
 411 Id. art. 60 (basing the proportion on the complexity, amount, and quality of the work 
of each of the cooperative’s members).  The operationalization of this standard remains 
unspecified. 
 412 Complaints are to be made in writing, and provisions for notification are specified.  
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, arts. 70–71.  The administrative organ mediating disputes 
usually has thirty days to render a decisión.  Id. art. 73.1. 
 413 Under these provisions, the supervising agencies are assigned responsibility for 
dissolution.  Id. art. 75.  A liquidation committee established by the General Assembly has 
responsibility for winding up.  Id. art. 76. 
 414 Ministerio de Económica y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12, supra note 56. 
 415 Ministerios de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12, supra note 56. 
 416 Id. ¶ 12. 
 417 Id. ¶ 13. 
 418 See Alejandro, supra note 105, at 63 (“En adición a estas limitantes se encuentra las 
restricciones de divisas que tiene el país para apoyar el microcrédito y un mercado de 
insumos mayoristas, tan necesario para el desarrollo de las Pymes.”). 
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privatized state sector organs.  But this essentially defeats the object of the 
redirection of the Cuban economy at the heart of the objectives of the 
Lineamientos.  It also suggests the triumph of the factions within the Cuban 
elite that view any change with great suspicion. 
IV.  THEORY AND ENGAGEMENT: CUBA AND COOPERATIVES IN 
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
The development of a cooperative theory—which started as a solution 
to the problem of organizing collective activity within a closely cabined 
retail sector in which only the state can own productive property—
highlights the peculiarities of Cuba’s economic reform and engagement in 
the global economy, and its distance from the path followed by the Chinese 
Communist Party since the 1980s.  The December 2012 Regulations sought 
to establish this theoretical vision, adhering closely to the narrowly 
constrained guidelines (Lineamientos) for economic reorganization.  Cuba 
is seeking to forge a third path between the market-oriented economic 
model of the West and the pattern of economic control developed by the 
great Asian Marxist-Leninist states.  It remains committed to a significant 
degree of central planning and suspicious of autonomous capital 
aggregations and of individuals not directly controlled or managed by the 
state.  It has sought to build these notions into its international and regional 
economic planning to the same extent it seeks to base its internal economic 
model on those principles.
419
  
The centerpiece of this internationalization of the Cuban model is 
ALBA.  But the internationalization is itself grounded in the exportation of 
a new model of economic organization based on the primacy of the state as 
the manager of economic activities and in which the private sector plays a 
small and well-managed role.
420
  ALBA appears to be moving to reflect the 
two-part division of economic activity within Cuba: a public sector 
populated with state-owned corporate enterprises and a private sector 
focused on small retail professions.
421
 
ALBA is firmly grounded on the idea that internationalization must be 
 
 419 See Backer & Molina, supra note 36. 
 420 Larry Catá Backer, Globalization and the Socialist Multinational: Cuba at the 
Intersection of Business and Human Rights, in 1 HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY CUBA: 
ECONOMY, POLITICS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND GLOBALIZATION (Mauricio A. Font & Carlos Riobó 
eds., 2012). 
 421 See generally Nick Hoskyns & David McKnight, Another Way Is Possible: Fair 
Trade, Cooperation and Solidarity, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6745.  Hoskyns and McKnight, when describing the 
idea of fair trade as a fundamental principle of ALBA trade policy used the example of 
Venezuelan cooperatives as an example of the concept at work, and noted in connection with 
his thought about Nicaraguan contributions to ALBA, that “Cuba is looking at the 
cooperatives in Nicaragua as a model to develop their economy.”  Id. 
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effectuated through states and public action rather than individuals and 
private markets.
422
  ALBA is not necessarily opposed to all private activity, 
just those activities that have become liberated from precise control by the 
state.  ALBA is thus founded on the notion that traditional divisions 
between public and private sectors remains valuable and important, and that 
certain sectors, traditionally overseen by the state as agent for territorially 
based communities, are essential for the maximization of the welfare of 
people organized into states.
423
  To this is added a fundamental distrust of 
private markets that are not strictly controlled and managed by the state.
424
  
ALBA is both a system of free trade and as a nexus point for legal and 
political resistance to economic globalization and legal internationalism 
sponsored by developed states.
425
  In this respect, ALBA reflects the core 
premises of the Cuban economic model: a suspicion of markets, a belief in 
the primacy of the state as the welfare-maximizing source of economic 
decision-making, and a mistrust of individual decision-making. 
The organization of the Cuban economy and its understanding of the 
notion that property remains a prerogative of the State, embedded in Cuba’s 
regional foreign relations.  Critical to that effort is the form of organization 
that ALBA has developed for the structuring of economic life in the 
 
 422 ALBA is said to institutionalize radical conflict necessary to build an integrated 
political space in Latin America, develop a model of twenty-first century socialism, and 
support the radical revolutionary processes within member states.  See Joel D. Hirst, What Is 
the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas and What Does It Do?, AMERICAS Q.,  
http://www.americasquarterly.org/HIRST/ARTICLE (last visited Mar. 20, 2013); 
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, ALBA-TCP (Oct. 17, 2009), 
http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/fundamental-principles-tcp. (“The fortification of the 
State like central actor of the economy from a country at all the levels, facing the opposite 
private practices the public interest, such as the monopoly, oligopoly, the cartelization, 
hoarding, speculation and usury.”). 
 423 Fernando Bossi, ¿Qué es el ALBA? Construyendo el ALBA desde los Pueblos [What is 
the ALBA? Building the ALBA from Peoples], ALBA-TCP ¶¶ 3.5, 4–6 (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=470. 
 424 Fifth Extraordinary Summit of the ALBA Final Declaration, ALBA-TCP (Apr. 17, 
2009), 
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1982. 
 425 Bossi, supra note 423.  Thus, in framing the fundamental principles of ALBA, it was 
stated: 
Vindicating expressed the revolutionary processes and of liberation in the firm 
decision of the peoples of our America, to break with the hegemonic schemes and 
to surpass the neoliberal model and its effects in the region that implies to finish 
with the logic of the accumulation, the profit, the gain, the competition and the 
financial speculation, as well as to advance in the construction of an alternative 
project based on the cooperation, principles of solidarity, complementarity and 
respect to the sovereignty and the self-determination of the peoples. 
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, supra note 422. 
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transnational sphere, especially in the context of regional integration.  A 
central framing element of that organization is what ALBA has designated 
grannacionales.
426
  Grannacionales, like cooperatives, are a form of capital 




The conception of the grannacional is understood as a political project 
with three components: (1) historical and geopolitical, (2) socio-economic, 
and (3) ideological.
428
  The first of these, the historical and geopolitical 
premise, is grounded in the sense that the business of Latin America’s 
construction, which started with the nineteenth century wars of liberation, is 
unfinished.  Its object is integration at the supra-national level, that is, to 
understand grannacionales as the formal expression of efforts to create a 
single nation. The second, the socio-economic component, incorporates an 
understanding that the commercial activity and its traditional forms can be 
used as a functional means to reach the political ends of integration.  
Grannacionales are to serve as the great vehicles for state-directed 
development.
429
  The third, the ideological premise, envisions the 
grannacional as functional integration devices advancing political and 
economic aims of the state.  Specifically, the objective of  grannacional 
enterprise is to manifest a united front by generating a multi-national block 
for the structuring of sovereign regional  politics. This parallels the 
conceptual framework of cooperatives.  And, of course, this approach 
produces consequences when looked at from the perspective of 
conventional economic globalization.  Efficiency is measured differently 
than in classical economics or under the framework of conventional 
economic globalization.  It is understood only in relation to the aims of the 
state in meeting its political goals, measured to some extent on the state’s 




 426 ALBA Grannacional, supra note 113. 
 427 See Empresas Grannacionales [Grand-National Companies], EMBAJADA DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DE CUBA [EMBASSY OF CUBA], http://www.embajadacuba.com.ve/alba/empresas-
grannacionales/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
 428  Conceptualización de Proyecto y Empresa Grannacional en el Marco del Alba: 
Documentos de la VI Cumbre [Conceptualization of the Project and Company Grannacional 
Under ALBA: Documents of the VI Summit], ALBA-TCP (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2074. 
 429 Fundamental Principles of the Peoples´’ Trade Treaty-TCP, supra note 422, princ. 15 
(“Execution of joint investments in trade issues that can adopt the form of Grand National 
companies.  The association of state companies of different countries to impel a sovereign 
development and of mutual benefit.”). 
 430 See Siete empresas grannacionales del Alba benefician a un mercado de 75 millones 
de personas [Seven Companies of Alba Grannacionales Benefit a Market of 75 Million 
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Both these goals are also constructs of state policy.  This approach 
somewhat inverts classical economic concepts. 
The grannacionales’ theoretical framework is implemented through 
grannacionales projects (proyectos grannacionales) (PG) and 
grannacionales companies (empresas grannacionales) (EG).
431
  The 
relationship between PGs and EGs follow the organization of the economy 
within Cuba—one in which economic sectors (including social and cultural 
production) are organized through ministries charged with planning and 
control, and specific production is devolved to economic units organized in 
“corporate” form.  PGs form the structuring element for reorganization of 
key sectors of state activity.
432
  These include  key fields, encompassing 
political, cultural, economic, scientific, and industrial activity.  This 
organization is grounded in ALBA’s normative construction of principles of 
“just trade” and solidarity commerce.
433
  The basis of just trade and 
solidarity, also foundations for cooperative operation, are based on 
principles of barter transactions,  non-reciprocity in trade relations, and 
differential treatment of trade partners to advance national and development 




EGs are entities created to carry out the economic and trade activity 
organized through PGs.  If PGs are meant to organize productive activities, 
EGs are meant to implement them in an orderly way.  EGs are SOEs, 
establishing separate juridical persons, interests measured through 
ownership by participating ALBA Member States.
435
  But they might be 
organized in other ways by special legislation or as a ministerial 
department.  PG and EG projects are not limited to the supra-national 
level—single-state PGs and EGs may be created as long as they are 
consonant with ALBA principles and goals.  The relationship between PGs 
and EGs is not strictly linear.  It is clear that every EG must derive from a 
 
 431 Backer, supra note 420. 
 432 For an example from the medical sector, see Qué es el proyecto Grannacional 
“Centro Regulador de Medicamentos del ALBA”.ALBAmed? [What is Grannacional Project 
“Center of Drug Regulatory ALBA” ALBAMED?], ALBAMED (Sept. 7, 2009, 10:40 AM), 
http://salud.alianzabolivariana.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&It
emid=56. 
 433 See Norman Girvan, ALBA, PETROCARIBE and CARICOM: Issues in a New 
Dynamic, in CARICOM: POLICY OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 218–234 
(Kenneth O. Hall et al. eds., 2010). 
 434 Backer, supra note 420. 
 435 ALBA Grannacional, supra note 113 (“Las Empresas Grannacionales no se definen 
como tales por el ámbito donde se hayan constituido, ni por su composición accionaria, sino 
por su naturaleza constitutiva. Esto quiere decir que podrán existir Empresas Grannacionales 
entre dos países (Bilaterales), entre tres países (Trilaterales), entre cuatro países 
(Multilaterales).”). 
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PG, but not every PG will require the establishment of an EG.  The EG and 
PG embody alternatives to the model of private multinational enterprises.  
They substitute the state and public welfare maximization for private 
shareholders and profit maximization as a foundational ordering element.  
EGs are said to invert the traditional maximization model by seeking to 
maximize the welfare of the objects of economic (or other) activity, rather 
than those involved in the production or financing of that activity.  EGs are 
organized as autonomous state enterprises that might enter into joint 
venture arrangements with private sector enterprises and whose primary 
focus is within the ALBA zone, with “excess” activity directed outbound.  
The effect is to develop a regionalist globalization model with economic 
activity directed by states rather than through markets.  This suggests a new 
face for traditional command economy activity, but it is unclear whether it 
also suggests a change in function. 
EGs embrace the form of organization and production of private 
multinational corporations, including supply and production chain 
principles, and resource procurement optimization.  But their intense 
connection to states makes them both regulatory and commercial vehicles.  
Pricing grounded in notions of “fair price,” an ambiguous term likely based 
on principles of just trade and solidarity as defined by the state.  Fair price 
might best be understood as a political rather than a conventional economic 
principle.  The idea of fair price, paralleling the Cuban theory of a tight 
integration between centralized planning and the state enterprises as 
vehicles through which central planning is effectuated, is grounded in 
harmony and deep management rather than competition and markets.
436
 
This theory is in line with ALBA’s core notion of the conflation of 
politics and economics.
437
  That, in turn, is in line with ALBA’s core 
political principle of the inseparability of public (sovereign) activity and 
market activity of state or private actors.  The concept of the grannacional, 
then, internationalizes the organizational forms and premises of the 
Lineamientos.  It internationalizes state-based central planning model 
within a regional trade zone.  It adopts conventional organizational forms 
from emerging private markets framework of economic globalization.  It 
changes conventional welfare maximization model from a focus on the 




Together PGs and EGs represent the state sector in the international 
arena.  But, as in Cuba, ALBA also contemplates a private sector.
439
  That 
 
 436 LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1–10. 
 437 Backer & Román, supra note 36. 
 438 Id. 
 439 See Ivan Barrios, Un 84% de las transacciones que ejecuta El ALBA proviene del 
sector privado [84% of Transactions Running ALBA is Private], YVKE MUNDIAL [YVKE 
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sector, however, is understood to be most valuable when closely tied to the 
state.
440
  ALBA reflects the idea, as well, of transnational and national 
private sector enterprises organized as cooperatives and similar entities, 
built around transnational commitments to public “purchases [which] are a 
planning tool for the development and promotion of national production 
that must be strengthen through participation, cooperation and the joint 
execution of purchases when convenient.”
441
  The ALBA Fundamental 
Principles also commit ALBA states to “favoring to the communities, 
communes, cooperatives, companies of social production, small and 
medium companies.  The Joint promotion towards exports markets of our 




The duplication of the Cuban organization model now has a parallel in 
Venezuela, where cooperatives are organized by the State to serve the local 
demand of neighborhoods in the production of consumer goods, the training 
and capital is provided by the State, and the cooperative is managed to 
produce an aggregate benefit to the people contributing their labor.
443
  As in 
 
WORLD] (Sept. 25, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/node/232106 (“The 
Executive Secretary of ALBA confirmed that ALBA remained committed to a private sector 
within ALBA state economies, which remains a driving force in local economies and 
contributed 84% $110 million in Sucre zone transactions.”). 
 440 In 2007, for instance, then-President Chavez declared that Venezuelan socialism did 
not exclude private property but rather contemplated a closer relationship between the state 
and private sector reflected in proposals for constitutional reform in Venezuela.  Chávez: 
Alianza estratégica Estado-sector privado es una de las propuestas de la Reforma 
Constitucional [Chavez: New Partnership State-Private Sector is One of the Proposals of the 
Constitutional Reform], APORREA [CLUB] (July 27, 2007, 11:04 AM) 
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n98609.html (“[E]l jefe del Estado venezolano anunció 
que el acercamiento entre el sector privado y el Estado es una de las propuestas que será 
presentada en la reforma constitucional.”) 
 441 Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, supra note 422, princ. 14 
 442 Id. princ. 9. 
 443 A participant describing MUDEBAR, a women’s cooperative producing textiles for 
local consumption, explained: 
In reality, we didn’t have money or anything until the government offered us credit 
so that we could achieve our objective, which was to associate ourselves as a 
cooperative.  The process was a call made by the government to participate in a 
social mission called Vuelvan Caras, a call to all the women who were in their 
houses without work, simply doing domestic work, doing housework until god 
called, watching our grandchildren and taking care of the house and when all of 
the women were called to the mission we began taking the courses. We took really 
good courses, and from that they prepared us to become a cooperative. 
Radio al Revés, Cooperatives in Venezuela Promote Solidarity, Equality and Dignity, 
UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Apr. 6, 2011, 10:40 PM), 
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/2988-cooperatives-in-venezuela-
promote-solidarity-equality-and-dignity.  MUDEBAR was a product of the efforts of a PG, 
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Cuba, these are closely connected conceptually to agricultural 
cooperatives.
444
  And like the emerging Cuban cooperatives, these are 
meant to serve political, social, and economic objectives—all in the service 
of the local people (micro-planning) in a way that furthers the larger 
objectives of the State (macro-planning).
445
  Within ALBA, this process is 
socio-political—capital is aggregated in corporations that are vehicles for 
state trade policy and economic management and that the non-state sector is 




Cuban cooperatives thus serve a political purpose beyond the internal 
organization of the Cuban domestic economy.  They provide a basis for the 
division and organization of labor within Cuba in ways that are compatible 
with Cuba’s efforts to internationalize its vision of a socialist command 
economy.  Organizations that privilege capital are consigned to the state 
sector as the only location for capital ownership and exploitation.  The 
private sector may aggregate labor but not capital.  For that sector, the labor 
cooperative offers the model of organization best suited to its circumstances 
and to the fundamental Marxist notion that the proletariat ought to focus on 
the offer of its labor in the context of collective economic activity.  Capital 
is to be supplied by the State as the guardian of that means of production for 
all people.  As a consequence, the state sector has the responsibility of 
organizing the economy, and controlling macro-economic policies and 
operations at the national and regional levels.  The private sector is to 
provide micro responses to local needs under the supervision of the State, 
which supplies capital and ensures policy purity.  The EGs and PGs are the 
analogues to Cuba’s state sector.  Cuban cooperatives are meant to join 
their counterparts in Venezuela and elsewhere to focus on the local retail 
 
meant to organize the private clothing sector at the neighborhood level to meet national 
planning needs. 
 444 LUCIA MICHELUTTI, SMALL-SCALE FARMERS UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS: 
VENEZUELA AND THE ALBA PEOPLE’S TRADE AGREEMENT 11–18 (2012), available at 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16516IIED.pdf?. 
 445 Revés, supra note 443.  Describing a cooperative that runs neighborhood buses, a 
person noted: 
So we organized an assembly in the neighborhoods and those assemblies decided 
what the bus routes were going to be and who would be some of the workers.  And 
out of those buses we also had political discussions and distributed fliers. So we 
broke with this business model of division, the separation into a business that gives 
a service and those who receive it. 
Id.  It is not clear, of course, whether these stories are ordinary or exceptional and meant to 
serve hortatory purposes. 
 446 See, e.g., Ken Cole, ALBA: A Process of Concientazión, 2 INT’L. J. CUBAN STUD. 31–
41 (2008), available at  
http://cubanstudies.plutojournals.org/Portals/8/Issues/sissue_2_bw.pdf#page=31. 
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sectors to the extent permitted by state policy. 
More generally, combined with the opening of the non-state sector for 
small scale goods and service businesses, the regulatory framework 
suggested by the Lineamientos seeks to provide a basic framework for 
reconceptualizing the economic organization of Cuba.  What emerges is an 
outline of an economic structure that is, even among Marxist-Leninist 
states, somewhat unique.  It confirms the state’s role as owner of the 
productive capital of the nation.  This capital can be utilized directly 
through allocations by state ministries, or decisions about allocation and 
pricing can be devolved to sub-units—corporations, grannacionales, or 
mixed enterprises. 
This re-worked economic model does provide for the creation (or 
better yet, the recognition and regularization) of a private sector 
economy.
447
  But that sector is understood to be small and limited to the 
retail sector.  The formal rules for its operation are structured to make large 
or independent activity difficult.  This private sector is not meant to grow 
large enough to challenge the state sector.  Nor is it meant to strip the state 
of its control of capital.  As such, this sector is tightly regulated.  However, 
within the scope of its permitted operations, the state is allowing a limited 
range of aggregation of activity.  In the form of cooperatives, individuals 
engaging in permitted private activities may aggregate their labor and the 
objects they may sell for mutual gain.  This system is then internationalized 
within the context of ALBA ideology. 
For non-Marxist systems, the ability of individuals to aggregate labor 
power the way that financial institutions aggregate capital could prove 
useful in reshaping the usual marginalization of labor within globalization.  
But the model of the Cuban cooperative—situated within the confines of a 
system that remains suspicious of non-state economic activity and retains 
control of goods markets necessary for the sort of activities that are the 
lifeblood of cooperatives—is likely to substantially reduce the utility of 
these ventures to effectuate Cuba and CCP’s goals.  The Cubans appear to 
insist on doing Lenin one better: Lenin would have combined private 
interest with state supervision,
448
 the Cubans insist on private enterprise 
through state control with little privilege. 
Conceptually, the cooperative fits nicely within Cuba’s efforts to 
develop a complex and well-integrated program of economic organization 
that means to tie local activity first to national socio-economic goals and 
 
 447 In effect, the reworked economic model could be understood as seeking to recognize 
and regulate the black market economy.  See PÉREZ LÓPEZ, supra note 293. 
 448 LENIN, supra note 16, at 91–92 (“For we have now found that degree of combination 
of private interest, of private commercial interest, with state supervision and control, that 
degree of subordination to the common interests which was formerly a stumbling block for 
very many socialist.”). 
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then in a parallel manner, to international economic activity coordinated 
through networks of state-to-state arrangements.  The cooperative could 
serve as an important ingredient in the construction of these economic 
structures, providing an alternative to the private markets principles of 
economic globalization, grounded in state control capital directly and 
indirectly through SOEs and individual aggregation of labor.  This 
organization is then replicated in the international arena where state-to-state 
transactions grounded in principles of popular welfare are organized 
through state sector enterprises with goods and services delivered at the 
retail level through individuals and private cooperatives. 
But the elegance of the system bumps up against the realities of Cuban 
politics—especially the reluctance of the CCP’s left wing to move far from 
the economic model that has been in place since the 1960s.  What this 
tendency produces is some of the outward forms of a new system but one 
that is hobbled by the insistence of perhaps too great a space for central 
planning and control by the state sector and too small a space for the 
operation of private enterprise.  This is well-illustrated by the differences 
between the Lineamientos as proposed and as adopted relating to the 
provisions on cooperatives.  The regulations adopted in late 2012 
underscore this point.  Both are driven by a mistrust of the power of 
individuals to aggregate resources without a substantial degree of 
supervision, management, and control by the state.  It is also grounded in a 
mistrust of principles of social obligation to serve state interests in the 
absence of state direction.  Indeed, the fear of operation in corporate form, 
in aggregations of people and capital that appear autonomous of the state 
(something permitted in China) may do more to reduce the success of this 
opening than any measure of Cuba’s external enemies.  Sometimes a mania 
for control may prove fatally counterproductive to the maintenance of that 
control.  The Chinese Communist Party understood this in 1978 (though it 
took a generation to produce results); it is not clear that the CCP is willing 
to open itself to that lesson. 
Thus, the greatest threat to the development of a proletarian 
corporation comes, ironically enough, from within Cuba rather than from 
outside.  The reluctance to abandon a state based central planning model for 
a model in which the non-state sector is given more autonomy in economic 
decision-making, even within the general parameters of Marxist-Leninist 
economic organization, is a premise that pervades the final form of the 
Lineamientos and the implementing regulations.  The debates about the 
problem of the cooperative and corporation in Cuba highlights a 
fundamental conundrum of Cuban economic development—the extent to 
which the current economic situation, and the change of leadership, has 
made possible a reconceptualization of what policy and policy discussion is 
permissible because it falls within the context of revolutionary thought and 
what policy alternatives remain outside and therefore likely to be dismissed 
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  Until recently, what fell within the Revolution 
was very narrowly circumscribed.  Necessity, and perhaps time, has 
permitted something like a small broadening of what might fall within the 
Revolution and thus be a permissible approach to reform.  Moreover, Cuba, 
especially in the context of the Lineamientos, must still confront the basic 
issue that has been troublesome since the first days after the 1959 
Revolution: if something falls outside the Revolution, does it necessarily or 
invariably constitute an anti-revolutionary act, or might there be a space 
outside the revolution that is not against the revolution?
450
  Cuban 
economists looking at the cooperative have suggested yet another 
interpretation: the issue is not whether there is a space outside the 
Revolution that is not against the Revolution; instead the question is what 
constitutes revolutionary space. 
The proceedings of the Sixth Party Congress showed just how little 
revolutionary space there is.  On the one hand, in theory, it appears that 
revolutionary space has indeed been growing.  That growth has permitted 
the development of new forms of economic organization that may find use 
not just in developing Marxist-Leninist states but also in other states where 
aggregations of labor, production of other economic forces might be 
profitable.  More importantly, it parallels trends in developed states that are 
also tentatively moving toward opening a space for stakeholder models of 
corporate activity, including the enactment of “benefit corporation” statutes. 
But the CCP appears less mindful of Lenin’s comment with respect to 
cooperatives and free enterprise within a socialist system: 
We went too far when we reintroduced [the New Economic Policy], 
but not because we attached too much importance to the principal of 
free enterprise and trade—we want too far because we lost sight of 
 
 449 Fidel Castro, Address at the Closing Session of a Series of Meetings of Intellectuals 
and Cultural Figures at the José Marti National Library (June 30, 1961), translated in THE 
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIDEL CASTRO’S 
REVOLUTION 117 (Julio García Luis ed., 2008) available at 
http://www.oceanbooks.com.au/static/pdfs/cuban_revolution_reader_TOC.pdf (“Within the 
revolution, everything; against the revolution, nothing.  Against the revolution, nothing, 
because the revolution also has its rights, and the first right of the revolution is the right to 
exist, and no one can oppose the revolution’s right to exist.”). 
 450 See Larry Catá Backer, Freemansons in Cuba: New Scholarship, LAW END DAY (June 
30, 2010) (discussing Jorge Romeu, The Cuban Freemasons in the Development of Civil 
Society and Political Opening, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CUBA: ECONOMY, 
POLITICS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 420).  This tension also evidences 
itself in the struggles of Afro-Cubans for a spiritual space.  See generally Zoya Kocur, The 
Sparks of Civil Society in Cuba: Afro-Cuban Cultural Production, Art Collectives, and the 
Struggle for a New Public Sphere, in POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 333 (Mauricio Font ed., 
2011), available at http://www.cubaproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/PoliticsandCivSocFinal.pdf. 
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the cooperatives, because we now underrate cooperatives, because 
we are already beginning to forget the vast importance of the 
cooperatives . . . .
451
 
The tentativeness with which the state organs have created its 
cooperative experiment, and the thoroughness with which it has enveloped 
the operation of cooperatives within the framework of state economic 
oversight suggest a reluctance to exploit the potential of cooperatives as 
both bridges to market efficiency and as vehicles for the internalization of 
social objectives in economic relations that serve Cuban state ideology and 
emerging global consensus on corporate social responsibility.
452
  But even 
the possibility of discourse about cooperatives within an altogether too 
small operational space is a step in the right direction.  Until the role of the 
State is better clarified, and until structures are developed to permit the 
State to trust the economic instincts of individuals acting both for social and 
personal advantage, the cooperative, will continue to run the risk of 
becoming no more than an instrumentality of the State. And these failures 
will be borne by Cuban cooperative members even as it they contribute the 
fruits of cooperative labor to the State. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Is it possible to theorize a proletarian corporation?  Is it possible to 
transpose theory into a working model of a proletarian corporation using the 
cooperative as a platform?  Will cooperatives make a difference and set the 
stage for the development of new forms of economic aggregations that 
could substitute, to some extent, the benefits the corporate form offers 
private individuals?  The Cubans have been attempting to make the 
cooperative a reality within their highly regulated system.  Theoretically, 
the cooperative could be a very useful means of modernizing the Cuban 
economic model within the broad framework of Marxist-Leninist state 
organization.  Indeed, it is well understood that the Cuban form of the 
cooperative has strong Leninist roots.
453
  Cooperatives offer a means of 
aggregating products and labor in ways that do not threaten the national 
control of the direction of national economic policy.  Nor does it impede 
state planning with respect to macroeconomics.  Limiting the financial 
cooperative (the corporation) to the State, while permitting other forms of 
aggregation, provides at least some method of communal activity at the 
simplest levels of economic activity that could stimulate small-scale retail 
 
 451 LENIN, supra note 15, ch. I. 
 452 Robert Dobrohoczki, Co-operatives as Spaces of Cultural Resistance and 
Transformation in Alienated Consumer Society (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/congreso06/conf3_dobrohoczki.pdf. 
 453 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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activity and increase public welfare in Cuba. 
The cooperative arose as a part of a solution to the stresses on the 
Cuban economic model that sought to retain its socialist character while 
also acknowledging that the conventional system of direct state control of 
virtually all aspects of economic activity was not working.  But the solution 
was constrained by the conceptual limits of restructuring, one in which the 
State would retain the power to aggregate capital and in which private 
economic activity was conceived as limited to a small and local retail 
sector.   
This Article considered the cooperative as an alternative to the 
corporate form, suggesting both its benefits and its limitations, even within 
the confines of Cuban political ideology.  It examined the development of 
new theoretical approaches, the use of the old conventional agricultural 
cooperative as a platform for innovation, and the limited success of 
transposing theoretical innovation first into the guidelines for reshaping the 
economy (the Lineamientos) and then into a regulatory system for 
cooperatives adopted in late 2012.  This Article concluded with an analysis 
of the internationalization of the Cuban approach to private capital 
aggregation in light of Cuba’s regional trade structures and the realities of 
globalization, as well as the lingering effects of the tensions, still 
unresolved, about the nature and limits of the role of the State in managing 
or controlling economic activity.  This Article thus ends where it started, 
with the institutional limitations of the current Cuban approach and its 
effects of both spurring innovation and constraining it.  As long as Cubans 
continue to politicize the property component of corporate ownership, and 
split economic aggregation between aggregations of capital in corporate 
form operated as instrumentalities of the State, and aggregations of labor 
operated as highly regulated private cooperatives, it will not be able to meet 
its objectives under the Lineamientos or realize the promise in the new 
regulations.  If the State is the only capitalist and labor is dependent on the 
State for the ownership of the fruits of the cooperative’s efforts, then the 
structural asymmetries of a capital-privileging regime remains.  Yet 
reinforcing this system of State capitalism supported at the margins by labor 
cooperatives perpetuates the dominance of capital in a socialist society, 
denies the cooperative the space to meet its potential to rebalance the 
relationship between labor and capital in production, and ultimately may 
make it much more difficult for the functional realization of the potential of 
this experiment in cooperatives. 
 
